Corporate Profit Shifting and the Multinational Enterprise by Webber, Stuart
Stuart Webber
The PhD School of Economics and Management PhD Series 23.2012
PhD
 Series 23.2012
Corporate Profi
t S
hifting and the M
ultinational Enterprise
copenhagen business school
handelshøjskolen
solbjerg plads 3
dk-2000 frederiksberg
danmark
www.cbs.dk
ISSN 0906-6934
Print ISBN:  978-87-92842-72-5
Online ISBN: 978-87-92842-73-2
Corporate Profit Shifting and the 
Multinational Enterprise
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate Profit Shifting and the Multinational 
Enterprise 
 
      By Stuart Webber 
      January 4, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stuart Webber
Corporate Profit Shifting and the Multinational Enterprise
1st edition 2012
PhD Series 23.2012
© The Author 
ISSN 0906-6934
Print ISBN:  978-87-92842-72-5
Online ISBN: 978-87-92842-73-2
“The Doctoral School of Economics and Management is an active national 
and international research environment at CBS for research degree students
who deal with economics and management at business, industry and country
level in a theoretical and empirical manner”.
All rights reserved.
No parts of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means,
electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information
storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.
2 
 
Table of Contents 
 
1. Executive Summary—English………………………………………………….page 3 
 
2. Resumé- Danish……………………………………………………………….. page 4 
 
3. Introductory Chapter: Evidence of Corporate Profit Shifting…………………..page 5 
4. Thin Capitalization and Interest Deduction Regulations: 
A Worldwide Survey…………………………………………………..page 23 
 
5. The Tax Efficient Supply Chain: Considerations for Multinationals………….page 94 
 
6. Escaping the U.S. Tax System: from Corporate Inversions to 
       Re-domiciling………………………………………………………….page 146 
 
7. The IRS Investor Model……………………………………………………….page 203 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Executive Summary 
 
This dissertation analyzes ways in which Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) shift profits from 
one country to another to reduce their income tax expense.   This is an important topic for a 
number of reasons.  From a country’s perspective, its income tax rates and policies can have a 
significant impact upon its tax revenue, economic competitiveness, and the vibrancy of its 
economy.  From the MNE’s perspective, income tax rates and policies determine a firm’s tax 
obligations, and thus affect net income and enterprise value.  The dissertation examines several 
ways in which MNEs shift profits to reduce income taxes, and consists of five chapters. 
 
The introductory chapter reviews the economic evidence demonstrating firms shift profits from 
one country to another in response to tax rates.  In the past two decades a number of economic 
studies have shown firms use tax and accounting techniques to shift reported profits to low tax 
jurisdictions, and that chapter reviews key articles that have demonstrated this.  The second 
paper explains how MNEs finance international investments to shift interest income to low-tax 
jurisdictions.  It reviews government tax policies in a number of countries that have been enacted 
to limit interest income shifting, and recommends an approach to control this activity.  The third 
paper examines tax efficient supply chains, in which tax departments and supply chain 
organizations collaborate to site business operations to achieve supply chain objectives and 
reduce tax obligations.  The fourth chapter analyzes how some U.S.-headquartered firms have 
moved their corporate headquarters from the U.S. to tax havens, to reduce their tax expense and 
avoid U.S. international tax policies.  The fifth and final chapter examines new U.S. tax 
regulations that propose to value intellectual property transfers in the same way outside investors 
would, which the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) calls its “investor model.”  It also makes 
recommendations concerning how the investor model can be improved.  
 
This dissertation draws upon a number of academic disciplines, including economics, finance, 
supply chain management, and tax law.  It does not fit into a single academic category, and it 
seeks to make a contribution by drawing upon these various disciplines to recommend ways 
countries can tax economic activity in fair and effective ways, and suggest ways firms can 
minimize tax obligations while still complying with international tax laws.    
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Resumé 
 
Denne afhandling analyserer, hvordan multinationale virksomheder flytter overskud fra et land 
til et andet for at reducere skat af årets resultat. Dette er et vigtigt emne af en række årsager. Fra 
et lands perspektiv kan indkomstskatten og skattepolitikken have en betydelig indflydelse på 
landets skatteindtægter, konkurrenceevne og dynamikken i økonomien. Fra den multinationale 
virksomheds perspektiv bestemmer indkomst, skattesatser og skattepolitikker en virksomheds 
skatte-forpligtelser, og påvirker således årets resultat og virksomhedens værdi. Afhandlingen 
undersøger flere forskellige måder, hvorpå multinationale virksomheder flytter overskud for at 
nedbringe indkomstskatten, og består af fem kapitler. 
 
Det indledende kapitel gennemgår den økonomiske vidnesbyrd, og viser at virksomheder flytter 
overskud fra et land til et andet som reaktion på skattesatser. I de sidste to årtier har en række 
økonomiske undersøgelser vist, virksomheder anvender skatte- og regnskabsmæssige teknikker 
til at flytte rapporterede overskud til favorable skattejurisdiktioner, og kapitlet gennemgår vigtige 
artikler, der har påvist dette. Det andet papir beskriver, hvordan multinationale virksomheder 
finansierer internationale investeringer for at flytte renteindtægter til regioner med lav skat. 
Papiret gennemgår regeringers skattepolitik i en række lande, der er blevet vedtaget for at 
begrænse flytning af renteindtægt, og anbefaler en tilgang til at styre denne aktivitet. Det tredje 
papir undersøger skatte-efficiente forsyningskæder (supply chains), i hvilke skattemyndigheder 
og supply chain organisationer samarbejder om at indrette forretninger til at opnå supply chain 
mål og reducere skattemæssige forpligtelser. Det fjerde kapitel analyserer hvordan visse 
virksomheder, med hovedkvarter i USA, har flyttet deres hovedkvarter fra USA til skattely for at 
reducere deres skatteomkostning og undgå amerikansk international skattepolitik. Det femte og 
sidste kapitel undersøger de nye amerikanske skatteregler, der søger at værdisætte overførsel af 
intellektuel ejendomsret på samme måde som investorer udefra ville gøre. Dette kalder U.S. 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) sin "investor-model." IRS udarbejder også anbefalinger om, 
hvordan investor-modellen kan forbedres. 
 
Denne afhandling trækker på en række akademiske discipliner, herunder økonomi, finansiering, 
supply chain management og skatteret. Afhandlingen passer ikke ind i ét specifikt akademisk 
felt, men søger at yde et bidrag ved at trække på disse forskellige discipliner for at anbefale 
måder, hvorpå lande kan beskatte økonomisk aktivitet på fair og effektive måder, og foreslå, 
hvordan virksomheder kan minimere skattemæssige forpligtelser i overensstemmelse med 
internationale skattelove. 
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Introduction 
 
By many measures international trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) have increased 
dramatically over the past several decades.  Driven by the desire to improve their standard of 
living, many countries have transitioned to market economies and encouraged international trade 
and overseas investment.  Several nominally communist have also welcomed international 
investment and created export-driven economies.  Barriers to trade between nations have fallen 
as international agreements have reduced tariffs and other trade barriers. 
 
This has created many new business opportunities for Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) and 
they have responded by increasing international investment.  In part this has been driven by the 
desire to enter new markets and attract new customers.  This has also been motivated by 
objectives to reduce cost structures and take advantage of lower wage rates in less-developed 
countries.   
 
Many trade barriers, such as duties and tariffs, are negotiated through bilateral and multilateral 
agreements.  In general countries agree to lower such costs as part of a coordinated effort to 
reduce them simultaneously.  However nations do not frequently coordinate their income tax 
rates and policies.  In fact, nations often compete with each other for investment by offering low 
tax rates and attractive tax policies.  As Gresik (2001) notes, MNEs can determine where they 
want to invest their resources, and thus governments often compete for FDI by reducing taxes (p. 
800).  While many factors go into a MNE’s decision concerning where it should site business 
activities, income tax rates are one important cost consideration.   
 
Research has demonstrated MNEs are attracted to low income tax rates and move business 
activities to reduce this expense.  Grubert and Mutti (1991) said “taxes can have a powerful 
effect in explaining the distribution of MNC capital in manufacturing” (p. 285).  Clausing (2006) 
concluded that “Multinational firms are more likely to invest in low-tax countries, and this in 
turn generates more trade with such countries” (p. 283).  In short, MNEs are attracted to low 
income tax rates and this will impact investment decisions.    
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Not only do income tax rates impact where investments are made, research has demonstrated 
MNEs are also able to shift taxable income from one country to another.  In other words, not 
only do MNEs shift real economic activity to countries with low income tax rates, they also 
employ a variety of tax techniques to shift reported income from high income tax to low-tax 
countries.  These techniques can include adjusting transfer prices, extending intercompany loans 
from low-tax to high-tax countries, or changing the worldwide headquarters of the MNE.  In fact, 
in many ways it is far easier to use these tax techniques to shift reported income from one 
country to another than it is to move real economic activity.  Shifting reported income to another 
country might be accomplished quickly by finance and tax departments through tax and 
accounting procedures that have negligible impact upon business operations.  In contrast, 
opening a new factory abroad can require a substantial investment of time and capital, disrupt a 
firm’s business operations, and displace many employees. 
 
New Challenges in Transfer Pricing 
 
International transfer pricing laws are based upon the “arms-length standard.”  This standard says 
that organizations within the MNE should behave as if they are unrelated parties.  Thus transfer 
prices should be consistent with prices profit-maximizing businesses would charge for their 
products and services.  To achieve this, firms and tax authorities often compare internal transfer 
prices with trade prices charged by businesses for similar products and services.  However a 
number of developments in recent years have made it more difficult to determine what a 
product’s trade price, and thus its transfer price, should be. 
 
One of these developments is the growth of the modern, international supply chain.  Supply 
chains have become increasingly elaborate and sophisticated in recent years, as MNEs have 
shifted manufacturing and other business processes to locations where they can be performed 
most efficiently.  Reductions in tariffs and duties have enabled firms to move goods more 
cheaply between sites, and advanced communications technologies have made it easier to 
manage an international supply chain.  As a result, companies are frequently transferring 
partially completed, intermediate goods from one country to another.  It is often difficult to find a 
reliable benchmark price for a partially-completed good.  Comparable trade prices are more 
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difficult to locate.  In the absence of good comparison prices, MNEs have the opportunity to 
manipulate transfer prices and reduce their worldwide tax expense. 
 
Second, it can be particularly challenging to benchmark trade prices when the products are 
sophisticated, high-technology goods.  When a final product consists of a variety of hardware 
components and software programs, it can be very difficult to establish with any precision how 
much value each piece contributes to the final product’s total value.  If those components are 
produced in different countries MNEs can calculate transfer prices to achieve income tax 
objectives.  They can manipulate transfer prices, shift profits to low-tax regions, and lower their 
worldwide tax rate.  These trends have created new challenges and opportunities in international 
tax, and have motivated several of the papers in this dissertation, which will be briefly described 
in the next section.     
 
Dissertation Papers 
 
This dissertation includes four additional papers that examine ways in which MNEs shift profits 
from one country to another, and how tax authorities attempt to limit this activity.  The four 
articles that follow are: 
 
1) Thin Capitalization and Interest Deduction Rules: A Worldwide Survey 
2) The Tax Efficient Supply Chain: Considerations for Multinationals 
3) Escaping the U.S. Tax System: from Corporate Inversions to Re-domiciling 
4) The IRS Investor Model 
 
A brief overview of each paper will be provided here, and later in this paper I will discuss each 
of these papers in more detail, explaining the focus, approach, and contributions of each article. 
 
The Thin Capitalization and Interest Deduction paper examines how MNEs finance their 
overseas operations to reduce income taxes.  In general there are two ways in which firms can 
finance such investments: they can inject either debt or equity into their subsidiaries.  When 
investments are funded with debt, firms are able to recognize tax-deductible interest expenses.  If 
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the MNE extends loans from a low-tax jurisdiction to a high-tax jurisdiction, interest income and 
profits are shifted to the low-tax jurisdiction, and the firm lowers its worldwide tax expense.  
This paper analyzes the rules a number of countries use to limit high levels of debt and tax 
deductible interest expenses, and proposes an approach countries might use to limit this activity 
in a fair, efficient and effective way.  This paper was also published in 2010 in Tax Notes 
International.1 
 
The Tax Efficient Supply Chain paper explains ways in which MNEs can improve net income by 
linking income tax planning and supply chain planning.  I argue that income tax planning and 
supply chain planning are frequently viewed as unrelated activities.  However both supply chain 
and income tax planning focus upon where firms should site their business operations.  Therefore 
to maximize net income, income tax and supply chain planning should be linked, so they can 
develop a tax efficient supply chain.  As mentioned, many firms have restructured their supply 
chains in recent years, so the tax impact of supply chain restructuring is very important. This 
paper was recently published in an edition of Tax Notes International. 2 
 
 
The Corporate Inversions and Re-domiciling paper analyzes another approach U.S.-based MNEs 
have used to reduce income taxes and avoid complex international tax policies.  As mentioned, 
many MNEs have restructured their supply chains in recent years, moving business operations 
from one location to another.  In recent years some U.S.-based MNEs have taken this activity a 
step further, and moved the corporate parent itself abroad.  That paper examines recent 
developments and trends in corporate inversions and headquarters relocations and was also 
published in Tax Notes International.3 
 
The IRS Investor Model paper examines IRS rules which were drafted to value sales of 
Intellectual Property (IP) from one country to another.  Before these regulations were drafted a 
                                                                
1 Webber, S. (2010). Thin capitalization and interest deduction rules: a worldwide survey.  Tax Notes International.  
60(9).  683-708.  
2 Webber, S. (2011).  The tax efficient supply chain: considerations for multinationals.  Tax Notes International.  
61(2). 149-168. 
3 Webber, S. (2011).  Escaping the U.S. tax system: from corporate inversions to re-domicling.  Tax Notes 
International, 63(4), 273-295. 
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number of U.S. MNEs transferred intellectual property to overseas entities within the MNE, and 
the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) believed firms were under- valuing these sales, and thus 
reducing their U.S. income taxes.  The IRS proposed an ”investor model” to value intellectual 
property sales, purporting to determine intellectual property values in the same way an external 
investor would.  Valuing IP properly is a key issue today, as copyrights, patents, trademarks and 
intellectual know-how are the most valuable assets many firms possess. 
 
 
But before explaining my papers in more detail, it may be helpful to demonstrate that 
corporations do shift profits in response to tax rate differences.  The following sections show that 
MNEs shift reported profits from one country to another in response to income tax rates, and 
they are able to reduce their total tax obligations by doing this.  Several of these papers have also 
demonstrated the tax tools MNEs use to shift reported profits and lower their worldwide tax 
obligations. 
 
Evidence of Profit Shifting Behavior 
 
Over the past twenty years a number of studies have demonstrated MNEs shift both real 
economic activity and reported profits from high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions.  For 
example, Grubert and Mutti (1991) conducted a study of U.S.-headquartered MNEs operating in 
33 countries, using firm-level financial information provided to tax authorities in 1982.  They 
concluded that income taxes had a powerful impact upon MNE location decisions; low income 
tax rates attracted FDI.  In addition, U.S. firms imported and exported more with low-tax 
countries than with high-tax countries.  But beyond this, their results were consistent with profit 
shifting behavior: firms were employing tax strategies to shift income to low-tax regions.  
Grubert and Mutti said this could be accomplished through manipulating transfer prices or 
leveraging debt upon subsidiaries in high-tax countries, but the paper did not demonstrate which 
tools were actually used (p. 286). 
 
Hines and Rice (1994) also analyzed the performance of U.S.-based MNEs, again relying upon 
firm-level reported profits in a variety of countries.  They concluded U.S. firms increased their 
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investments in tax havens during the early 1980s (p. 153).   But on top of the real economic 
activity shifted to tax havens, their results suggested firms were shifting reported profits to those 
jurisdictions.  They found that reported profit levels in tax havens were “extraordinarily high” (p. 
149), consistent with manipulated transfer prices, intercompany interest payments, and other 
techniques employed to shift earnings from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions.   Devereux and 
Maffini (2007) prepared a comprehensive survey of firm-level data demonstrating that MNEs 
shifted both real activity and reported profits to achieve tax minimization goals. 
 
Evidence of Transfer Price Manipulation 
 
While these studies demonstrated firms engaged in profit shifting behavior, they did not 
demonstrate the mechanism by which firms accomplished this goal.  Both manipulating transfer 
prices and intercompany debt could accomplish this objective.  Clausing (2003, 2006) and 
Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) used product price information to show MNEs manipulated 
transfer prices to achieve tax objectives. 
 
Clausing (2003) directly analyzed trade and transfer prices to demonstrate U.S.-based MNEs 
priced products to reduce income taxes.  She analyzed trade and transfer price information 
collected by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics for 22,000 items, both imports and exports, 
between 1997 and 1999.  Clausing demonstrated pricing behavior was consistent with tax 
minimization goals.  Transfer prices were below trade prices when products were sold to low-tax 
countries, which reduced worldwide tax expenses.  Transfer prices were above trade prices when 
products were sold to high-tax countries, which also reduced income taxes.  Clausing (2006) 
used this same database to investigate how tax minimization can impact international trade 
statistics.  She showed that U.S.-based MNEs tend to under-price intercompany sales to low-tax 
countries and over-price sales to high tax countries, which she called the price effect.  She 
demonstrated that firms will engage in more intercompany activity with related parties in low-tax 
countries than in high-tax countries, which she termed the quantity effect.  And all things being 
equal, companies will make more investments in low-tax countries than high-tax countries, 
which Clausing called the location effect. 
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Bartlesman and Beetsma (2003) also developed a methodology that did not focus upon reported 
profits.  Using OECD’s STAN sectoral database they analyzed value added, defined as sales less 
the cost of intermediate transactions.  Intermediate transactions include both goods and services 
purchased from other entities within the MNE.  Value added is less likely to be misreported, 
since it is not impacted by direct expenses, interest expenses, and expense allocation 
methodologies.  Bartlesman and Beetsma ran a regression of the total ratio of value added to 
wage payments to differences in corporate tax rates, and demonstrated corporate profit shifting 
within Europe.  They concluded the impact of shifting reported income from one country to 
another is significant from both a statistical and economic perspective, calculating that perhaps 
more than 65% of income expected from a tax increase would be lost due to income shifting (p. 
2226).    
 
Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) used price information from the U.S. Customs Bureau 
between 1993 and 2000 to analyze the differences between arm’s length (trade) prices and 
related-party transfer prices.  Their analysis demonstrated large differences between arm’s 
length, trade prices when compared to related- party, transfer prices.  The direction of those 
differences was consistent with tax minimization strategies.  Furthermore, the authors found that 
this price difference was significantly larger for highly differentiated, complex products than it 
was for commodities.   
 
Huizinga and Laeven (2008) analyzed EBIT to demonstrate European MNEs shift profit.  By 
focusing on EBIT they eliminated intercompany interest payments as the cause of income 
shifting.  Using the Amadeus database, they used firm-level information on European MNEs in 
1999 to show these firms were able to shift substantial income from countries levying high-
income taxes to countries with lower income tax rates.  They found that firms were shifting 
income from such countries as Germany, which imposed high income tax rates that year, to 
countries with lower income tax rates, such as Hungary.  Moreover, they determined “profit 
shifting leads to a significant redistribution of national of national corporate tax revenues in 
Europe” (p. 1180).  Maffini and Mokkas (2011) use this same firm-level data and investigated 
how income tax differences impact total factor productivity.  One of their conclusions was that 
firms in countries with low income tax rates appear to be more productive than in countries with 
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high income tax rates, since companies may use transfer pricing policies and expense allocation 
methodologies to boost income in low tax jurisdictions.  Thus their economies look more 
productive. 
Evidence of Earnings Stripping 
 
The evidence also indicates MNEs use intercompany loans to shift income from one country to 
another.  For example, Mintz and Smart (2004) found Canadian businesses shifted profits within 
Canada in response to local tax rates.  Both the Canadian federal government and its provinces 
levy income taxes, but there are two ways in which firms calculate provincial tax obligations.  If 
the business opens affiliates in various provinces, each is required to prepare a separate income 
statement and determine the profits earned there.  But if the business does not open affiliates in 
each province, the firm allocates taxable income to each province based on a statutory formula 
that includes sales and payroll data.  Mintz and Smart reasoned that when a firm formed affiliates 
in differing provinces it would be easier to shift income between them.  Their findings were 
consistent with this hypothesis; they determined that firms using separate accounting procedures 
were able to shift more income to low tax provinces than did firms allocating profits through the 
statutory formula.  Furthermore, Mintz and Smart said “our results show that interest payments 
are significantly related to taxes for ‘shifting’ firms, but not for other firms” (p. 1165).  In other 
words, intercompany loans appear to be one of the key techniques firms use to shift profits, 
though they did not exclude the use of other tax tools to accomplish this goal.  They also found 
that the financial impact was very significant, stating “income shifting has pronounced effects on 
provincial tax bases” (p. 1149). 
 
Seida and Wempe (2004) also demonstrated that intercompany interest payments were a tool 
some firms used to reduce their worldwide tax rate.  Their study was part of a larger analysis of 
corporate inversions, which will be also described in the next section.  Seida and Wempe 
analyzed the intercompany interest expense for the four inverted firms that reported this 
information in their 10-K’s, and concluded intercompany interest payments were used to shift 
earnings out of the U.S.  They write “we conclude that substantial portions of the ETR (Effective 
Tax Rate) reductions and post-inversion earnings reported by these four firms are the result of 
stripping U.S. earnings to lower-tax jurisdictions” (p. 822).  They determined intercompany debt 
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and interest payments were the tool used to move earnings from the U.S. to lower tax 
jurisdictions. 
 
Impact of Corporate Inversions 
 
Desai and Hines (2002) focused on another tactic U.S.-based MNEs used to reduce their income 
tax obligations: moving their corporate headquarters abroad.  In the late 1990s and early 2000s a 
number of American corporations moved their parent company’s headquarters from the United 
States to Caribbean tax havens, such as the Cayman Islands and Bermuda.  In each case these 
were paper transactions that officially moved the parent company’s legal home, but had no 
material impact on the firm’s business operations.  Desai and Hines consolidated financial 
information on twenty-four American firms that announced their intention to invert before 2003.  
They compared those results with balance sheets and income statements for 663 firms that did 
not invert over this period.  They ran a regression on this data and demonstrated that firms with a 
high proportion of foreign assets were more likely to invert (p.428).  As these firms had 
substantial international operations, this suggested to them that the U.S. policy of taxing 
worldwide income may have motivated corporate inversions.  They also concluded that firms 
with high debt ratios were more likely to invert (p. 429).  This suggested to them that U.S. 
interest allocation rules, which use statutory formulas to transfer interest expenses to foreign 
subsidiaries, also motivated corporate inversions.   
 
As mentioned, Seida and Wempe (2004) also analyzed U.S. corporate inversions. Their study 
compared the Effective Tax Rate (ETR) of 12 inverted firms with the tax rates of 24 comparable 
firms.  For each inverted firm two control firms were selected; these firms were competitors in 
that industry with similar annual revenue figures.  Seida and Wempe found the inverted firms 
reduced their ETR by 11.6 percentage points after an inversion, while the tax rate for the control 
firms declined by four percentage points.  Thus corporate inversions led to a significantly larger 
reduction in their tax rate.  They also analyzed changes in overseas and domestic profitability 
after an inversion.  They found that once the inversion was completed the profitability of 
overseas operations doubled, and the formerly profitable U.S. subsidiaries reported losses (p. 
814).   As discussed in the prior section, Seida and Wempe analyzed the intercompany interest 
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payments of four firms, and determined that the intercompany debt leveraged on the U.S. entity, 
combined with the corporate inversion, caused the substantial reduction in each firm’s 
worldwide tax rate and U.S. tax obligations.  The corporate inversion made the earnings 
stripping more effective, as the firms were able to avoid U.S. tax policies that tax worldwide 
income.  Thus by inverting those companies permanently reduced U.S. income taxes. 
 
To summarize these studies, they demonstrated MNEs have found a variety of tax techniques to 
shift reported income from one country to another.  Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and 
Rice (1994) showed profit margins were higher in low-tax countries than in high-tax countries.  
Clausing (2003, 2006) and Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) demonstrated that MNEs 
manipulated transfer prices to reduce their tax expense.  Mintz and Smart (2004) and Seida and 
Wempe (2004) demonstrated that MNEs structured intercompany loans from low-tax to high-tax 
jurisdictions to shift reported profits and reduce tax expenses.  Desai and Hines (2002) and Seida 
and Wempe showed how U.S. MNEs were able to reduce their worldwide tax expense by 
moving their corporate headquarters abroad.   
 
With this evidence in mind, the four additional papers in this dissertation will now be discussed 
in more detail, along with the papers’ approaches, conclusions, and contributions to knowledge 
of corporate profit shifting activities.  As mentioned, the papers in this dissertation have focused 
on four methods firms have used to shift profits from one country to another to achieve tax goals: 
using financing strategies to shift profits from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions; integrating tax 
planning and supply chain planning to create a tax-efficient supply chain; transferring the MNE’s 
corporate home from one country to another;  and transferring intellectual property to other 
countries to reduce income tax obligations. 
 
Dissertation Papers 
 
International tax draws upon several disciplines, including law, accounting, supply chain 
management, finance, and economics.  The papers that follow draw on principles from these 
various fields, and do not fit into one academic category.  In several papers I have attempted to 
make a contribution by bringing together information from several disciplines.  However the 
papers are connected in that each focuses on international tax management.  The papers explore 
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ways MNEs can use existing rules to reduce their tax expense legally, or suggest ways in which 
countries can craft rules to achieve objectives to raise tax revenue in fair, efficient and effective 
ways.  
 
The next paper in this dissertation focuses upon thin capitalization, a financing technique MNEs 
use to shift profits from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions.  The arm’s length standard should be 
applied to intercompany loans, but in practice applying this principle has been challenging.  Tax 
laws provide an incentive for firms to finance investments with debt rather than equity, since 
interest payments are often tax deductible, and dividend payments are not.  However trade 
businesses are likely to face market constraints that limit their debt levels.  Lenders may be 
reluctant to extend loans to highly leveraged firms, and investors may avoid the securities of 
firms with excessive debt.  However these market constraints may not limit the debt levels of a 
subsidiary within a MNE, since the lender and borrower are part of the same worldwide 
enterprise.  As they are part of the same MNE, the lender may not be concerned with the 
borrower’s potential default risk.  Thus market forces may not limit intercompany debt or tax-
motivated earnings stripping.     
 
As mentioned, Mintz and Smart (2004) and Seida and Wempe (2004) demonstrated companies 
extend intercompany loans to shift earnings from high-tax to low-tax locations.  The Thin 
Capitalization and Interest Deduction paper evaluates the approaches a number of the world’s 
most developed economies have used to control this activity.  In general countries have 
attempted to control earnings stripping by establishing “one size fit all” quantitative limits on 
either debt-to-equity ratios and/or on interest expense deductions, though some countries employ 
a combination of approaches to limit intercompany debt and earnings stripping. 
 
The Thin Capitalization and Interest Deduction paper argues that one size fits all limitations are 
frequently ineffective at controlling thin capitalization.  If a country establishes a debt-to-equity 
limit at a relatively high level, many firms are able to extend loans and shift earnings from one 
country to another for the sole purpose of reducing income taxes.  For example, suppose a MNE 
chooses a business model that maintains low debt levels to minimize its risk and keep interest 
expenses low.  This same firm might choose to finance its subsidiaries with far higher levels of 
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debt than the worldwide business would accept, for the sole purpose of reducing taxes.  At the 
same time, these one size fits all limitations might constrain MNEs that have decided upon a 
leveraged capital structure.  The Thin Capitalization and Interest Deduction paper argues the 
most effective and fair way to limit earnings stripping is to use the worldwide enterprise’s ratio 
of interest expenses to EBITDA to limit each subsidiary’s tax deductible interest expense.  In 
other words, if the worldwide enterprise’s ratio of trade interest expense to EBITDA is 15%, that 
figure should be each subsidiary’s tax deductible interest expense limit.  This approach can 
prevent firms from incurring tax motivated intercompany debt, and it would also treat firms or 
industries that choose leveraged financial structures more fairly.  Furthermore, the limit is 
determined by the parent firm’s capital structure, a logical limitation based on the worldwide 
enterprise’s funding strategy.   
 
 
The Tax Efficient Supply Chain paper focuses upon the relationship between international 
income tax and supply chain planning.  As mentioned, supply chains have become increasingly 
sophisticated in recent years, and many companies have become adept at rapidly shifting 
activities from one country to another, to sites in which they can be performed most efficiently.  
From a legal perspective, transfer pricing laws are based on the assumption that the subsidiaries 
within the MNE are formed to perform clearly defined functions, such as invent products, 
manufacture them, distribute goods, or sell products and services.  This functional model 
supports transfer pricing, as firms and tax authorities can benchmark profit levels of similar 
businesses to determine the appropriate profit margins for the MNE’s subsidiaries.  Supply chain 
restructurings frequently change the functions performed within the MNE and its subsidiaries, so 
tax departments also need to determine whether these supply chain changes impact their 
functional model of the MNE.  
 
The supply chain paper shows that the preponderance of supply chain literature has focused upon 
maximizing pre-tax income.  I argue firms should increase shareholder wealth by maximizing net 
income, and to accomplish this they need to link supply chain and income tax planning.  Both 
activities determine where firms should site business operations, so they should collaborate to 
accomplish this.  Moreover, the evidence indicates some firms are linking tax and supply chain 
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planning to create a tax efficient supply chain.  However supply chain organizations and tax 
departments often have different reporting relationships and expertise, so these activities may not 
be naturally linked for many businesses.  Therefore MNEs need to find ways to encourage 
collaboration between supply chain and tax organizations. 
 
The Tax Efficient Supply Chain paper specifically focuses upon income tax considerations firms 
should consider when they construct a tax efficient supply chain.  In particular, it analyzes the 
functional model of MNEs to determine the best opportunities for integrated supply chain and 
tax planning.  The paper evaluates a MNE’s functional entities such as sales companies, 
distribution centers, manufacturing organizations, procurement organizations and shared service 
providers, and identifies key factors firms should consider when constructing an income tax 
efficient supply chain.  In addition, the paper also identifies ways in which tax organizations can 
support their firm when tax authorities audit supply chain restructurings.   
 
 
 
The next paper in this dissertation analyzes corporate inversions and headquarters relocations.  
As mentioned, in a corporate inversion a firm engages in a series of legal transactions to move its 
legal headquarters from one country to another.  In general these were paper transactions that had 
no impact upon how the firm was actually managed.   From a legal perspective, there are two 
competing views concerning how a firm’s headquarters should be determined.  Most European 
countries use “real seat” rules to determine where a company is headquartered, focusing upon the 
location where key management decisions are made.   However the United States uses “place of 
incorporation” rules, which identify the MNE’s parent country by determining where the parent 
company is legally incorporated.  Place of incorporation rules made it comparatively easy for 
U.S. MNEs to move their headquarters by reincorporating the corporate parent abroad, since the 
parent company could move its legal home through paper transactions that required no change in 
where the firm was actually managed. 
 
A number of U.S.-headquartered firms relocated the parent company in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, but the U.S. Congress enacted tax laws to limit this activity in 2003.  While some analysts 
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said corporate inversion activity apparently was reduced since that law was enacted, my paper 
actually quantified the change.  The paper demonstrated that while six S&P 500 members 
inverted in the five years prior to 2003, no S&P 500 members have inverted since then.  It also 
showed that of the six firms that inverted prior to 2003, all but one has relocated again, moving 
from Caribbean tax havens to either Ireland or Switzerland. 
 
The Corporate Inversions and Re-domiciling paper also evaluated recent developments in 
corporate inversion laws, and showed why the motivations to escape U.S. income tax rates and 
policies still exist.  These motivations include high tax rates and complicated, worldwide 
taxation policies.  The corporate inversions paper focuses upon the actions of one firm, Ensco, 
which recently moved its corporate home from the United States to the United Kingdom.  Ensco 
says it “re-domiciled” its headquarters, rather than inverting.  Ensco moved key executive 
managers to the United Kingdom to accomplish this objective.   That paper explains a number of 
keys differences between corporate inversions and corporate re-domiciling.  It also identifies a 
number of alternatives firms might consider to avoid high U.S. income tax rates and complicated 
international tax laws. 
 
The IRS Investor Model paper evaluates recent U.S. Treasury Regulations governing Cost 
Sharing Agreements (CSAs) in the United States.  In a CSA, a number of entities within a MNE 
agree to share the costs of developing intellectual property, and thus the benefits.  The IRS 
Investor Model and those regulations were written in an attempt to determine more accurate 
values for sales of intellectual property from one country to another as part of a CSA, generally 
from the United States to another nation.  The investor model purports to value those sales in the 
same manner a third-party investor would.  The primary goal of that paper was to determine 
whether those Treasury Regulations achieved that objective.  This is a critical issue, as many 
high-technology products have become increasingly sophisticated, and intellectual property may 
be the most important asset for many firms.  Furthermore, as Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) 
note, the differences between trade and transfer prices are relatively large for differentiated, 
complex products, but narrower for commodities. 
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As mentioned, transfer pricing laws are generally based upon the arm’s length standard.  When 
the arm’s length standard was first adopted it may have been easier to enforce than it is currently.  
If products are commodities or finished goods it is easier to find benchmark transfer prices than 
it is today, when so many products are either sophisticated, high-technology products or 
partially-completed, intermediate goods.  In short, the arm’s length standard needs more clarity 
and precision than it required in the past, particularly with respect to intellectual property.  
Finding a reliable benchmark price for intellectual property is inherently challenging, since 
intellectual property is generally unique.  The IRS investor model is an attempt to determine 
values for intangible products, such as patents, trademarks, copyrights and intellectual know-
how. 
 
The IRS Investor Model paper evaluates 2009 Temporary Regulations the IRS released to 
support its investor model.  The regulations replaced the Proposed Regulations the IRS released 
in 2005 which first articulated this model.  My paper identifies a number of ways the new 
regulations have improved upon the prior regulations.  For example, they value intangible assets 
in more reasonable ways, and recognize the value of such assets may decline over time.  
However I also argue the IRS should improve its regulations by providing more guidance 
concerning how taxpayers should determine a discount rate to value profits earned in the future.  
Because the IRS provides such little guidance on this important topic, I believe taxpayers have 
little incentive to create Cost Sharing Agreements that comply with the IRS investor model 
regulations.  Instead, I suggest taxpayers may want to consider other approaches to address these 
issues, such as negotitating an Advanced Pricing Agreement with the IRS. 
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Abstract 
The United States federal government is projecting to incur large budget deficits for many years 
into the future, and may propose international tax law changes to raise tax revenue.  While a 
2009 Obama administration proposal to change U.S. international tax laws was withdrawn, a 
comprehensive overhaul plan may be submitted in the future.  One potential change may involve 
restrictions on interest deductions.  The purpose of this paper is to analyze current thin 
capitalization regulations in a number of key countries, and to recommend the best approach to 
limit highly leveraged financing structures.  These regulations are evaluated by a number of tax 
principles, including efficiency, effectiveness and fairness.  A key problem with many existing 
approaches is that they enact uniform, “one size fits all,” interest deduction regulations, and these 
approaches frequently do not achieve their intended objectives.  Uniform regulations permit 
many firms to incur more intercompany debt than the enterprise would choose to borrow, and 
they can also unfairly constrain other businesses that rely on debt.  This paper proposes limiting 
a Controlled Foreign Corporation’s (CFC’s) tax deductible interest expenses by the worldwide 
enterprise’s own ratio of interest expense to earnings.  This approach may resolve many of the 
problems inherent in other regulations and it achieves many of the principles for a high quality 
tax system.  This approach should be considered by countries considering amending their 
regulations, including the United States. 
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Introduction 
The United States federal government is currently facing budget deficits that are among the 
largest in its history.  According to the government’s Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the 
2009 deficit will total $1.6 trillion, which is 11.2 percent of GDP, the highest percentage since 
World War II (CBO Summary, 2009, p. 1).   Moreover, budget deficits are expected to remain 
large long into the future. According to CBO projections, the U.S. federal government’s 
spending will exceed revenue every year over the next decade.  The CBO projects rising health 
care costs and an aging population will put further pressure on budget deficits, and this debt will 
reduce economic growth.  It says that “Over the long term (beyond the 10-year baseline 
projection period), the budget remains on an unsustainable path” (p. 4).  The CBO Summary also 
states, “Putting the nation on a sustainable fiscal course will require some combination of lower 
spending and higher revenues than the amounts now projected” (p. 1).   
 
Several years ago the Obama Administration proposed a new set of international tax laws, 
designed to overhaul the way in which U.S.-based Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) are taxed, 
and to generate additional tax revenue.  While the 2009 proposal was withdrawn, the Obama 
administration is reportedly proposing a comprehensive overhaul of international tax laws in the 
future.4  One 2009 proposal would have tightened restrictions on interest deductibility, but it 
would only apply in very limited situations.  In contrast, a number of other countries have 
recently enacted more comprehensive changes to rules governing interest deductions.  For 
example, Germany and Italy have recently overhauled their interest deduction rules, and other 
EU countries are also considering modifications.  As Nadal (2008) writes, “countries around the 
world, concerned with earnings stripping, have been tightening their thin capitalization regimes” 
(p. 1).  She added: “The question becomes whether the U.S. thin cap rules are tight enough, or 
whether there are loopholes that can be closed.”  
 
                                                                
4 See “Business Fends Off Tax Hit: Obama Administration Shelves Plan to Change How U.S. Treats Overseas 
Profits” in the October 13, 2009 Wall Street Journal, page A1, for a discussion of its decision to withdraw its 2009 
tax proposals.  According to the article “Obama aides say the administration has set the idea aside for now, but may 
return to it as part of a broader tax overhaul sometime next year” (page A1). 
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This paper’s purpose is to analyze international tax laws that regulate excessively leveraged 
financing structures.  These tax laws are designed to combat thinly capitalized financing 
structures and are important both to governments and MNEs.  From a government’s perspective, 
they impact both tax revenue and the country’s economic competitiveness.  From the MNE’s 
perspective, they determine the firm’s tax expense and may shape where it conducts business.  
The purpose of this paper is to analyze approaches countries are employing to combat these tax 
minimization strategies and to recommend a strategy that is most likely to achieve the intended 
objectives. 
 
Thin capitalization is a financing strategy MNEs use to make Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).  
When a MNE initiates business activities in another country, it frequently forms a local 
subsidiary to conduct business.  These investments need to be funded to support business 
expansion.  The cash is supplied as equity and/or debt.  Debt creates an opportunity to lower 
income taxes, as interest expenses are tax deductible, while dividends are not.  When an 
investment in a high-tax country is funded with intercompany debt extended from a low-tax 
country, profit is shifted to the country imposing lower taxes.  Thus the MNE reduces its 
worldwide tax rate without incurring additional trade expenses.  This can motivate MNEs to fund 
overseas investments in high-tax jurisdictions with a high ratio of debt-to-equity.   
 
Farrar and Mawani (2008) write: “A business is said to be thinly capitalized if it is financed with 
a high proportion of debt relative to equity.  The rules that limit the amount of interest deductions 
in those situations are known as thin capitalization rules” (p. 3).  Some analysts prefer to focus 
on how income is shifted from one jurisdiction to another, and use the terms “interest stripping” 
or “earnings stripping.”  In describing how income is shifted out of the U.S. Isenbergh (2005) 
writes: “This maneuver is known in the tax lexicon as ‘interest stripping’ or ‘earnings-stripping’ 
because taxable income is stripped from the U.S. tax environment by interest deductions” (p. 33).   
Whatever term is used, the evidence demonstrates this is not a theoretical concern; it happens in 
practice.   Haufler and Runkel (2008) write “Recent empirical research provide conclusive 
evidence that international tax differentials affect multinationals’ financing structures in a way 
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that is consistent with overall tax minimization” (p. 1).  Countries imposing high income tax 
rates are concerned with these funding strategies, contending the income was earned in their 
country, and profits should be taxed there.  To limit this activity, countries have enacted a 
number of regulatory strategies.  Thin capitalization rules limit a firm’s debt-to-equity ratio to 
control highly leveraged financing structures.  Interest deduction regulations directly limit the tax 
deductible interest expense a firm can recognize.  Some countries employ either thin 
capitalization rules or interest deduction limitations, but many countries use a combination of 
regulations to combat excessive financial leverage. 
 
Banks, insurance companies, and investment banks rely on significantly more debt than non-
financial services firms, such as manufacturing organizations and retail firms.  Thus financial 
services firms have higher debt-to-equity ratios compared to other industries, and some countries 
establish separate thin capitalization policies for these firms.  This paper will not address thin 
capitalization/interest deduction limitations in that business sector.  It will also focus on rules 
applying to corporate entities, rather than partnerships and other business forms. 
 
 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate a number of current approaches used to control 
excessively leveraged financing structures.  These approaches are measured against criteria used 
to evaluate tax law quality, and a proposal is made concerning the best regulatory approach.  
This paper assumes no major changes to the existing paradigm of international business taxation; 
it is taken for granted that each country separately taxes the profits earned by businesses 
operating within its borders, and that governments do not coordinate their activities when 
enacting and enforcing tax laws.5   
                                                                
5 A number of articles have proposed fundamental changes to the existing paradigm of international taxation.  For 
example, see Avi-Yonah, R. and Clausing, K., "Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to 
Adopt Formulary Apportionment." The article is in Path to Prosperity: Hamilton Project Ideas on Income Security, 
Education, and Taxes, edited by J. Furman and J. E. Bordoff, 319-44. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2008. 
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This paper contributes to knowledge of these international tax regulations by critically evaluating 
approaches to combat thin capitalization/interest deduction tax rules.  Key findings are that there 
are flaws in many thin capitalization and interest deduction tax laws that can make them 
ineffective and inefficient at achieving their intended objectives.  Other regulations do not give 
firms or regulators sufficient guidance to determine whether they are complying with these tax 
laws. After reviewing tax principles and existing regulations, this paper proposes an approach 
that satisfies the principles which define an effective, efficient and fair tax law.  
 
Literature Review 
As explained, this paper’s purpose is to evaluate regulations that constrain highly leveraged 
financing structures by comparing such regulations against tax principles that define effective, 
efficient and fair tax laws.  Thus this paper draw upon literature from a number of sources, 
including theories concerning what defines a high quality tax law, and other papers that 
specifically address thin capitalization issues. 
 
Adam Smith may have been the first economist to define the qualities of fair and effective tax 
laws, but he wrote at when government spending and taxes were significantly lower than they are 
today.    Musgrave and Musgrave (1976) defined tax principles in a modern era, when 
government spending programs play a substantial role in developed economies, more activities 
are taxed, and taxes play an important role in shaping a nation’s economy.  In addition, MNEs 
now operate throughout the world and are capable of rapidly moving operations from one 
country to another, sometimes motivated by the search for lower taxes.  The OECD (2001) has 
also attempted to define tax principles in a world in which global businesses move activities 
between countries and nations compete vigorously to attract jobs and investment. 
 
Gresik (2001) analyzed a world in which global tax competition shapes national tax laws.  He 
described how MNEs seek to reduce their tax obligations by shifting activities from one country 
to another, and how tax competition drives countries to reduce income tax rates and attract 
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Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).   As FDI directly and indirectly stimulates economic prosperity 
and creates a more skilled workforce, nations compete to attract MNEs, eroding the tax base of 
other countries.  Thus tax competition continually drives business tax rates down.    
In recent years a number of studies have shown that thin capitalization is one way MNEs reduce 
their worldwide tax obligations.  Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) conducted a study of U.S.-based 
MNEs, and demonstrated they leveraged subsidiaries in countries with high income tax rates 
with more debt than subsidiaries in countries imposing low income taxes.  In addition, they 
demonstrated that intercompany debt was more responsive to high tax rates than third-party debt.  
In other words, the subsidiaries were leveraged with loans extended from related parties, 
supporting the premise that companies were stripping earnings from high-tax to low-tax 
jurisdictions.  Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005) conducted a similar study of German-based 
MNEs, and reached very similar conclusions.  Subsidiaries of German firms were incurring more 
debt when they operated in high-tax jurisdictions than they did when conducting business in low-
tax countries.  They also determined the German subsidiaries were primarily leveraged with 
intercompany debt, again supporting the hypothesis that firms used thin capitalization strategies 
to shift earnings from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions.   
 
Seida and Wempe (2004) conducted a study of U.S. Inverted Corporations (ICs).  In a U.S. 
corporate inversion, MNEs shift their worldwide headquarters from the United States to other 
countries.  They demonstrated several companies that transferred their headquarters abroad 
reduced their taxes substantially as a result.  They showed that several of these companies 
achieved this result by leveraging their U.S. subsidiary with intercompany debt, stripping 
earnings from the United States to other countries.  Though their study focused only on ICs, their 
study provided further evidence that MNEs transfer earnings from high-tax to low-tax 
jurisdictions through intercompany loans and interest payments. 
 
A number of papers have focused upon the specific thin capitalization/interest deduction 
regulations in certain countries.  Lund, Korsgaard and Albertsen (2008) introduced a series of 
articles describing thin capitalization and interest deduction rules in thirty-five countries.  Each 
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of the articles was written by a specialist in that country’s rules. The articles described how 
interest expenses are treated for tax purposes in each country, and explained restrictions the 
governments impose on either financing structures or interest deductibility.  The authors noted 
that historically the rules have regulated debt-to-equity ratios.  However in recent years some 
governments have restricted interest deductibility by establishing limits on the ratio of interest 
expenses to earnings.   
 
von Brocke and Perez (2009) focused upon the evolution of thin capitalization rules in Germany 
and discussed related developments in the United Kingdom.    They described how thin 
capitalization rules originated in those countries to combat excessively leveraged financing 
structures, which deprived governments of needed tax revenue.  However both countries 
modified their rules to comply with Article 43 of the EC Treaty, the freedom of establishment 
clause.  Lawmakers in both countries modified their rules to ensure they treated domestic and 
international firms equitably.  In addition, von Brocke and Perez explained how Italian 
legislators in 2008 modeled new rules after German legislation.  The article demonstrated that 
tax laws sometimes face legal challenges, and it also showed that nations closely monitor thin 
capitalization laws in other countries.  
 
van Saparoea (2009) also analyzed thin capitalization rules in Germany and the United Kingdom, 
and offered suggestions concerning proposed changes in the Netherlands.  The article described 
how competitive economic pressures have forced frequent changes to these laws.  It also 
explained the difficulties large countries experience trying to remain economically competitive 
while other countries reduce tax rates to attract FDI.  It provided further evidence tax 
competition is a key force shaping thin capitalization rules, and demonstrated that tax authorities 
evaluate thin capitalization rules in other countries when constructing their own laws. 
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Tax Principles 
To evaluate the effectiveness of thin capitalization and interest deduction rules, it will be useful 
to identify the criteria by which these laws should be judged.  It may be impossible to develop a 
comprehensive list of tax principles to which all would agree.  Nonetheless, economists and tax 
experts have identified general principles by which tax laws should be evaluated.  As Musgrave 
and Musgrave (1976) write, “ideas as to what constitutes a ‘good’ tax system have had their 
influence.  Economists and social philosophers, from Adam Smith on, have propounded what 
such requirements should be” (p. 210).  For the purposes of this paper, we will focus upon those 
principles that may be relevant to an analysis of thin capitalization and interest deduction tax 
regulations. 
 
It is generally agreed that tax obligations should be clearly stated, and identified with as little 
ambiguity as possible. Both the taxpayer and tax collector benefit from knowing precisely the 
amount owed, and when funds are due.  Businesses need this information to prepare accurate 
financial statements and to prepare financial forecasts.  And government agencies need this same 
information to prepare their financial plans.  The European Commission (EC) states that 
certainty is an important tax principle, emphasizing both the taxpayer’s and government’s need 
for predictability.  The EC (2004) has written “Certainty is desirable to assist business planning, 
but also to provide a degree of revenue certainty for administration; for example, if the rules 
governing loss-offset are unclear then neither business nor government can predict tax payments 
and revenue” (p. 4).  For the purposes of this paper, this will be called the certainty principle. 
 
Efficiency is another important principle that is generally supported.  To be efficient, a tax 
system should collect revenue with as little expense as possible.  Funds spent collecting taxes 
reduce the earnings of businesses and individuals, and add nothing to public welfare.  Musgrave 
and Musgrave (1976) write: “Administration and compliance cost should be as low as possible 
compatible with other objectives” (p. 211).  The EC Commission also supports the efficiency 
principle, writing, “The simpler a tax base is the lower the administrative or compliance costs 
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should be, for both administrations and business” (p. 5).  Furthermore, “The rules of a tax base 
must be easy to enforce as an unenforceable tax is unlikely to be equitable or neutral” (p. 5).   
 
The EC comments identify another efficiency characteristic, which is the efficient functioning of 
markets.  Most economists believe that when markets are operating efficiently, tax motivations 
should play a minimal role in shaping business and consumer decisions.  Taxes can distort 
markets and impose a welfare loss upon an economy.  Musgrave and Musgrave (1976) wrote 
“Taxes should be chosen so as to minimize interference with economic decisions in otherwise 
efficient markets” (p. 210).  Ideally taxes should play a negligible role in shaping economic 
decisions. 
 
However taxes can play an important role in correcting market inefficiencies, or in addressing 
externalities.  As Musgrave and Musgrave (1976) wrote:  “At the same time, taxes may be used 
to correct inefficiencies in the private sector, provided they are a suitable instrument for doing 
so” (p. 210).  Similarly, the EC Commission (2004) has written:  “taxation policy may be used to 
correct ‘market failures’ whereby distortions or inefficiencies in a particular market economy can 
be ‘corrected’ by the use of specific tax incentives” (p. 4).  While it may not be easy to discern 
whether markets are operating efficiently or not, most economists and tax experts would agree 
that taxes should play a role in addressing externalities.  
 
Probably all parties agree taxes should be “fair,” but defining fairness with any specificity is 
difficult.  Jones (2006) writes a “standard by which to evaluate a tax is whether the tax is fair to 
the people who must pay it.  While no economist, social scientist, or politician would ever argue 
against fairness as a norm, there is precious little agreement as to the exact nature of tax equity” 
(p. 34).   Nonetheless, taxpayers and regulators expect tax laws should be rational and logical, 
and they should not be random or arbitrary.  In a general sense, most economists, tax experts and 
taxpayers expect tax laws should be reasonable, coherent and just.  Moreover, they should not 
unduly impact business operations without good cause.   
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Some experts have taken the general concept of fairness, and tried to describe it more precisely.  
Two further fairness definitions have been suggested, and while neither is a comprehensive 
definition, both identify what many taxpayers expect.  One is the benefit principle, which argues 
a taxpayer’s obligations should be related to the value of services received from the government.  
A second is the ability-to-pay principle, which says taxes should be related to the taxpayer’s 
capacity to meet the obligation.  At a minimum, it makes no sense to assess taxes which cannot 
be paid. 
 
However the benefit principle and the ability-to-pay principle may direct tax laws in different 
directions.  First, it may be difficult to measure and value the government benefits taxpayers 
receive. How does one value the benefit of police protection or public parks?  As Schön (2009) 
writes, “There is simply no conceivable way to measure the ‘price’ of public services for the 
individual private actor” (p. 76).  Beyond this, many public services are specifically designed to 
aid a society’s neediest citizens, with the least ability-to-pay.  The benefits they receive may far 
exceed the taxes they can pay.  And others may have the capacity to pay substantial taxes, but 
have little or no need for many government programs.  Liberals and conservatives are likely to 
have different perspectives on which principle best represents fairness.   Political conservatives 
may favor the benefit principle, which advocates paying only for what is received.  Political 
liberals are likely to favor the ability-to-pay principle, which may support income redistribution.    
As Musgrave (1986) writes, “Contrasted with the conservative appeal of the benefit doctrine, the 
ability to pay approach was favoured by liberal writers who were not averse to income 
redistribution” (p. 321).  
 
Musgrave and Musgrave (1976) describe the benefit principle this way: “One approach rests on 
the so-called benefit principle.  According to the theory, dating back to Adam Smith and earlier 
writers, an equitable tax system is one under which each taxpayer contributes in line with the 
benefits which he receives from public services” (p. 211).  In international tax, this is also used 
to support taxing profits where they are sourced.  Schön (2009) writes, “The benefit principle is 
meant to justify income taxation with respect to the support granted by a country to the 
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generation of income in its territory.  This principle is in particular invoked by source countries 
to legitimate taxation in jurisdictions where the taxpayer is not resident but carries on all or part 
of his income-generating operations” (p. 75).  Governments may cite the benefit principle to 
support thin capitalization/interest deduction regulations, arguing that intercompany loans are 
extended to shift income from where it is earned, and where government services are provided, 
to low-tax jurisdictions that provide minimal government support. 
 
Musgrave and Musgrave (1976) describe the other fairness principle this way: “The other strand, 
also of distinguished ancestry, rests on the ‘ability-to-pay’ principle.  Under this approach, the 
tax problem is viewed by itself, independent of expenditure determination.” (p. 211). Thus tax 
obligations are not necessarily linked to benefits received.  Schön (2009) notes that the ability-to-
pay principle rests upon liberal values of shared sacrifice, writing “The ability-to-pay principle is 
deeply rooted in the Western tradition of being a citizen’s contribution to the common good by 
reason of solidarity among the members of a society.  It is meant to address the different 
consumption power of different taxpayers in order to enforce a politically defined financial 
sacrifice” (p. 71).   Musgrave and Musgrave say that while market-oriented economists may take 
issue with the ability-to-pay principle, it remains an important standard by which taxes are 
frequently evaluated.  They write that a “given total revenue is needed and each taxpayer is 
asked to contribute in line with his ability to pay.  This approach leaves the expenditure side of 
the public sector dangling, and is thus less satisfactory from the economist’s point of view.  Yet, 
actual tax policy is largely determined independently of the expenditure side and an equity rule is 
needed to provide guidance.  The ability-to-pay principle is widely accepted as this guide” (p. 
211-212).   
Most experts believe taxes should be neutral, in that they should not discriminate in favor or 
against certain taxpayers and investors, in the absence of externalities.  Musgrave and Musgrave 
(1976) said “Taxes should be chosen so as to minimize interference with economic decisions in 
otherwise efficient markets” (p. 210).  Doernberg (2008) writes “From an efficiency point of 
view, the aspirational goal for a tax system in general, or for the U.S. rules governing 
international transactions specifically, is the implementation of a tax-neutral set of rules that 
neither discourage nor encourage particular activity.  The tax system should remain in the 
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background, and business, investment, and consumption decisions should be made for non-tax 
reasons” (p. 3-4).  
 
In general, there are two different aspects to neutrality.  One is capital-export neutrality, and the 
second is capital-import neutrality.  Concerning the former, Doernberg (2008) writes:  “A tax 
system meets the standard of capital-export neutrality if a taxpayer’s choice between investing 
capital at home or abroad is not affected by taxation” (p. 4).  Schön  (2009) describes it similarly, 
writing that capital export neutrality “requires that—from the position of the investor—the tax 
burden for foreign and domestic investment is equal and therefore does not distort the decision of 
whether to invest here or there” (p. 79).   While many believe this is still a worthwhile objective, 
in practice capital-export neutrality does not exist today, due to international tax competition and 
laws that encourage countries to tax income where it is sourced, or earned.   Schön (2009) argues 
that capital-export neutrality would be “most easily achieved when the country of residence of 
the investor taxes his or her worldwide income while the country of source fully waives its 
jurisdiction over income connected with its territory” (p. 79).   However source-based taxation is 
more frequent than residence-based taxation, and few countries would be willing to forgo taxing 
profits earned (or sourced) in their country. 
 
Capital import neutrality has played an important role in the development of thin capitalization 
laws.  Schön (2009) writes “The concept of capital import neutrality starts from the perspective 
of the host country of an investment and compares the tax burden for domestic and foreign 
investors” (p. 80).  Doernberg (2008) says “This standard is satisfied when all firms doing 
business in a market are taxed at the same rate” (p. 5).  To encourage FDI and support 
international trade, many international agreements require that domestic firms and overseas 
investments are taxed equitably, and countries violating these rules can be subject to trade 
sanctions and penalties.  To attract or limit FDI countries may be tempted to use the tax system 
to either subsidize or penalize overseas investors, which is considered an unfair trade practice.  
Thus many trade agreements and international tax standards mandate consistent tax rates and 
regulations, so companies compete on a “level-playing field.”  Some jurisdictions support this 
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standard with a “freedom of establishment” clause.  As will be explained subsequently, several 
thin capitalization rules have violated this standard, as judged by the European Commonwealth’s 
(EC) freedom of establishment clause.  
 
Finally, we should ask whether thin capitalization/earnings stripping rules achieve their intended 
objective.  Are they effective?  As Musgrave and Musgrave (1976) wrote, it is appropriate to use 
taxes to correct market inefficiencies (p. 210).  In this case, the inefficiency tax authorities wish 
to address is the shifting of earnings from high-tax jurisdictions in which they are earned, to low-
tax jurisdictions.  Is a thin capitalization rule effective at achieving this objective?  Or is it so lax 
that it does not restrict abuse?  How easy is it to evade the tax laws and move profits?  Is the law 
so restrictive that it constrains firms from financing FDI in ways inconsistent with their business 
models?  In short, do the laws achieve the goals of funding government services while promoting 
a prosperous economy?  An effective thin capitalization law should constrain firms from 
incurring excessive intercompany debt solely for the purpose of reducing taxes.  But it should 
also allow firms to incur debt, and take a tax deduction, when such debt is a normal part of a 
firm’s business model.   
To summarize, the tax principles used to evaluate thin capitalization, interest expense deduction 
limits, and related rules are:  
1) The certainty principle 
 
2) The efficiency principle   
 
3) The fairness principle, which also includes: 
a. The benefit principle    
b. The ability-to-pay principle 
 
4) The neutrality principle, which also includes: 
a. Capital-export neutrality 
b. Capital-import neutrality 
 
5) The effectiveness principle 
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International Tax Laws 
International laws govern how business transactions are treated for income tax purposes, and 
frequently reflect the tax principles cited.  These tax laws are more specific than tax principles, 
and may be interpreted differently from country-to-country.  Nonetheless, they govern how 
nations tax MNEs.  In addition, unlike the tax principles mentioned above, these international tax 
laws may be the source of litigation between taxpayers and tax authorities in various nations.    
Most economists and tax experts believe business transactions should not be motivated solely by 
tax reduction goals. This is the business purpose doctrine.  This doctrine says a business 
transaction should have some purpose other than tax minimization.  Jones (2006) says in the 
United States “a transaction should not be effective for tax purposes unless it has a genuine 
business purpose other than tax avoidance.  The lack of any business purpose by the participants 
can render a transaction meaningless, at least from the perspective of the IRS, even if the 
transaction literally complies with the law” (p. 85)6  Many other countries have similar 
regulations, to prevent taxpayers and advisors from structuring elaborate tax transactions that 
serve no business purpose other than reducing tax obligations. 
 
Related to the business purpose doctrine, most tax authorities believe tax obligations should be 
determined by the underlying business substance, rather than the legal structuring of a 
transaction.  This is known as the substance over form doctrine.7  In many situations it is possible 
to structure a business transaction so it literally complies with the law, but the net result of the 
transaction conflicts with the law’s intention.  As Lessambo (2009) writes, “The substance over 
form doctrine relies upon the underpinning that the tax results of an arrangement are better 
determined based on the underlying substance rather than its mere formal structuring.  Therefore, 
the IRS has the ability to challenge a given transaction according to its underlying substance” (p. 
207).  This doctrine is frequently relevant in thin capitalization regulations.  For example, to shift 
income from one country to another, a MNE may extend an intercompany loan from one legal 
entity to another.  Tax regulations might try to prevent this by specifically limiting intercompany 
                                                                
6   The business purpose doctrine was first articulated in the United States in Gregory v. Halvering, 293 U.S. 465 
(1935). 
7 Within the United States, this doctrine was articulated in Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771 (CA-3, 1967). 
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debt.  In response, the MNE might structure a loan so it is literally extended from a third party, 
but in substance the parent guarantees the debt or initiates a back-to-back loan that culminates in 
the third-party loan.  Tax authorities may argue that while the loan was formally extended from a 
third party, in substance it was an intercompany loan.8  Courts frequently look through the legal 
agreements and focus on the net business substance of transactions. 
 
Another important legal concept is the arm’s-length standard.  The arm’s-length standard 
governs how related entities value sales of products and services.  When a MNE operates in 
more than one country, it typically creates a new legal entity to facilitate legal operations in that 
jurisdiction.  That entity may need to buy or sell products from other legal entities within the 
same MNE.  According to Jones (2006), “An important presumption about market transactions is 
that the parties are negotiating at arm’s-length.  In other words, each party is dealing in its own 
economic self-interest, trying to obtain the most advantageous terms possible from the other 
party” (p. 62).    The OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations (2010) cite the arm’s-length standard (pp. 31-32).  U.S. Treasury Regulation 
§1.482(1)(b)(1) also supports the arm’s length standard, stating, “In determining the true taxable 
income of a controlled taxpayer, the standard to be applied in every case is that of a taxpayer 
dealing at arm’s length with an uncontrolled taxpayer.” 
 
Development and Overview of Thin Capitalization Rules 
To understand thin capitalization rules, a brief overview of this issue follows, and a more 
detailed examination of the regulations in a number of key countries will ensue.  Rules in all G-7 
countries plus Denmark, the Netherlands and New Zealand will be reviewed in some detail, as 
rules in those countries illustrate many of the challenges and complexities of drafting effective 
                                                                
8 A closely-related and overlapping tax standard is the “step transaction” doctrine.  Lessambo (2009) writes, “Under 
the step transaction doctrine a series of formally separate transactions will be integrated if they show to be 
interdependent, and part of a sole picture” (p. 209).  For example, if a MNE lent money to a bank, and that bank lent 
the funds back to the MNE’s subsidiary, tax authorities might collapse the two transactions together to demonstrate 
the loan should be viewed as related-party debt.  Thus both the form over substance principle and the step-
transaction doctrine could be used to treat the series of transactions as a related-party loan. 
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thin capitalization/interest deduction rules.  These rules will be contrasted with regulations in a 
number of smaller European countries. 
 
In 1969 the United States enacted IRC 385, which gave tax authorities the power to determine if 
intercompany loans were, in substance, equity investments.  Tax authorities believed then that 
characterizing intercompany loans as equity would resolve the thin capitalization issue.  If the 
IRS could deem intercompany loans to be investments, it could treat the interest payments as 
dividends, which are not tax deductible.  However tax authorities eventually determined these 
tools were inadequate, and that additional tools were necessary.  According to Lessambo (2009), 
“In 1989, Congress enacted section 163(j) for excessive interest payments paid abroad” (p. 10).  
Many other countries began to develop similar rules around this time.  According to von Brocke 
and Perez (2009), “In the late 1990s most developed countries began to introduce thin 
capitalization rules in order to restrict the implementation of abusive financing structures which 
might lead to the transfer of profits to another jurisdiction where the profits were taxed at a lower 
rate” (p. 29).    
 
From inception, thin capitalization rules generally evaluated the firm’s balance sheet to 
determine if the Controlled Foreign Corporation’s (CFC’s) financing structure was excessively 
leveraged.  von Brocke and Perez (2009) write, “In a first stage, the majority of these thin 
capitalization rules established the existence of safe harbours (e.g. debt-to-equity ratios) in order 
to force related companies to apply normal market conditions in their intra-group transactions” 
(p. 29).  Lund, Korsgaard and Albertsen (2008) agree, writing “Specific rules aimed to 
discourage thin capitalization often require that the debt-to-equity ratio meet a specific ratio in 
order for the company to be allowed to deduct interest expenses” (p. 283). 
However, since that time, several countries have shifted their approach to combat these financing 
strategies.  Lund, Korsgaard and Albertsen (2008) write “In recent years, there has been a 
tendency for some countries to base their rules on a company’s operations, and more and more 
countries are introducing so-called interest limitation rules and earnings stripping rules” (p. 283). 
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Germany and Italy have recently adopted this approach.  von Brocke and Perez (2009) believe 
debt-to-equity rules were ineffective, writing “it was very simple for companies to circumvent 
the limit established by debt-to-equity ratio by increasing the equity of the financed subsidiary in 
a manner sufficient to push down as much debt as necessary” (p. 29).  In addition, several 
countries found their rules were inconsistent with the capital import neutrality principle, which 
also motivated those countries to develop alternative regulatory approaches. 
 
One country, the United Kingdom, began by limiting the debt-to-equity ratio, and now relies 
exclusively upon the arm’s-length standard.  The U.K. does not give taxpayers any firm financial 
guidelines or ratios, which may make it difficult for taxpayers to comply with the standard, and 
for regulators to enforce it.  Developments in the United Kingdom will be discussed in more 
detail subsequently. 
 
There are several other facets to thin capitalization rules that merit attention.  One is that 
countries monitor thin capitalization rules in other countries when developing their own policies.  
van Saparoea (2009) writes that a “Netherlands legislator has been investigating the possibility 
of introducing new legislation that is similar to that applying in Germany” (p.7).  von Brocke and 
Perez state “With the 2008 Budget law, the Italian parliament introduced new interest limitation 
rules inspired by the new German rules, and repealed thin capitalization rules which have been in 
place since 2003” (p. 33).  In part this is driven by the search for more effective way to regulate 
this activity, but it may also be motivated by tax competition. 
 
Several countries have altered their rules a number of times in the past decade.  von Brocke and 
Perez (2009) write “the United Kingdom modified its thin capitalization rules three times 
between 1994 and 2004” (p. 29).  They also explain Germany had thin capitalization rules which 
were changed in 2000, 2003, and 2007 (pp. 30-33).  Describing developments in Germany, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, van Saparoea’s article is entitled “Optimizing the Interest 
Deduction Rules—A Never-Ending Story” (p. 3).  Frequent changes suggest it has been difficult 
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to craft these rules successfully.  Several governments have monitored these rules regularly and 
have modified them to improve effectiveness.  However other countries have developed more 
stable thin capitalization rules, for reasons to be discussed subsequently. 
 
The Impact of Tax Competition 
One of the driving forces behind international tax laws is tax competition.  As MNEs must 
satisfy shareholders they seek to maximize net income, which motivates them to reduce income 
taxes.  Gresik (2001) notes that MNEs have the ability to transfer operations from one country to 
another, and explains: “This flexibility not only helps transnationals minimize the cost of taxes 
and regulations imposed by national governments; it can also aid them in pitting one government 
against another” (p. 800).  Because MNEs can move business operations easily, they have a 
negotiating advantage over taxing authorities.   
 
Gresik argues tax competition deprives some countries of needed tax revenue.  He writes “it is 
clear that one country’s choice of tax policy can impose fiscal externalities on another country” 
(p. 820).  Beyond this, MNEs manage the information they provide to taxing authorities.  
Governments do not share tax return information without taxpayer agreement, creating an 
information asymmetry that benefits the MNE.   As Gresik writes, “In the absence of shared 
information, the usual global efficiency losses arise because each country’s tax policies still 
impose negative externalities on the other” (p. 833).   
 
Similarly, governments aim to develop tax policies that maximize a nation’s well-being.  
However the task confronting tax authorities and legislators can be challenging.  While it is clear 
MNEs increase profits through lower tax rates, it is less clear whether governments benefit from 
increasing or decreasing income tax rates.  Lowering tax rates may reduce tax revenues, at least 
initially.  But lower taxes may also attract FDI, create jobs, and make businesses more 
competitive.  Increasing tax rates might immediately raise tax revenue, but discourage FDI. 
Schön (2009) writes, “Governments know that a simple extension of the tax base or a raise of the 
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tax rate might not have the aspired revenue effect once mobile taxpayers relocated their 
residence or their activity/investment to another jurisdiction.  There might be a fall in revenue, 
while a lowering of the tax base or rate might induce more investment, increasing both domestic 
welfare and the government budget” (p. 70).  Some small countries, such as Singapore and 
Ireland, have adopted low tax strategies to attract investment.  It is not entirely certain what the 
best economic strategy is, and countries need to balance prospects of attracting new investment 
against the immediate impact upon tax revenue.  So not only do MNEs have an information 
advantage over governments, they have clearer objectives.   
 
van Saparoea (2009) describes the government’s dilemma:  “Anti-abuse legislation has over time 
become a challenging issue for tax authorities, which try to balance tax opportunities, on the one 
hand, and tax restrictions, on the other, within the constraints of retaining a competitive 
advantage, compared to other jurisdictions” (p. 3).  In the absence of coordinated international 
tax policies, this clearly gives MNEs an advantage.  In a global economy with mobile capital, 
one country can gain an advantage by offering lower income tax rates or less restrictive tax 
policies, at least in the short run.  This pressures other countries to follow suit and match the tax 
rate cuts or to enact permissive tax regulations. 
Evidence of Thin Capitalization/Earnings Stripping 
While it is clear that MNEs could reduce their tax rate by leveraging debt on subsidiaries in high-
tax jurisdictions, for some time no study conclusively demonstrated firms were doing so.  Desai, 
Foley and Hines (2004) commented that “estimating the sensitivity of capital structure to tax 
incentives has proven remarkably difficult, due in part to measurement problems.  Consequently, 
it is not surprising that several studies find no effect or unexpected relationships between tax 
incentives and the use of debt” (p. 2454).   
 
However in recent years several studies have shown that firms leverage more debt on 
subsidiaries operating in countries imposing high income taxes.  As Haufler and Runkel (2008) 
wrote, the evidence that high income tax rates motivate additional debt is “conclusive” (p. 1).   In 
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addition, the studies also demonstrate that most of the additional debt is extended from related 
entities within the MNE, which allows the company to reduce its tax rate without incurring 
additional trade expenses. 
 
Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) studied the leverage of 3,680 MNEs owning 32,342 related 
corporations during 1982, 1989 and 1994.  The study focused on U.S. firms investing abroad.  
They concluded these firms increased debt in response to high tax rates.  They write:  “First, 
there is strong evidence that affiliates of multinational firms alter the overall level of composition 
of debt in response to tax incentives.  The estimates imply 10% higher tax rates are associated 
with 2.8% greater affiliate debt as a fraction of assets, internal finance being particularly 
sensitive to tax differences.  While the estimated elasticity of external borrowing with respect to 
the tax rate is 0.19, the estimated tax elasticity of borrowing from parent companies is 0.35” (p. 
2452).  In other words, when operating in high-tax jurisdictions, MNEs increased both trade and 
intercompany debt, but intercompany debt was more responsive to high income tax rates. 
 
They also compared debt-to-equity levels in several countries.  Desai, Foley and Hines write 
“affiliates in high-tax countries generally make greater use of debt to finance their assets than do 
affiliates in low-tax countries.  Affiliates in tax havens such as Barbados have aggregate leverage 
ratios of 0.30 or less, while affiliates in high-tax countries such Japan and Italy have aggregate 
leverage ratios that exceed 0.53” (p. 2462).   
 
A study of German companies reached similar conclusions.  Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005) 
conducted a study of the outbound investments of 13,758 German-owned subsidiaries between 
1996 and 2002.  They also concluded there was a strong relationship between high income tax 
rates and subsidiary debt.  They write, “We find that the tax rate in the host country has a 
sizeable and significantly positive effect on leverage” (p. 1).    
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Mintz and Weichenrieder said their results were similar to those in the study by Desai, Foley and 
Hines, writing “our estimates are largely in line with results derived from U.S.-owned 
subsidiaries” (p. 17).  However they did find some differences in the behavior of German firms, 
as compared to U.S. based MNEs.  They concluded German firms used very little third-party 
debt to achieve higher leverage, writing “German-owned subsidiaries rely almost exclusively on 
intra-company loans, while in U.S. studies the marginal effect of a tax change has turned out to 
be larger for third-party debt” (p. 17).  In short, the German firms used little trade debt to achieve 
financial leverage. 
 
Mintz and Weichenrieder also analyzed the debt ratios of wholly-owned versus partially-owned 
subsidiaries.  They write “While wholly-owned firms experience a significant tax effect on their 
financial leverage, this is not the case for German subsidiaries that are less than 100% owned 
affiliates” (p. 17).  They believed that minority shareholder interests complicated the process of 
extending related-party debt. 
 
Seida and Wempe (2004) analyzed the impact of twelve corporate inversions, contrasting results 
with twenty-four similar corporations, in similar industries and with comparable annual revenue 
figures.  They found that ICs realized substantial reductions in their effective tax rate (ETR) as a 
result of the corporate inversion.  The pre-inversion tax rate fell from 32.01 percent to 20.44 
percent after the inversion (p. 806).  They wrote “The 11.57 percentage point percentage point 
reduction in mean ETR for the inversion sample is significantly greater than the mean ETR 
reduction for the control sample (approximately four percentage points)” (p. 806). 
 
Furthermore, the study concluded the ETR decreased due to a substantial decline in U.S.-sourced 
income, primarily due to earning’s stripping.  They write that “despite managers’ claims that 
inversion is necessary to avoid U.S. tax on foreign earnings, most of the observed inversion-
related tax reduction is likely due to avoidance of U.S. tax on U.S. earnings through increased 
stripping of U.S. earnings to lower-tax foreign countries” (p. 825).   
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To summarize, all three studies demonstrated that MNEs transfer earnings from high-tax 
jurisdictions by leveraging subsidiaries with debt.  Each of the three studies also concluded that 
the debt was lent by related entities, rather than third-parties. 
 
Thin Capitalization/Interest Deduction Limits in the United States 
U.S. corporate income taxes are among the highest in the world, rivaled only by Japan’s 40% 
rate.  The federal income tax rate is 35%, and most states also levy corporate income taxes, so 
the combined rate is approximately the same as Japan’s.9  Given these high income tax rates and 
the size of the U.S. economy, the federal government should be alert to potential inbound thin 
capitalization activities. 
 
U.S. thin capitalization rules were first implemented in 1989 when IRC section §163(j) was 
enacted.  Section §163(j)(2)(A)(ii) applies 
 when “the ratio of debt to equity of such corporation as of the close of such taxable years (or any 
other day during the taxable year as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe) exceeds 1.5 to 
1.”  When that condition is met, and the interest expense is greater than fifty percent of the 
adjusted taxable income of the business, that portion above fifty percent is not tax deductible.  
Thus both conditions must be met before tax deductible interest expenses are limited.  Adjusted 
taxable income is calculated by adding back net interest expense, depreciation, amortization, 
depletion, and a net operating loss deduction to taxable income (Department of Treasury, 2007, 
p. 9).  The excess interest is not deductible that year, but can be carried forward into future years.  
The initial rules only applied to debt extended from related parties, but in 1993 the law was 
expanded to include debt extended from unrelated parties, if guaranteed by a foreign or tax-
exempt entity (Department of Treasury, 2007, p. 9). 
 
                                                                
9 See tables on page 43-44 for income tax rates in the G-7 countries. 
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The U.S. 1.5 to 1 debt-to-equity figure is a “safe harbor” rule.  When the debt-to-equity ratio is 
below that figure, the IRS will not question whether the debt is excessive.  If it is above the 1.5 
to 1 ratio, the IRS may or may not determine the debt is excessive, based on an examination of 
all relevant facts and circumstances.  To describe rules in several other countries the Department 
of Treasury (2007) wrote, “A debt-to-equity ratio is often used, but sometimes it is a strict limit 
(e.g. interest on any debt that exceeds the ratio is disallowed) rather than only a safe harbor as it 
is in the United States” (pp. 10-11). 
 
While the U.S. debt-to-equity ratio is lower than that imposed in other nations, this does not 
necessarily demonstrate the rules are effective at achieving their objective.  If the limitations are 
ineffective, firms can still shift income overseas through excessive debt.  The U.S. Congress 
became concerned that earning’s stripping was depriving the U.S. Treasury of needed tax 
revenue, and in 2004 directed the Department of Treasury to study the impact of thin 
capitalization upon  tax revenue. 
 
To analyze this issue, the U.S. Treasury Department conducted two studies.  The first compared 
the profitability of Foreign Controlled Domestic Corporations (FCDCs), which are owned 50% 
or more by foreign parties, and Domestically Controlled Corporations (DCCs).   If FCDCs were 
less profitable than DCs, this might indicate earnings were being stripped out of the U.S.  But 
this study did not reach a conclusion on that question.   
 
The Department of Treasury study analyzed the 2004 tax returns for over 76,000 corporations, 
and determined DCCs were significantly more profitable than FCDCs.10  DCC profit levels 
averaged 4.3% of revenue, while FCDCs averaged 2.9% of revenue (Department of Treasury, 
2007, p. 13).  However the Department of Treasury study suggested this may be explained by the 
fact “that DCCs receive a substantial amount of income in the form of dividends and royalties, 
                                                                
10 Partnerships, Real Estate Investment Trusts and S-Co’s (small, domestic corporations) were excluded from the 
study to facilitate consistent comparisons, though the Department of Treasury acknowledged these entities could 
sometimes be financed through excessive debt. 
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mainly from subsidiaries abroad” (Department of Treasury, 2007, p. 14).    Comparisons of 
operating income, which exclude dividends, royalties, interest revenue and expenses, and 
depreciation and amortization, demonstrate that FCDCs are actually more profitable than DCCs, 
registering profits at 6.3% of revenue, versus 5.5% of revenue for DCCs (p. 15).  Furthermore, 
comparisons of interest paid/cash flow demonstrated that interest expenses for DCCs and FCDCs 
were roughly comparable (p. 18).  Thus the study “did not find conclusive evidence that FCDCs 
have very high interest expense relative to cash flow compared to DCCs” (p. 21).  Given these 
results, the Treasury Department reached no conclusion on earning’s stripping, but determined it 
needed to gather more information.   
 
To analyze this topic further, in February 2009 the IRS released a new form, 8926, entitled 
Disqualified Corporate Interest Expense Disallowed Under Section 163(j) and Related 
Information.  The purpose of the form is to collect more information to determine whether some 
FCDCs might be engaged in earning’s stripping activities.  According to IRS Bulletin 2007-50, 
“Form 8926 solicits information relating to the determination and computation of a corporate 
taxpayer’s 163(j) limitation, including the determination of the taxpayer’s debt-to-equity ratio, 
net interest expense, adjusted taxable income, excess interest expense, total disqualified interest 
for the tax year and the amount of interest deduction disallowed under section 163(j), as well as 
certain information with respect to the related persons receiving disqualified interest.”  The IRS 
plans to use this information to determine if earning’s stripping from the United States is 
occurring. 
 
In the second study, the U.S. Department of Treasury analyzed the behavior of Inverted 
Corporations (ICs) to determine if they were engaged in earning’s stripping activities.  An IC is a 
MNE that shifts its corporate headquarters from one country to another.  A U.S. IC is relieved of 
the burden of the U.S. tax on worldwide earnings.  In principle, taxes on U.S.-sourced income 
should not change.  However the study determined, “data on ICs strongly suggest that these 
corporations are shifting substantially all of their income out of the United States, primarily 
though interest payments” (p. 21).  Rules to combat thin capitalization were ineffective at 
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controlling this activity.  The Department of Treasury study relied primarily upon the previously 
cited analysis by Seida and Wempe (2004) that analyzed the tax impact of corporate inversions. 
As mentioned, Seida and Wempe determined that ICs substantially reduced their effective tax 
rate by shifting their corporate headquarters abroad, leveraging the U.S. entity with substantial 
debt, and transferring earnings to low-tax jurisdictions.  Over the course of the study they found 
ICs reduced their effective tax rate (ETR) by 11.57 points, while comparable firms reduced their 
tax rate by approximately four points.  Seida and Wempe did a detailed analysis of four firms 
and concluded the ETR reduction was “attributable to the stripping of U.S. earnings via 
intercompany interest payments” (p. 825).  They found that all four firms substantially increased 
total and long-term intercompany debt after the inversion, much of it incurred by the U.S.-based 
entity (p. 816-817).  Furthermore, they found that thin capitalization rules were not effective in 
limiting earning’s stripping.  Seida and Wempe analyzed publically-available information, and 
did not have access to the firms’ tax returns.  However they concluded that at least three of the 
firms, and possibly all four, had U.S. debt-to-equity ratios less than 1.5 to 1, the thin 
capitalization limit in the United States (p. 821).  They found the debt-to-equity ratio for the 
fourth firm may or may not be below 1.5 to 1, depending upon how the firm consolidated its 
financial results for tax purposes.  That firm’s debt-to-equity ratio may have been as low as .9 to 
1, if its “Other Subsidiaries” were consolidated into the parent’s tax return. 11   Seida and Wempe 
(2004) did not specifically analyze whether the firm’s interest expenses exceeded 50% of 
EBITDA.  However that limitation does not take effect if the debt-to-equity ratio is less than 1.5 
to 1.  Thus it is possible to strip all earnings from the US as long as the debt-to-equity ratio is not 
exceeded. 
 
Congress passed legislation in 2004 (AJCA 2004) that addressed corporate inversions. It was 
specifically aimed at ICs in which “the former shareholders of the U.S. corporation hold (by 
                                                                
11 Seida and Wempe (2004) specifically focused upon ICs, but note that other MNEs may be motivated to strip 
earnings from the U.S., as well.  However they believe the incentives may not be as strong, writing “Foreign-
domiciled firms (whose foreign domicile was not established via an inversion) with tax rates less that the U.S. rate 
have incentives to strip U.S. earnings.  U.S.-domiciled firms also have incentives to strip U.S. earnings.  However, 
their ability to do so is severely limited by statutory interest expense allocation rules…U.S.-domiciled firms achieve 
only deferral of income when U.S. earnings are stripped; foreign-domiciled firms (including inverted firms) achieve 
permanent exclusion of income stripped from the U.S.” (p. 806). 
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reason of holding stock in the U.S. corporation) 80 percent or more (by vote or value) of the 
stock of the foreign-incorporated entity after the transaction” (Joint Committee on Taxation, 
2009, p. 58).  IRC §7874 has significantly reduced this activity in the United States.  According 
to Nadal (2008) “Under section 7874, inversions are disregarded when a foreign corporation 
acquires substantially all the assets of a domestic entity such that after the transaction, at least 80 
percent of the foreign corporation’s shares are owned by former shareholders of the domestic 
entity and the expanded affiliate group does not have substantial commercial activities in the 
foreign corporation’s country of incorporation” (p. 3).  When those conditions are met, the firm 
continues to be treated as a U.S. corporation for tax purposes. 
 
Earlier this year the Obama administration released proposals to change international tax rules in 
a variety of ways, including the tax deductibility of interest expenses in limited situations.  
Because the Department of Treasury study did not provide evidence that overseas firms with 
domestic CFCs were stripping earnings outside the U.S., no changes were proposed to those 
rules.  However as the Seida and Wempe (2004) study demonstrated Inverted Corporations were 
stripping earnings from the U.S., Congress enacted IRC §7874, which taxes Inverted 
Corporations as domestic entities.  But IRC §7874 only taxed ICs as domestic entities when the 
80% ownership threshold was met.  Thus the Obama administration proposed a to lower this 
threshold to situations in which 60% of the stock in the new entity is owned by former 
shareholders of that corporation (Joint Committee on Taxation, 2009, p. 58).  As mentioned, the 
entire international proposal was withdrawn in October, 2009, including these additional tax 
rules governing those ICs.   
 
The details of the withdrawn IC rules merit review, as they reflect the administration’s thinking 
on thin capitalization regulations, and thus may shape future proposals.  According to the Joint 
Committee on Taxation (2009) proposal, the 1.5 to 1 debt-to-equity safe harbor would have been 
eliminated, and ICs would be able to deduct interest only up to 25 percent of adjusted taxable 
income, versus 50 percent today (Joint Committee on Taxation, 2009, page 59).  However the 
rules would only have applied upon interest paid to related parties.  The interest cap remained at 
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50 percent of adjusted taxable income for interest paid to third-parties, when the debt is 
guaranteed by a related-party.  The Joint Committee on Taxation summarized the proposal by 
stating, “By eliminating the debt-equity safe harbor, reducing the adjusted taxable income 
threshold from 50 percent to 25 percent for interest on related-party debt, limiting the 
carryforward of disallowed interest to 10 years, and eliminating the carryforward of excess 
limitation, the proposal significantly strengthens rules that appear ineffective in preventing 
certain recent earnings stripping arrangements in the context of corporate inversion transactions” 
(p. 61).   
 
As mentioned previously, one way MNEs can avoid debt-to-equity constraints is by injecting 
both equity and debt into a subsidiary.  If the MNE aims to reduce taxes, it can first calculate 
how much debt it wants to leverage on the subsidiary to strip earnings, and then calculate how 
much equity must be invested to comply with debt-to-equity limitations.  While the worldwide 
enterprise’s external debt-to-equity ratio may be determined by the firm’s objective to balance 
shareholder risk and return, this is not necessarily the motivation for each internally-funded 
subsidiary.  The optimal debt structure for a worldwide enterprise may not be the optimal debt 
structure for a subsidiary, particularly if that CFC operates in a country that imposes high income 
taxes.   
 
Given these facts, it seems the United States may be too cautious in regulating earning’s 
stripping activities.  The relationship between high income tax rates and debt has been 
demonstrated several times, and the U.S. corporate tax rates are among the highest in the world.   
Its current rules do not effectively limit earning’s stripping, as the Seida and Wempe (2004) 
study showed.   Many other industrialized countries have taken more aggressive steps to control 
earning’s stripping, as later sections in this paper will demonstrate.  As the United States looks to 
raise additional sources of tax revenue, it should aim to tighten existing rules which do not 
adequately control tax-motivated intercompany debt.  
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Thin Capitalization/Interest Deduction Limits in Germany 
Germany initially implemented debt-to-equity limitations to control excessive financial leverage.  
Germany’s tax deductible debt-to-equity limit ratio was 1.5 to 1 in most situations; however, it 
was 3 to 1 for holding companies (Strunin, 2003, p. 52).  The rules were specifically aimed at 
combating situations in which a related party in another country extended loans to shift earnings 
from Germany.  “The thin capitalization rules applicable until fiscal year 2003 were focussed 
specifically on the avoidance of abusive financing strategies in which the lender was a foreign 
shareholder or related party” (von Brocke and Perez, page 30).  However Germany’s approach 
prompted legal challenges in the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
 
In the 2002 Lankhorst-Hohorst case the ECJ determined that German anti-abuse rules violated 
the freedom of establishment standard in Article 43 of the EC Treaty.  In that case a Dutch firm 
lent EUR 1.5 million to its German subsidiary, Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH, in which it owned 
100% of the shares.  As part of the loan, the parent wrote a letter of support which waived the 
right to repayment in the event third party creditors made claims against the German subsidiary.  
This loan enabled the subsidiary to reduce its bank borrowing and its interest expense.  German 
tax authorities denied the interest deduction and deemed the interest payments to the Dutch 
owner a dividend distribution, reasoning that a third-party would not have made a loan under the 
same conditions, given the firm’s high level of indebtedness and the parent’s agreement to waive 
repayment in favor of other creditors (von Brocke and Perez, 2009, p. 30). 
However the ECJ determined the German tax rules treated domestic and international firms 
inequitably.  It rejected arguments from German, Danish, and U.K. tax authorities, as well as the 
EU Commission, supporting the German law.  German tax authorities had characterized the 
interest payments as dividends, and German tax law treated dividend payments to German and 
international firms differently.  If a German resident corporation had extended the loan and it 
was deemed a dividend distribution, the parent would have been entitled to claim a tax credit for 
additional taxes due.  However if a non-resident corporation extended the loan, and it were 
deemed a dividend distribution, the additional income would be taxed at a 30% rate.  No tax 
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credits would apply.  Thus domestic and international firms were treated differently, giving tax 
preferential treatment to domestically-owned German companies.   
 
In response, the German government modified its article 8A by expanding scope so that it 
applied to all lending transactions, including German resident parent companies.  Nonetheless, 
new German rules did not fully eliminate differences in treatment of domestic and international 
owners of German firms.  von Brocke and Perez write “the deemed dividends appreciated in 
relation to German parent companies were 95% tax exempt, while if the lender were a foreign 
company, the deemed dividend would be subject to a withholding tax at the rate of 25%” unless 
a tax treaty offered a lower rate (p. 31).  These rules again may not have complied with Article 
43 of the EC treaty freedom of establishment clause, necessitating changes.  In short, it appears 
that once the thin capitalization rules determined interest expenses should be treated as 
dividends, domestic and international parent companies were again taxed differently.   
 
In addition, Germany sought to create a more attractive investment environment, and thus 
lowered income tax rates and simplified certain tax regulations.  van Saparoea (2009) writes, 
“Germany has attempted to create an attractive tax jurisdiction by widening its tax base in the 
Corporate Tax Reform Act of 2008” (p. 6).  This has been part of a longer term German strategy 
to make that country more attractive to investors.  Becker, Fuest and Hemmelgarn (2006) write:  
“The main goals of the German Tax Reform 2000 were to improve the competitiveness of firms 
in Germany, to foster investment, to increase Germany’s attractiveness to foreign investors and 
to adapt the corporate tax system to the rules of the EC common market” (p. 6).  As part of this 
longer term strategy, Germany has overhauled its tax legislation on thin capitalization, and has 
shifted from focusing on debt-to-equity ratios to an emphasis upon limiting interest expense 
deductions.  An advantage of these rules is that they directly limit interest deductions, and thus 
sidestep the complexities of characterizing interest expenses as dividends. 
 
54 
 
Germany recently passed a General Interest Disallowance Rule, which was phased in during 
2007 and 2008.  The rule does not reference balance sheet debt, and it limits the net interest 
expense of a corporation to 30% of the taxable income before interest expense, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization expenses (EBITDA).  Net interest expense is defined as interest 
revenue less interest expense. Bagel and Huning (2008) write “The scope of the new rules is far 
broader than former thin capitalization rules, as any third-party debt financing (whether or not 
there is back-to-back financing) is included” (p. 310).  The interest deduction rules apply when 
the business is part of a controlled group, which is defined as an enterprise that is or may be 
included in consolidated financial statements, prepared according to IFRS, U.S. GAAP or 
German GAAP standards.  When interest expenses are disallowed they can be carried forward 
indefinitely. 
 
The German rules offer three exceptions to these interest limitation rules.  First, to be 
administratively efficient a de minimis rule states the interest limitation does not apply when 
firms incur net interest expenses less than EUR one million per year.  Second, a “stand alone 
clause” provides an exception if the relevant business is not fully consolidated into the 
worldwide enterprise’s results, for either financial or business control reasons.  Third, an 
exception is granted if the business belongs to a worldwide enterprise, and the ratio of equity-to- 
assets for the subsidiary is greater than or comes with one percentage point of the equity-to-
assets ratio of the worldwide enterprise.  In other words, if the subsidiary is less leveraged than 
the worldwide enterprise, or is no more than one percent more leveraged than the worldwide 
business, the firm is not constrained by the interest limitation rule (van Saparoea, 2009, p. 6).   
 
The new German rules appear to have several advantages over their prior regulations.  First, 
these rules may in part avoid the foreign neutrality problems inherent in their other laws.  
Limiting interest expense deductions may circumvent complexities in recharacterizing interest 
payments as dividends.  Second, debt-to-equity ratio limitations may not always prevent 
earning’s stripping.  A related party might extend substantial debt and equity, comply with debt-
to-equity ratio limitations, and still generate enough interest expense to strip earnings from one 
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jurisdiction to another.  Limiting interest deductions appears to be more effective by directly 
addressing the real concern of tax authorities:  reduced tax receipts.  Finally, the rules avoid the 
issue of whether one debt-to-equity ratio is correct for all businesses.  Some industries rely on 
more debt to fund operations than do other firms, and the same debt-to-equity ratio limit for all 
firms may appear arbitrary. 
 
While the interest limitation approach appears to resolve a number of the issues associated with 
thin capitalization rules, it is not clear the 30% interest expense limitation is the correct figure for 
all businesses.  The third escape clause, which exempts CFCs that are less leveraged than the 
worldwide enterprise, may resolve part of this concern.  If the consolidated firm is funded with 
substantial debt, and the CFC has a higher equity-to-assets ratio (or within one percentage point) 
the escape clause exempts that firm.  However there is an alternative scenario to consider.  If the 
worldwide enterprise incurred minimal debt and recognized low interest expenses, the 30% of 
EBITDA cap may permit the enterprise to fund subsidiaries with a far greater portion of debt 
than the enterprise would incur.  This may permit the MNE to strip earnings from high-tax 
jurisdictions in ways inconsistent with the enterprise’s funding strategy. 
 
In addition, the new German rules may not avoid all challenges based on the freedom of 
establishment clause in the EC treaty.  von Brocke and Perez write the rules “may also 
contravene the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital by way of a hidden 
discrimination” (p. 34).  If a German parent owns a German subsidiary it can be treated as one 
business under its tax laws, and thus could be exempted from the rules under the previously 
mentioned “stand alone” clause.  This opportunity is not open to German firms owned by a 
foreign parent, so the rules could again be challenged.  The German government is likely to 
argue these rules are within its authority, and it is not certain how the ECJ will rule. 
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Thin Capitalization/Interest Deduction Limits in the United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom’s tax regulators have struggled with the same challenge encountered by 
German tax authorities.   To minimize earning’s stripping their regulations have aimed to prevent 
MNEs from leveraging businesses with excessive debt extended from related foreign entities.  
But the rules also need to comply with requirements to treat domestic and internationally owned 
firms equally.   Achieving both objectives has been a difficult challenge. 
 
The United Kingdom has regulated highly leveraged financing structures since the 1990s.  von 
Brocke and Perez (2009) write “the United Kingdom modified its thin capitalization rules three 
times between 1994 and 2004, in order to introduce the arms-length principle and to guarantee an 
equal treatment of UK resident companies, and companies resident in an EU Member State…” 
(p. 29).  U.K. thin capitalization rules were challenged in the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 
the Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation12 case.  As the regulations were modified 
several times, the court’s rulings addressed the different regulations in effect over that period.  
According the von Brocke and Perez (2009) “the ECJ concluded that even prior to 1995 and, in 
any case, between 1995 and 2004, when interest was paid by a resident company in respect of a 
loan granted by a related non-resident company, the tax position of the former company was less 
advantageous than that of a resident borrowing company which had been granted a loan by a 
related resident company” (p. 31).  When interest expenses were recharacterized as distributions, 
the U.K. rules provided more favorable tax treatment when the lender was also subject to U.K. 
tax rules.  Thus U.K.-owned enterprise’s had an advantage over internationally-owned 
businesses.  As such, the ECJ determined ”the U.K. thin capitalization rules contravened the 
freedom of establishment clause in Article 43 of the EC Treaty” (von Brocke and Perez, 2009, p. 
31).  
 
The U.K. now relies upon the arm’s length principle to regulate excessively leveraged financing 
structures.  According to HMRC, “In tax terms a UK company (which may be part of a group) 
                                                                
12 ECJ.  Case C-524/04, 13 March 2007, ECR (2007) 2107.   
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may be said to be thinly capitalized when it has excessive debt in relation to its arm’s length 
borrowing capacity, leading to the possibility of excessive interest deductions.”13   Furthermore: 
“The arm’s length borrowing capacity of a UK company is the amount of debt which it could 
and would have taken from an independent lender as a stand alone entity rather than as part of a 
multinational group.”14   
 
The U.K. rules then specify the process regulators should use to determine whether a firm is 
thinly capitalized.  First, it is necessary to “ascertain how much the company or companies 
would have been able to borrow from an independent lender.”15  This figure must be compared 
with “the amounts actually borrowed from group companies or with backing of group 
companies.”16  The regulations then deny tax deduction for interest expenses that exceed a firm’s 
arm’s length debt capacity. 
 
These transfer pricing rules apply when one entity loans funds to another organization it controls, 
or when both organizations are controlled by the same party (Kyte, 2008, p. 348).  According to 
HMRC, “the borrowing capacity of a UK company must be assessed on a stand alone basis, 
disregarding any relationship with other group companies…”17  Thus it is a hypothetical debt 
capacity.  As a result, firms may be motivated to determine the maximum amount they could 
borrow, whether or not they would actually do so.  In other words, the more firms can use the 
arm’s-length standard to demonstrate they could borrow large sums of money, the more earnings 
they can strip to another jurisdiction.  According to HMRC:  “It follows that in establishing the 
arm’s length borrowing capacity of a particular borrower, it is necessary to hypothesise that the 
borrower is a separate entity from the larger group of which it is part.”18   
                                                                
13 See HMRC INTM541010—Introduction to thin capitalization (legislation and principles) 
14 Ibid 
15 See INTM541020—Introduction to thin capitalization (legislation and principle) 
16 Ibid 
17 See HMRC INTM56100—Thin capitalization: FA 2004 legislation—main changes to the thin capitalization 
legislation. 
18 See INTM541010: Introduction the thin capitalization (legislation and principles) 
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The U.K. legislation also applies when the entities engage in a series of related lending 
transactions, culminating in a third-party loan.  In short, the rules specifically state they intend to 
apply the substance over form doctrine.  The rules do not include any safe harbors, exceptions, or 
sourcing rules for interest expenses.  They also exclude debt borrowed for an undefined 
“unallowable purpose” (van Saparoea, p. 7).  
 
One key question with the U.K.’s approach is whether it gives taxpayers sufficient guidance to 
determine whether their debts or interest expenses are excessive.  To comply with the U.K.’s 
requirements taxpayers may need more specific direction concerning how much debt violates the 
arm’s length standard.  Furthermore, it can be difficult to determine the CFC’s stand-alone debt 
capacity, as this is a hypothetical exercise.  CFCs have little experience doing this, and lenders 
have no incentive to evaluate the organization’s hypothetical, stand-alone debt capacity.  
Lending rules of thumb may be helpful in determining a range of debt capacities, but actual loan 
agreements are often the result of detailed discussions between lender and borrower, in which 
trade-offs between debt limits, collateral, and loan covenants are negotiated.  The U.K.’s 
approach gives taxpayers little guidance and conflicts with the certainty principle.  The absence 
of clear regulations also increases the likelihood of costly litigation.  This can also make the 
enforcing rules very inefficient.  This may be why no other major country has chosen this 
approach. 
 
Furthermore, many companies may have capacity to incur more debt than they actually choose to 
accept.  Firms may consciously choose to minimize debt because they do not wish to incur the 
additional risks, interest expenses, or operating restrictions that may accompany debt.  Some 
businesses believe avoiding debt gives them more freedom to manage their operations without 
intrusive loan covenants.  A subsidiary may have the arm’s length capacity to incur more debt, 
but this does not mean additional debt is consistent with the enterprise’s business strategy.  If a 
MNE’s strategy includes keeping debt levels low, it may not make sense to permit subsidiaries to 
leverage themselves with intercompany debt to reduce the firm’s worldwide tax expense. 
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A number of studies have demonstrated that many firms incur substantially less debt than they 
could borrow.  Allen’s study (2000) of Australian, British and Japanese firms demonstrated firms 
in those countries have spare debt capacity.  Allen defined spare borrowing capacity as “mobile 
uncommitted pool of capital resources that a company possesses” (p. 300).  He wrote it “may 
take the form of committed or uncommitted lines of credit and bank loans, or a level of current 
borrowing which is substantially below the upper limit that the company’s management, bankers 
and creditors regard as being prudent” (p. 30).   
 
Allen was not seeking to determine whether firms have spare debt capacity, as that had been 
demonstrated in a number of prior studies.19  However it is one of the most recent studies.  Allen 
believed spare debt capacity was a signaling tool firms used to communicate to investors they 
had financial resources available.  Because Japanese firms frequently are members of a keiretsu, 
in which firms have developed close and long-term banking relationships, Allen believed fewer 
Japanese firms would need to signal spare debt capacity to investors.  He believed investors in 
Japanese firms understood those firms had banking relationships that could be counted on for 
financial support, should the need arise.   
 
Allen said prior studies indicated that spare borrowing capacity was often maintained to signal 
investors the firm had the ability to tap into financial resources immediately should they need to 
do so.  Allen surveyed Australian, British and Japanese firms to determine if they maintained 
spare borrowing capacity.  They were asked how much spare borrowing capacity they kept, the 
reasons for maintaining unused lines of credit or spare borrowing capacity, and whether they had 
a target debt ratio, or an upper limit.  Allen reported that 56% of Australian firms, 88% of British 
firms, and 32% of Japanese firms had a policy of maintaining spare borrowing capacity (p. 309).  
Firms reported they had a variety of unused bank lines of credit to support their needs, as well as 
                                                                
19 In his literature review, Allen cited a number of prior studies, including:  Donaldson, G. (1961) Corporate Debt 
Capacity.  Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.  Also cited was Fama, E.F. (1990).  Contract costs and 
financing decisions,  Journal of Business, Vol. 63, 71-91.  A third example was: Duan, J. & Yoon, S. (1993).  Loan 
commitments, investment decisions, and the signaling equilibrium. Journal of Banking and Finance.  Vol. 17, 645-
661.  
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overdraft facilities.  Businesses reported a variety of reasons for spare borrowing capacity, 
including the desire to have funds available for special projects, reserves for crises, acquisitions, 
and unplanned circumstances and opportunities.  Furthermore, Allen reported “The larger the 
company, the more likely it is to have such a policy” (p. 310).  Allen also concluded that many 
firms could borrow significantly more without facing higher interest rates.  “Some 63% of the 
Australian respondents and 89% of the British ones consider that they could borrow 20% or 
more than existing borrowings without increasing their average borrowing costs.  The evidence 
suggests fairly extensive spare debt capacity existed at the time of the survey” (p. 314).  Allen 
concluded that “spare borrowing capacity is a relatively common policy” (p. 318). 
 
Industrialist David Packard, co-founder of Hewlett-Packard, explained his reasoning for avoiding 
debt.  He said HP eschewed long-term debt, in large part because the founders feared loss of 
control to lenders.  They also believed avoiding long-term debt imposed financial discipline on 
the firm.  Co-founder David Packard (1995) wrote, “Bill (Hewlett) and I determined we would 
operate our company on a pay-as-you-go basis, financing our growth primarily out of earnings 
rather than by borrowing money” (p. 84).  Commenting upon proponents of leveraged capital 
structures, Packard said “The advocates of this approach say you can make your profits go 
further by leveraging them.  That may be, but at HP it was our firm policy to pay as we go and 
not incur substantial debt” (p. 85).   The firm had the capacity to incur debt, but would not do so.  
If a business avoids commercial debt, should its subsidiaries be able to incur tax-deductible 
intercompany debt, simply because its subsidiaries have the capacity to accept loans?  If 
intercompany debt is incurred only to minimize taxes, it could be argued this is inconsistent with 
the business purpose doctrine. 
 
This information suggests that the U.K. approach on debt capacity may be too lenient.  Limiting 
a CFC’s debt-to-equity ratio by referencing what the firm could have borrowed in external 
markets may sound logical, but Allen’s study showed that 88% of British firms had spare 
borrowing capacity.  Firms were capable of borrowing more debt than they incurred.  It may 
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make more sense to limit debt by referencing what the worldwide enterprise actually chooses to 
borrow, rather than by what a CFC theoretically could borrow. 
 
In a related development, HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) has introduced a tax proposal that 
in some situations may limit the tax deductibility of interest expenses there.  The legislation, 
commonly called the worldwide debt cap, became effective January 1, 2010.  The legislation is 
aimed at limiting tax deductible interest expense for companies that incur the great majority of 
their debt in the U.K.  It is specifically aimed at large businesses and applies to both U.K. and 
foreign headquartered firms, but Dodwell, Bird, Buck and Richards (2009) say “HMRC 
anticipates that the debt cap rules would apply to relatively few U.K. inbound groups” (p. 1). 
 
The new proposal was first mentioned in a 2007 discussion paper20 in which the U.K. 
government suggested it favored a new approach, which van Saparoea said would limit debt “to 
the external borrowings of the group as a whole” (p. 7).  According to Dodwell, Bird, Buck and 
Richards (2009) U.K. tax authorities’ proposal “would be capped by reference to the worldwide 
group’s net external borrowing costs in its consolidated accounts” (p. 1).  The rules apply to 
companies that contain at least one U.K. firm (or a U.K. permanent establishment).  “The rule is 
targeted at situations in which a UK group bears more debt than is required for the worldwide 
group to operate” (Dodwell, Bird, Buck and Richards, 2009, p. 1). 
 
The Worldwide Debt cap legislation is specifically aimed at large businesses, and excludes all 
businesses defined a “micro, small and medium-sized enterprises as defined in the Annex to 
Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC” (HMRC Draft Bill, 2009, p. 9).  In short, HMRC 
believes it would not be cost-effective to apply the debt limitation to small firms.  HMRC writes 
“A de minimis limit is introduced for purposes of excluding amounts that the government does 
not consider material for purposes of the debt cap” (HMRC, Worldwide Debt Cap Current 
Thinking, 2009, p.1). 
                                                                
20 HMRC, “Taxation of the foreign profits of companies: a discussion document,” (21 June 2007) Chapter 5. 
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Two figures must be calculated to determine if the interest limitations apply.  Under the U.K. 
legislation, one figure is the “tested amount,” and the second figure is the “available amount.”  
According to HMRC “Worldwide Debt Cap Current Thinking” (7 April, 2009) the tested amount 
is “the total intra-group finance expenses in the UK” (p. 1).  This must be compared with the 
available amount, which is “the net external finance expense of the worldwide group from 
consolidated accounts” (p. 1).  The rule states that “Any excess of the tested amount over the 
available amount is disallowed, but the worldwide group may reduce the amount of UK taxable 
receipts to match the disallowance that arises” (p. 1).  In brief, the limits apply when the internal 
finance costs of the U.K. firm exceed the external finance costs of the worldwide enterprise.  If a 
subsidiary bears only a small portion of a firm’s worldwide debt, these rules would not apply.    
 
However comparing a subsidiary’s finance expense with that of the worldwide enterprise is an 
idea that has merit.  As mentioned previously, Germany’s current rules provide an exception for 
subsidiaries that are no more leveraged than the worldwide enterprise.  In addition, Japan allows 
firms to measure their debt-to-equity ratio with similar Japanese firms to determine if they are 
excessively leveraged.  Comparing a subsidiary’s debt or interest expense to the worldwide 
business, or to a similar enterprise, may be a fairer and more efficient rule than uniform, 
somewhat arbitrary limitations.   Some industries and firms choose to incur more debt than 
others as part of their funding strategy, and “fair” regulations should not penalize such firms. 
 
Thin Capitalization/Interest Deduction Limits in Other G-7 Countries 
Analysis of rules in Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States illustrate many of the 
challenges inherent in drafting effective thin capitalization/earning’s stripping tax legislation.  
However rules in the other G-7 countries may help to demonstrate other difficulties 
economically powerful nations face when crafting these rules.  
 
Italy’s approach is closely modeled after Germany’s.  It also abandoned a debt-to-equity test in 
favor of income statement limitations, effective January 1, 2008.  von Brocke and Perez (2009) 
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say that Italy’s rules were “inspired by the new German rules” (p. 33). The rules also restrict net 
interest expense to 30% of EBITDA, the same figure selected by German legislators (p. 34).  
Like the German rules, they also apply to interest paid to non-related parties, such as banks.      
 
Italian legislators made several changes to the German law.  According to Polombo (2008) the 
30% interest limitation applies to financial statements prepared according to Italian GAAP (p. 
319), not taxable income.  Italian legislators also took additional steps to ensure their laws 
regulated domestic and international firms equitably.  von Brock and Perez write “The Italian 
parliament has avoided one problem under the German rules by extending the benefits of group 
relief…to foreign companies of a group, provided that the foreign company meets all the 
condition foreseen under Italian law for the formation of a consolidated group except the 
residence requirement” (p. 34).  Italian legislators were concerned German regulations may be 
challenged once again under the freedom of establishment clause.  Polombo also notes that 
disallowed interest deductions can be carried forward indefinitely into the future (p. 319). 
 
France is the last G-7 European country currently relying upon the debt-to-equity ratio to limit 
excessive financial leverage.  According to Galinier-Warrain (2008), France modified its thin 
capitalization policies, effective January 1, 2007, and they are described as “quite complex” (p. 
307).  The key elements to France’s thin capitalization/interest deduction rules are that they cap 
the debt-to-equity ratio at 1.5 to 1, and interest may be non-deductible when “the amount of 
interest exceeds 25% of the current pre-tax result, increased notably by intra-group loan interest 
and the depreciation considered to determine this pre-tax result” (p. 308). 
 
Under France’s new law, the debt-to-equity ratio now is calculated based on a firm’s net equity, 
rather than contributed capital.   The firm can elect to use either net equity at the beginning of the 
year or at the end.  Debt now includes all debt extended from related parties, while prior rules 
included only loans extended from direct shareholders.  Firms can carry forward non-deductible 
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interest expenses, however after two years the carry-forwards are discounted by 5% per annum.  
In general France’s new rules tighten interest deductibility restrictions.  
 
Canada began to evaluate thin capitalization legislation in 1969, when a White Paper on Tax 
Reform proposed limiting interest deductibility when a nonresident shareholder owns at least 25 
percent of the Canadian corporation, lends money to that corporation, and the firm’s debt-to-
equity ratio exceeds three to one (Nitikman, 2000, pp. 23-24).  The rules were enacted in 1972 
and they are contained in subsections 18(4) to 18(6) of Canada’s Income Tax Act. 
 
The debt-to-ratio was reduced to two to one in 2001.  This change was apparently motivated by a 
Canadian Department of Finance study which stated that other countries were reducing their 
debt-to-equity ratio below three to one.  Farrar and Mawani (2008) believe very little analysis 
went into the decision to change the ratio, writing “no clear justification for this reduction 
appears to have been given.  Perhaps the Department of Finance relied on the recommendation 
from the Mintz Report,21 which suggested a reduction because at that time other (unidentified) 
countries had reduced their ratios to 2:1” (p. 6). 
 
Farrar and Mawani (2008) conducted a study of 3,715 Canadian firms in 64 industries to 
determine their debt-to-equity ratios.  They found the mean debt-to-equity ratio for Canadian 
firms was 1.06 to 1, and that four industries had debt-to-equity ratios that exceeded 2:1 (pp. 16-
17).  Of the four “only the real estate industry had a debt-equity ratio exceeding 2:1 with 
statistical significance,” but 7.1% of individual firms had debt-to-equity ratios exceeding 2:1.  
While Farrar and Mawani concluded Canada’s 2:1 ratio “seems reasonable,” (p. 2), the mean 
debt-to equity during 2001-2005 ranged from a high of 4.2 to 1 to a low of 0.15 to 1 (p. 35), 
which might also suggest that it is very difficult to determine one ratio that is fair and effective 
for all firms and industries.  It could be argued that the 2:1 ratio is too low for 7.1% of 
                                                                
21 The Mintz Report was a 1998 Department of Finance Report which suggested changes to Canada’s thin 
capitalization rules. 
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businesses.  But at the same time, it might be too high for the remaining businesses.  If the 
worldwide enterprise firm chooses to keep its debt levels low, a 2:1 debt-to-equity ratio may 
encourage firms to incur intercompany debt for the sole purpose of reducing income taxes. 
 
Japan’s first thin capitalization rules were introduced in 1992 and current rules have been in 
place since 2006, according to Nakamura (2008, pp. 321-322). In most cases Japan’s thin 
capitalization rules apply when a firm’s debt-to-equity ratio exceeds three to one.  They phase 
out interest deductions when the ratio of “interest-bearing debt to foreign controlling 
shareholders and third parties in specified cases” (p. 323) is greater than three times the firm’s 
equity.  The rules apply both to Japanese companies and foreign companies operating there.   A 
two to one ratio applies in certain situations.  If a company has engaged in large bond repurchase 
transactions, this debt can be excluded from the calculation, and the lower ratio applies. 
Japanese thin capitalization rules also permit an alternative measure, in place of the debt-to-
equity ratios above.  Nakamura writes that “a company has the option to use the debt-to-equity 
ratio of a comparable Japanese company operating in the same business, and having similar 
characteristics as to size” (p. 323).  Thus we see examples in Germany and Japan where rules 
reference market debt-to-equity ratios.  Such approaches may be a more effective approach to 
arrive at an appropriate debt-to-equity ratio for a CFC.  Identifying one debt-to-ratio for all 
businesses is inherently problematic, and can be viewed as “unfair” by certain businesses that 
tend to incur more debt, such as the 7.1% of Canadian firms mentioned.  However, as pointed 
out previously, any debt-to-equity ratio may not be effective, as it does not limit the absolute 
level of debt, and thus interest expenses.    It would be more effective to adopt the approach 
Germany and Italy have selected, and limit interest expenses to a percentage of EBITDA. 
 
The following table provides a brief summary of thin capitalization/interest deduction rules in 
each of the G-7 countries: 
 
 
66 
 
TABLE I: Summary of Thin Capitalization/Interest Deduction Policies in G-7 countries: 
Country/ 
Max. 2009  
Corp. Tax 
Rate22 
2006 
Pop-
ulation 
Rules to 
limit 
financial 
leverage?  
Approach to 
limit abuse 
Financial Tests Comments 
Canada/ 
31.32% 
32.6M Yes Balance 
Sheet Test 
Debt to equity 
ratio not to 
exceed 2 to 1 
Original 3 to 1 
ratio was 
modified in 2001 
France/ 
34.43% 
60.7M Yes Balance 
Sheet and 
Income 
Statement 
Test 
Debt to equity 
ratio should not 
exceed 1.5 to 1, 
and interest 
expenses should 
not exceed 25% 
of pre-tax 
income, after 
interest and 
depreciation are 
added back 
Implemented new 
law January 1, 
2007.  The law 
has a broader 
definition of 
equity, and debt 
includes all debt 
extended from 
related parties, 
not only 
shareholders 
Germany/ 
30.18% 
82.7M Yes Income 
Statement 
Test 
Net interest 
expense limited to 
30% of EBITDA 
Rules changed in 
2001, 2003 and 
2008.  Most 
recent change 
shifted from thin 
capitalization test 
to interest 
deduction limits 
Italy/ 
27.50% 
58.1M Yes Income 
Statement 
Test 
Net interest 
expense limited to 
30% of EBITDA 
New laws 
implemented 
January 1, 2008.  
Changed from 
thin capitalization 
                                                                
22 Corporate tax rates for all G-7 countries were obtained from the OECD Tax Database 
http://www.oced.org/ctp/taxadatabase.  See Table II.1. 
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test to interest 
deduction limits 
Japan/ 
39.54% 
128.2M Yes Balance 
Sheet Test 
Debt-to-equity 
ratio not to 
exceed 3 to 1   
Firms have the 
option of using 
the debt-to-equity 
ratio of a similar 
Japanese firm 
United 
Kingdom/
28% 
59.8M Yes Arms-length 
principle 
No specific 
financial test or 
safe-harbor ratio 
Rules changed 
three times 
between 1994 and 
2004.  Worldwide 
Debt Cap 
legislation in 
process 
United 
States/ 
39.10%23 
301.0M Yes Balance 
Sheet test 
which limits 
interest 
expense 
deductibility 
If debt-to-equity 
ratio exceeds 1.5 
to 1, interest 
expenses > 50% 
of EBITDA not 
deductible 
The 1.5 to 1 debt-
to-equity ratio is a 
“safe harbor.”  
The IRS will 
presume ratios 
below 1.5 to 1 are 
not excessively 
leveraged, but 
ratios above 1.5 
to 1 may or may 
not be challenged 
 
Thin Capitalization/Interest Deduction Limits in Other Key Countries 
In addition to the G-7 countries, there are a number of other countries that are concerned with the 
tax impact of leveraged financing structures, and have developed innovative regulations rules 
that deserve special attention.  Three countries that have created ambitious thin 
capitalization/interest deduction limitations are Denmark, the Netherlands, and New Zealand.   
                                                                
23 The maximum U.S. federal statutory tax rate is 35%, but the great majority of U.S. states also impose income 
taxes, pushing the combined rate to approximately 40%.  It can be higher or lower than that figure depending upon 
the states in which the business operates. 
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Each country has a smaller economy and population than the G-7 countries, yet each is also a 
prosperous nation that has developed advanced social programs dependent upon generating tax 
revenue. 
 
Denmark has developed sophisticated thin capitalization rules that are considered “very 
complicated and detailed” (Lund and Korsgaard, 2008, p. 302).  Denmark’s approach is to limit 
interest deductions by a series of three limitations, each of which can successively reduce tax 
deductible interest expenses.  The first restriction limits the deductibility of debts extended from 
related parties.  The second limitation establishes a limit based on the value of a firm’s 
qualifying assets.  And the third limitation caps net financing expenses based on the firm’s 
Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT). 
 
According to Lund and Korsgaard (2008), under the first limitation “interest expenses on 
controlled debt are not deductible to the extent that the debt-to-equity ratio exceeds 4:1” (p. 302).  
The rules do not apply to interest on debts less than DKK 10 million, or to loans extended by 
private individuals.  If a company can document that a similar loan could be obtained from an 
independent party, the four to one debt-to-equity limitation may not apply.  However the rules 
apply both to loans extended by related parties, and to loans extended by third parties if they are 
collateralized by related party assets. 
 
Under the second limitation, “companies may deduct net financing expenses only to the extent 
that the expense does not exceed a standard rate of interest…on certain qualifying assets” (Lund 
and Korsgaard, 2008, p. 302).  In 2009 that interest rate was 6.5% (Bundgaard and Tell, 2010, p. 
7).  The interest rate is applied upon the tax value of assets at year end to determine the interest 
ceiling limitation.  Fixed assets are valued net of accumulated depreciation; non-depreciable 
assets are valued at cost plus the cost any improvements; internally developed intangible assets 
are not valued unless the costs are capitalized for tax purposes; and inventory, receivables and 
work-in-process are valued net of any reserves.  That figure is compared with net financing 
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expenses, which are defined as the sum of taxable interest income less deductible interest 
expenses, excluding interest on trade accounts payable and trade receivables, trading losses, loan 
losses, and gains and losses on foreign exchange gains and losses.  The rules apply both to debts 
extended from both related and third parties.  Interest expenses above the limitation are not 
deductible and cannot be carried forward.  The rules only apply when net financing expenses 
exceed 21.3 million DKK (Bundgaard and Tell, 2010, p. 9). This de minimis figure is adjusted 
annually. 
 
Finally, a third Danish interest limitation rule restricts interest to a percentage of Earnings Before 
Interest and Taxes (EBIT).  Kaserer (2008) writes, “Most prominently, Denmark extended its 
thin capitalization rule by an interest stripping rule restricting a firm’s interest deductions to 80% 
of EBIT” (p. 3).  Kaserer notes that similar rules were adopted in Germany and Italy, but those 
rules limit interest expenses to 30% of EBITDA.  The U.S. limits interest expenses to 50% of 
adjusted taxable income, but only if the 1.5 to 1 debt-to-equity ratio is exceeded. 
 
Similar to the G-7 countries, the Netherlands attempts to balance the competing goals of raising 
tax revenue and creating an attractive investment environment.  van Saparoea (2009) comments, 
“For Asian and American companies in particular, the Netherlands has long been one of the 
preferred jurisdictions in Europe in which to develop a base.  Numerous international operations 
have derived significant tax benefits from using the Netherlands as an international base; thereby 
contributing to a reduction in their worldwide tax burden” (p. 5).   Not only do MNEs reduce 
their tax rate, the Netherlands generates tax revenue from the MNEs, so its tax policies are 
mutually advantageous. 
 
The Netherlands’ current rules were implemented effective January 1, 2004.  These rules identify 
two tests to determine whether interest expenses are tax deductible.  Sporken (2004) says “The 
first test concerns the debt-to-equity ratio of the taxable company itself, which may be 3:1 at a 
maximum” (p. 329).  Debt is defined as average payables less average receivables, so the rules 
70 
 
measure net debt, rather than gross obligations.  This figure is compared to average equity for tax 
purposes.  The rules also specify that firms must use an equity figure of at least one EUR, even if 
average equity is determined to be less than that figure.  If the debt-to-equity ratio exceeds 3:1 
and the excess is greater than 500,000 EUR, the associated interest expense is not tax deductible.  
However “The amount of interest that is not deductible cannot, however, be greater than the 
amount of interest on loans payable to entities that are related to the taxpayer less the amount of 
interest on loans payable by the entities to the taxpayer” (van Saparoea, 2009, p. 4).   
The second option is to use the worldwide enterprise’s debt-to-equity ratio.  van Saparoea (2009) 
writes, “Specifically, if the taxpayer in its tax return opts for this group ratio (the second ratio), 
its excess debt is held to be the amount by which its average debt:equity ratio exceeds the 
average debt:equity ratio of the group to which it belongs” (p. 4).  If the taxpayer belongs to 
more than one group the highest debt-to-equity ratio applies.  The taxpayer can select whether it 
wants the three to one ratio or the worldwide enterprise’s debt-to-equity ratio to apply, and firms 
are annually permitted to select the measure by which its debts will be tested. 
 
To prevent abuse and maintain tax revenue, the Netherlands’ rules also identify a number of 
specific cases in which interest is not tax deductible.  According to Sporken (2008) interest is 
deductible “unless the expense cannot be considered a business expense or when specific anti-
abuse rules apply” (p. 328).   If a Netherlands corporation incurs debt to fund profit distributions, 
fund investments in related entities, or acquire a related-entity the associated interest expense 
may not be tax deductible.   However the rules also provide two exceptions to these limitations.  
If the loans are taken for sound business reasons, or if the income is taxed at a reasonable level, 
which is generally defined as 10% of income, these rules do not apply (van Saparoea, 2009, p. 
5). 
 
In January of 2008 the Netherlands amended these regulations.  Specifically, the exception that 
allowed firms to incur debt, as long as the associated interest income was taxed at 10%, was 
modified.  According to van Saparoea, legislators in the Netherlands “feared that maintaining the 
second exception…without amendment would have adverse budgetary consequences” (p. 5).   
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For example, since Cyprus’s income tax rate is 10%, and the Netherlands’ is 25.5%, a MNE 
could establish a subsidiary in Cyprus, extend debt to a related-entity in the Netherlands, and 
substantially reduce income taxes.  van Saparoea (2008) writes “The amended law states that, in 
situations in which a taxpayer can sufficiently demonstrate that its interest income is taxable at a 
rate of at least 10%, it would nevertheless remain possible for a tax inspector to substantiate that 
either a debt itself or a transaction that corresponds to it lacks a sound business reason” (p. 5).  In 
short, legislators wanted to maintain the power to tax such income in the Netherlands, even if the 
profits were shifted to a jurisdiction taxing the income at 10% or more.  
 
According to van Saparoea (2008) the Netherlands is already considering changing this rule 
“because the current rules could damage the attractiveness of the Netherlands as a business 
location” (p. 3).  van Saparoea says the amended rules have increased uncertainty for MNEs, as 
they do not know whether tax authorities will challenge interest deductions in many situations. 
MNEs are also concerned their profits could be taxed twice.  Beyond this, three Netherlands tax 
professors have written the amendment may not comply with the EC freedom of establishment 
clause.24   Thus it is possible the 2008 amendment may be relaxed, though no changes have been 
enacted at this time.   
 
 New Zealand has also developed creative rules to limit thin capitalization/earning’s stripping 
activities.  Smith and Dunmore (2003) write that New Zealand’s rules were implemented in 
1996, noting, “The reason for introducing the thin capitalization rules then was to complement 
the new transfer pricing rules being enacted at the same time.  It was believed that the absence of 
any formal thin capitalization rules when the new transfer pricing rules were being introduced 
could give rise to opportunities for tax avoidance and create uncertainty in the minds of foreign 
investors as to New Zealand’s stance on thin capitalization.  It was also thought that clarity of the 
tax policy and of the tax regime was essential to promote foreign investment in New Zealand” 
                                                                
24 Prof. Mr. F.A. Englen, Prof. Dr. H. Vording and Prof. Mr. S. Weeghel, “Wijzinking van belastingwetten met het 
oog op het tegengaan van uitholling van de belastinggrondslag en het verbeteren van het fiscale vestigingsklimaar.”  
Weekblad Fiscaal Recht 6777, 28 August 2008. 
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(p. 505).  In short, they recognized that taxpayers desire certainty when calculating tax 
obligations. 
New Zealand’s thin capitalization rules apply only to firms that meet an ownership test.  They 
specifically apply to taxpayers in three categories.  The rules affect: 1) non-residents; 2) a New 
Zealand resident company in which a non resident owns 50% or more of the firm; and 3) trustees 
of a non-qualifying trust, controlled 50% or more by a non-resident  (Smith and Dunmore, 2003, 
pp. 505-506).  If the taxpayer falls into one of those categories at any point during the year, the 
rules apply.  Thus the rules do not apply to New Zealand residents, and they would fail to meet 
the freedom of establishment clause in the EU treaty, were New Zealand a member.   
 
If the ownership test is met, two further tests are applied to determine if the debt is excessive.  
The first is a “safe-harbour debt percentage of 75%” (Smith and Dunmore, 2003, p. 505).  In 
other words, if a firm’s debt-to-equity ratio is less than three to one, the debt is not considered 
excessive.  According to Smith and Dunmore, “The safe-harbour debt percentage is designed to 
reduce compliance costs of taxpayer who operate with moderate levels of debt” (p. 506).  
Writing in 2003, Smith and Dunmore said that while this limit appeared similar to debt-to equity 
ratio caps in other countries, it is in fact more stringent.  “While a 75% safe-harbour debt 
percentage appears comparable to the safe-harbour debt/equity ratios adopted in the thin 
capitalization rules of Canada, Japan and Germany, the New Zealand debt percentage is 
effectively lower because the ratios of those other countries take into account only related-party 
interest-bearing debt, while New Zealand’s debt percentage takes into account all interest-
bearing debt” (p. 506). 
However New Zealand’s rules also permit taxpayers to exceed the three to one ratio in certain 
situations.  If the worldwide business has a debt-to-equity ratio that exceeds three to one, the 
New Zealand entity is also permitted to have a higher debt ratio.  Smith and Dunmore write, “In 
addition, there is a provision allowing taxpayers to maintain a debt percentage above 75% 
without suffering a penalty under the rules if the worldwide group debt of which the New 
Zealand taxpayer is part also has a debt percentage above 75%” (p. 505).  If a New Zealand 
taxpayer’s debt ratio exceeds three to one, it is permitted to have a debt percentage up to 110% 
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of the worldwide enterprise’s debt percentage.  Thus the New Zealand entity can exceed the 
parent company’s debt-to-equity ratio.  The 110% rules apply to companies and trusts, but not 
individuals. 
New Zealand’s approach requires it to define how the worldwide enterprise’s group debt 
percentage is calculated.  Smith and Dunmore write, “A taxpayer’s ‘group debt percentage’ is 
defined as the proportion of the total interest-bearing debt to the total assets of the taxpayer’s 
New Zealand group for the income year.  Thus, interest-free loans are excluded and are 
essentially treated as equity, as are accrual accounting provisions, deferred tax, and other similar 
liabilities or provisions” (p. 506).  New Zealand’s rules also allow taxpayers to exclude debt for 
funds lent to non-related organizations and individuals.  The worldwide debt percentage is 
calculated annually, at the end of the firm’s fiscal year. 
A summary of thin capitalization/interest deduction regulations in Denmark, the Netherlands, 
and New Zealand follows: 
TABLE II: Summary of Thin Capitalization/Interest Deduction Policies in Denmark, the 
Netherlands and New Zealand: 
Country/ 
Max. 2009  
Corp. Tax 
Rate25 
2006 
Pop-
ulation 
Rules to 
limit 
financial 
leverage?  
Approach to 
limit abuse 
Financial Tests Comments 
Denmark/ 
25.0% 
5.4M Yes A series of 
three rules 
that 
progressively 
limit interest 
deductions 
1) Related party 
debt-to-equity 
ratios not to 
exceed 4:1 
2) Interest 
expenses not to 
exceed a percent 
(currently 7%) of 
qualifying assets 
De  minimis rules 
apply.  Rules are 
considered 
complex. 
                                                                
25 Corporate tax rates for all G-7 countries were obtained from the OECD Tax Database 
http://www.oced.org/ctp/taxadatabase.  See Table II.1. 
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3) Interest  
expenses not to 
exceed 80% of 
EBIT 
Nether-
lands/ 
25.5% 
16.3M Yes Balance 
sheet tests 
1) Net debt-to-
equity ratio not to 
exceed 3:1 
2) Firm can opt to 
be limited by the 
worldwide 
enterprise’s debt-
to-equity ratio 
Current rules 
implemented 
January 1, 2004.  
Firm can 
determine each 
year by which 
limit which limit 
will apply.  
Revisions are 
being discussed 
New 
Zealand/ 
30.0% 
4.1M Yes Balance 
sheet tests 
Taxpayer’s 
limited by the 
higher of: 1) 3:1 
debt to equity 
ratio, or 2) 110% 
of the worldwide 
enterprise’s debt-
to-equity ratio. 
The 3:1 debt-to-
equity ratio 
includes all 
interest-bearing 
debt.  The 110% 
worldwide 
enterprise debt 
cap excludes the 
worldwide 
enterprise’s 
deferred tax 
liabilities and 
other accruals. 
 
Thin Capitalization/Interest Deduction Regulations in EU’s Least Populous Countries 
While all of the G-7 countries may want to limit highly leveraged financing structures, not all 
countries view thin capitalization as a priority.  As previously mentioned, some countries view 
low income tax rates and more lenient tax policies as an opportunity to attract FDI.  In particular, 
small, less economically powerful countries may want to lower taxes to entice MNEs to site 
operations there.   Those countries may have fewer globally-successful MNEs headquartered 
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there, and thus low tax rates may have less impact upon government finances.  They may see the 
potential to attract FDI through lower income tax rates and more lenient thin capitalization 
and/or interest deduction regulations. 
Haufler and Runkel (2008) explain this by saying, “the country with the smaller population size 
not only chooses the lower tax rate but also the more lenient thin capitalization rule.  This is 
because the smaller country faces the more elastic tax base for internationally mobile capital, but 
the same is not true for internationally immobile capital” (p. 3-4). 
To illustrate this point, the thin capitalization/interest deduction limitations of the eight smallest 
EU members will be reviewed.   These countries have been selected as information is readily 
available and all are in Europe.  As the majority of the G-7 countries are in Europe, comparisons 
are relevant.  While the G-7 countries have populations ranging from 33-301 million, the eight 
least populous European countries have populations ranging from 400 thousand to 4.2 million.    
With one exception, each also has a population smaller than Denmark, the Netherlands and New 
Zealand.  Ireland’s population is 4.2 million, while New Zealand’s is 4.1 million.   
 
A summary of the thin capitalization policies of these EU members is included in Table III.  Half 
of these countries have no thin capitalization policies; the others rely on debt-to-equity ratios.  
The debt-to-equity ratios in the smaller countries are more lenient than restrictions found in the 
countries previously cited.  In addition, the regulations in these countries also appear to be 
somewhat more stable than in the G-7 countries; only one of the eight countries plans to make 
any changes to their limit. 
 
Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland and Malta do not currently have any thin capitalization or interest 
deduction rules.  Latvia and Lithuania limit debt-to-equity ratios to four to one.  Interest 
expenses for debt above this level are not tax deductible.  Luxembourg and Slovenia cap debt-to-
equity ratios at six to one.   Slovenia plans to reduce its limitation from six to one to four to one 
in 2012.  The four countries with thin capitalization policies have not changed their policies since 
they were first implemented.    
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Haufler and Runkel (2008) observed similar results, commenting “large countries, such as 
Germany, France or the United States have rather elaborate rules limiting the interest-
deductibility of internal debt, whereas small countries such as Ireland, Luxembourg and many 
countries in Eastern Europe have either no thin capitalization rules at all, or very permissive 
ones” (p. 4).  Given that debt-to-equity ratio ratios of 1.5 to 1 in the U.S. have been ineffective at 
constraining Inverted Corporations there, it is unlikely that four to one or six to one ratios will 
limit earning’s stripping.  The study of Canadian firms found only 7.1% had debt-to-equity ratios 
exceeding 2:1.  It is likely these smaller countries have maintained stable rules because their 
regulations have not discouraged FDI.   As their current rules impose few restrictions on thin 
capitalization strategies, they have little motivation to modify their regulations.  A summary  
follows: 
TABLE III: Summary of Policies in the EU’s Eight Least Populous Countries 
Country/ 
Max. 2009 
Corp. 
Tax Rate26 
2006 
Population 
Rules to limit 
thin 
Capitalization  
Approach 
to limit 
abuse 
Financial 
Test27 
Changes to Law 
Cyprus/ 
10% 
780K No rules to 
restrict thin 
capitalization 
N/A N/A N/A 
Estonia/ 
21% 
1.3M No rules to 
restrict thin 
capitalization 
N/A N/A N/A 
Ireland/ 
12.5% 
4.2M No rules to 
restrict thin 
capitalization 
N/A N/A N/A 
                                                                
26 Corporate tax rates for Ireland and Luxembourg were obtained from the OECD Tax Database 
http://www.oced.org/ctp/taxadatabase.  See Table II.1.  All others were drawn from the International Transfer 
Pricing Journal, November/December 2008, p. 352. 
27 All of the information on thin capitalization policies in these countries comes from  a series of articles introduced 
Lund, H., Korsgaard, C., & Albertsen, M. International Transfer Pricing Journal (2008, November/December).  
Financing: a global survey of thin capitalization and thin capitalization rules in 35 selected countries, pp. 283-352. 
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Latvia/ 
15% 
2.3M Yes Balance 
Sheet 
Test 
Debt to 
equity 
ratio limit 
is 4 to 1 
No changes made 
since implemented 
Lithuania/ 
15% 
3.4M Yes Balance 
Sheet 
Test 
Debt to 
equity 
ratio limit 
is 4 to 1 
No changes made 
to law since 
implemented 
1/1/2004 
Luxembourg 
29.63% 
470K Yes Balance 
Sheet  
Test 
Debt to 
equity 
ratio limit 
is 6 to 1 
No changes made 
to law since 
implementation 
Malta/ 
35% 
400K No N/A N/A N/A 
Slovenia/ 
22% 
2.0M Yes Balance 
Sheet 
Test 
Debt to 
equity 
ratio limit 
6 to 1 
No changes made 
to law yet, but 
Debt to Equity 
ratio cap will drop 
to 4 to 1 in 2012 
 
Ireland’s population is slightly larger than New Zealand’s, and it imposes no thin capitalization 
rules.  While Haufler and Runkel have noted smaller countries tend to enact lower tax rates and 
more lenient thin capitalization rules, the political process and tax policies are not an exact 
science.  There may be other considerations.  Ireland‘s close proximity to countries imposing 
high income rates may have led it to conclude it could succeed at tax competition, while New 
Zealand’s remoteness from many MNEs and large markets may have led that nation in another 
direction.    
 
As Haufler and Runkel (2008) noted, countries that impose lax or no pose thin capitalization 
policies often have low income tax rates as well: 
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Table IV:  Corporate Income Tax Rate Comparisons 
2009 
Corporate 
Income Tax 
Rate 
10- 20% 20-24.99% 25-30% 31-35% 36%+ 
G-7 Countries 0 0 3 
Italy 
Germany     
UK 
2 
Canada 
France 
  
2 
Japan        
USA   
 
Other countries 
addressing thin 
capitalization 
0 0 3 
Denmark  
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
0 0 
Small EU 
Countries 
4 
Cyprus 
Ireland  
Lithuania 
Latvia 
2 
Estonia 
Solvenia 
 
1 
Luxembourg 
1 
Malta 
0 
 
Evaluation of Thin Capitalization/Interest Deduction Regulations 
 
The G-7 countries and other nations attempting to regulate thin capitalization have a challenging 
task.  They must balance their short-term tax revenue goals against the need to create an 
attractive investment environment.  Countries such as Germany, France, the United Kingdom 
and Italy have all modified their regulations in recent years as they seek to achieve both 
objectives.  Denmark, the Netherlands and New Zealand have crafted sophisticated rules 
designed to generate tax revenue and still attract FDI. 
All G-7 countries began their regulatory efforts by limiting the debt-to-equity ratio of CFCs 
operating within their borders.  This appears to be a logical approach, since it is the high debt 
which generates the intercompany interest expenses, shifting earnings to low-tax jurisdictions.  
However experience has shown that countries cannot rely exclusively upon debt-to-equity ratios 
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to prevent earning’s stripping.  There are several problems with employing debt-to-equity ratios 
in this context.  One is the foreign neutrality tax doctrine, at least within the EU.  As discussed, 
both the United Kingdom and Germany found its laws violated the freedom of establishment 
clause in the EC treaty.  Both found it difficult to craft laws that were specifically designed to 
prevent MNEs from leveraging corporations with excessive intercompany debt, while treating 
domestic and internationally-owned firms equally.  Each lost cases in the ECJ and has adopted a 
different strategy. 
 
In addition, thin capitalization rules may not achieve their objectives.  A debt-to-equity ratio does 
not limit absolute debt levels, and thus it may not prevent earning’s stripping.  If the MNE’s 
objective is to reduce income taxes, it can determine how much debt is necessary to shift 
earnings from a country, inject sufficient debt and equity to comply with limitations, and transfer 
profits.  As von Brocke and Perez (2009) wrote, “In a first stage, the majority of these thin 
capitalization rules established the existence of safe harbours (e.g. debt-to-equity ratio) in order 
to force related companies to apply normal market conditions in their intra-group transactions.  
However, as it was very simple for companies to circumvent the limit established by debt-to-
equity ratio by increasing the equity of the financed subsidiary in a manner sufficient to push 
down as much debt as necessary…” (p. 29).   Seida and Wempe (2004) also determined a 1.5 to 
1 debt-to-equity ratio was ineffective at preventing ICs from stripping earnings from the United 
States.  They wrote “we conclude that inverted firms’ (presumed) technical compliance with 
current, rule-based impediments to earnings stripping is producing U.S. tax outcomes (liabilities) 
that bear very little resemblance to underlying economic events and circumstances” (p. 826, 
emphasis in original).  In fact, the behavior they documented was so egregious they believed 
both the substance over form tax standard and the fairness principle were violated.  They wrote, 
“it seems implausible that the earnings stripping behavior we document is consistent with the 
notion that a fair tax system must favor substance over form, and that the tax treatments of 
income and expense items should produce as a result that clearly reflects an entity’s income” (p. 
826).  In short, capping the debt-to-equity ratio may conflict with both the effectiveness and 
fairness principles.  As a result some nations, such as France and Denmark, have supplemented 
debt-to-equity limitations with other regulations to limit interest deductions. 
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Beyond this, it may also be difficult to determine one debt-to-equity ratio limit that is fair and 
appropriate for all businesses.  Based on their risk appetite, capital needs and the vicissitudes or 
credit markets, businesses establish and negotiate capital structures designed to achieve their 
business objectives.  As a result, studies of debt-to-equity ratios show they vary widely in 
practice.  Farrar and Mawani (2008) found Canadian debt-to-equity ratios ranged from 4.2:1 to 
0.15:1.  The United States Department of Treasury (2007) found many debt-to-equity ratios 
above the 1.5 to 1 safe harbor.  It stated, “Commentators have noted, however, that many U.S. 
corporations have debt-to-equity ratios that exceed 1.5 to 1.  For example, the capital structure of 
multinational businesses may vary based on their lines of business and what the market will bear 
with respect to such a business.  Consequently, some commentators have argued that the debt-to-
equity safe harbor should not be eliminated but should be modified to reflect this reality” (p. 29).  
However determining appropriate debt-to-equity ratios for various industries is not an easy task.  
It may be very difficult to determine “fair” debt-to-equity limits for a range of industries.   
 
The Department of Treasury (2007) determined “modifying the debt-to-equity safe harbor to take 
into account different levels of leverage supportable by different assets was too complex and that 
almost any generalization regarding the ability of the assets of a corporation to support debt, 
even within limited classes of assets, meant that at least some taxpayers would believe the test 
was insufficiently precise” (p. 30).  While that may be correct, this argument does not support 
existing regulations, which specify one debt-to-equity safe harbor for all firms.  And there are 
other regulatory approaches that could be effective.  In certain situations New Zealand and the 
Netherlands reference the worldwide enterprise’s debt-to-equity ratio when regulating a CFC’s 
leverage.  Denmark establishes an interest deduction limit based on a percentage of qualifying 
assets.28  The Department of Treasury study showed no evidence it considered more effective 
regulatory strategies in other nations. 
 
                                                                
28 As mentioned, Denmark has three limitations that successively reduce interest deductions.  The second limitation 
applies an interest rate on qualifying assets to limit deductible interest expenses.  The interest rate for 2009 was 
6.5% (Bundgaard and Tell, 2010, p. 7). 
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In the last two years both Germany and Italy have implemented regulations directly limiting 
interest deductions to 30% of EBITDA.  This approach has several advantages over debt-to-
equity caps.  First, interest deduction rules directly address the real issue that concerns tax 
authorities, which is lost tax revenue.  The most straightforward way to retain tax revenue is 
through limiting tax deductible interest, not controlling the capital structure of the firm.  Interest 
deduction limits also support compliance with the capital import neutrality standard.  As 
discussed, Italian legislators have taken more precautions than Germans to ensure their new rules 
treat domestic and foreign corporations equally.  
 
However interest deduction limitations share a problem with debt-to-equity ratios, as it is very 
difficult to determine one limitation that is appropriate for all businesses and industries.  If a 
country establishes a high interest expense limit few taxpayers will contend the restriction is 
unfair, but the rule will not limit excessive financial leverage.  Tighter regulations may limit 
abuse, but may also unfairly constrain other businesses that depend upon debt.  Such rules may 
also be incompatible with the arm’s length standard.  A single figure regulating all businesses is 
arbitrary and may be too restrictive for some firms, and too lax for others.  When debt-to-equity 
ratios vary widely in practice, “one size fits all” limitations may fail to satisfy both the fairness 
principle and the effectiveness principle. 
 
The U.K. is the only country today that relies exclusively upon the arm’s length standard.  This 
approach fails to satisfy the certainty principle.  Unlike any other major country analyzed, the 
U.K. gives taxpayers no quantitative guidance to determine how much debt or interest expense 
might be considered excessive.  Furthermore, the CFC has to determine its debt capacity as a 
stand-alone business, ignoring its function within the larger enterprise. This is inherently 
difficult.  These ambiguities can also make administration of these rules inefficient, as regulators 
and tax authorities litigate their differences. 
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Beyond this, the U.K.’s approach may be too lenient.  As van Saparoea (2009) writes, “The 
arms-length debt capacity of a UK business is defined as the level of indebtedness the UK 
business could have handled from an independent lender, without considering any larger 
enterprise to which the firm may belong” (p. 6).  By focusing on what a subsidiary “could have 
borrowed,” the UK’s approach may permit excessive leverage.  In practice, many firms borrow 
substantially less than they could.  The U.K. approach encourages CFCs to define their 
maximum borrowing capacity, though the MNE may have no intention of assuming such 
leverage. 
 
Proposal: Limit Interest Expenses to the WW Enterprise’s Interest Expense Ratio 
Nations have attempted a variety of regulatory strategies to control highly leveraged financing 
structures.  Based upon this paper’s analysis of such tax regulations, several conclusions can be 
reached concerning the most effective ways to control this activity.   
 
One conclusion is that debt-to-equity limits are not always effective at preventing firms from 
stripping earnings from one country to another.  If the MNE has sufficient capital, it can inject 
debt and equity into the CFC, comply with debt-to-equity limits, and still strip earnings from one 
country to another.  MNEs have been able to work around these restrictions, as several studies 
have shown.  The comparatively strict U.S. 1.5 to 1 debt-to-equity ratio was completely 
ineffective at preventing Inverted Corporations from shifting earnings abroad.  It is very easy to 
inject both debt and equity into a subsidiary, comply with regulatory restrictions, and strip 
earnings.  For this reason several countries, such as Germany and Italy, have adopted interest 
deduction limitations, and this is a more effective approach. 
 
Second, it is inherently difficult to identify one debt-to-equity ratio, or one interest deduction 
limitation, that is fair and appropriate for all businesses.  As mentioned, a Canadian study found 
trade debt-to-equity ratios there ranged from 4.2 to 1 to 0.15 to 1.  Thus some firms were 
leveraged with twenty-eight times the debt ratio as other businesses.  In addition, the U.S. 
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Department of Treasury (2007) considered establishing different debt-to-equity limits for various 
industries, but determined this was too difficult to accomplish with any precision.  So it 
continues to limit all firms with one debt-to-equity ratio, which is an unfair and inefficient 
regulation, disconnected from market place realities. 
 
Several countries have implemented rules that link a firm’s capital structure to the worldwide 
enterprise’s debt-to-equity ratio, or to that of similar firms in the same industry.  The third escape 
clause in Germany’s current interest deduction rule exempts firms that are no more leveraged 
than the consolidated firm.  Japanese thin capitalization rules allow firms to use the debt-to-
equity ratio of a similar Japanese firm to determine their maximum debt-to-equity ratio.  The 
Netherlands’ rules limit a subsidiary’s debt-to-equity ratio to that of the worldwide enterprise.  
New Zealand’s rules limit a subsidiary’s debt-to-equity ratio to 110% of the consolidated 
business.  Thus several countries impose thin capitalization rules that reference the debt level of 
the worldwide enterprise, or similar firms in like industries. 
 
Rules in these countries demonstrate that limiting a firm’s financing structure by referencing the 
worldwide enterprise’s financial metrics, or that of a comparable firm, is a legitimate regulatory 
approach.  However, it should be noted that in all of these cases countries were using market-
based measures as a backup strategy, in the event the primary rules were too stringent.  If the 
country’s primary limits were too restrictive, they provided firms an alternative to demonstrate 
their leverage was similar to the worldwide enterprise’s, and thus not a tax-motivated strategy.   
 
This paper proposes that the best approach to controlling excessively leveraged funding 
strategies is to limit a CFC’s tax deductible interest expenses to the worldwide enterprise’s ratio 
of interest expense to earnings.  This should be the primary strategy to combat excessively 
leveraged financing structures.  While it makes sense to establish market-based financial 
measures to control financial leverage, debt-to-equity limitations are not always effective.  As 
Germany, Italy and the United States currently reference EBITDA (or a close approximation) to 
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limit tax deductible interest expenses, it makes sense to continue to use that earnings measure.  
The following table demonstrates how the worldwide enterprise’s ratio of interest expense can be 
used to determine the maximum tax deductible expense for a subsidiary: 
 
Table V: Proposal to Limit a CFC’s tax deductible interest expense by the worldwide 
enterprise’s ratio of interest expense to EBITDA  
 
 
Financial Measures WW Enterprise 
Financial Results 
Financial Measures CFC Financial 
Results/Limit 
Total Trade Interest 
Expense 
$15,000,000 Limit of Tax Deductible 
Interest Expense to EBITDA 
7.5% 
WW EBITDA $200,000,000 CFC EBITDA $10,000,000 
WW Ratio of Trade 
Interest Expense to 
EBITDA 
7.5% Tax Deductible Limit for 
Trade/Intercompany Interest 
Expenses 
$750,000 
 
 
In the above example, the worldwide enterprise reported $15,000,000 in trade interest expenses, 
and EBITDA totaled $200,000,000.  Thus its ratio of interest expense to EBITDA is 7.5%.  This 
establishes the subsidiary’s tax deductible limit.  The subsidiary earned $10,000,000.  The CFC’s 
tax deductible interest expense limit is determined by multiplying the 7.5% figure times its 
EBITDA of $10,000,000, which is $750,000.  Interest expenses up to that figure are tax 
deductible.  Interest expenses above that figure are disallowed, and perhaps carried forward into 
a future tax year. 
 
 
This proposal supports the certainty principle.  Calculating the worldwide enterprise’s ratio of 
interest expense to earnings is a straightforward task, and it provides taxpayers and regulators 
with a clear, unambiguous rule.  It provides much more certainty than the U.K.’s approach, 
which relies on the vagaries of the arm’s-length standard.  It also provides more certainty than 
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safe harbors.  These upper limits offer certainty for taxpayers operating below the safe harbor 
limit. But leveraged taxpayers may exceed the safe harbor boundary as part of their normal 
business activities, not as a tax minimization strategy.  They have no assurance their financing 
structure will not be challenged by tax authorities. 
 
Many international tax issues are filled with uncertainty, so establishing clear rules for all parties 
benefits both MNEs and governments.  As Smith and Dunmore (2003) wrote, “In the case of thin 
capitalization, it is likely that arm’s length debt/equity ratios of comparable enterprise’s will be 
easier to obtain than appropriate CUPs for transfer pricing investigations, given that debt/equity 
ratios can be simply calculated from companies’ financial statements” (p. 504).  However this 
proposal creates even more certainty, as the MNE would use its own financial results to establish 
limits, rather than search for comparable firms. 
 
Because this proposal provides taxpayers and tax authorities with certainty, it also supports the 
efficiency principle.  Both the taxpayer and tax authorities can quickly determine their limits by 
reviewing the worldwide enterprise’s income statement.  In contrast, complying with France’s or 
Denmark’s complicated rules can be difficult, expensive and time-consuming.  The U.K. rules 
encourage taxpayers to determine their arm’s-length borrowing capacity, viewed as a stand-alone 
enterprise, which can also be a costly and lengthy process.    
 
Not only does this approach support efficient tax collection, it supports market efficiency.  As 
Musgrave and Musgrave (1976) wrote:  “Taxes should be chosen so as to minimize interference 
with economic decisions in otherwise efficient markets” (p. 210).    Tax rules that establish “one 
size fits all” debt limitations do not support market efficiency, as they may encourage tax-
motivated decisions.  Interest limitations that are consistent with the worldwide enterprise’s 
funding decisions support market efficiency.   The motivations of the MNE and its subsidiaries 
become aligned.  The CFC’s limit is established by the WW enterprise’s own financing 
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decisions.  Subsidiaries in countries imposing high income taxes would lose their incentive to 
incur excessive intercompany debt.   
 
While “fairness” is difficult to define, in some ways this proposal appears to be fairer than the 
“one size fits all” rules adopted by many countries.  Tax authorities would not create limitations 
inconsistent with firm’s own funding strategy.  In fact, tax authorities would not be regulating an 
appropriate capital structure for the CFC.  The business would be establishing its own financial 
limit, through its own funding decisions.  In contrast to uniform regulations, it sets a fair and 
appropriate interest expense limit for each firm, neither too strict nor too lenient.  In certain cases 
a subsidiary may be engaged in a fundamentally different line of work than the worldwide 
enterprise.  In those cases fairness would dictate establishing an interest expense limit consistent 
with other firms in that industry, as Japanese rules permit today. 
 
Finally, this proposal improves effectiveness.  As demonstrated previously, current debt-to-
equity limitations are often ineffective at halting abuse.  Interest deduction limits are more 
effective, but they only establish an upper limit for tax deductible interest expenses.  As long as 
the MNE is careful not to exceed the regulatory maximum, it is free to pursue tax-driven 
financing decisions.  For example, suppose a MNE consciously chose to keep debt and interest 
expenses low.  Today it is permitted to increase deductible interest expenses to 30% of EBITDA 
in Germany and Italy.  These countries may be depriving themselves of tax revenue because they 
permit MNEs to structure intercompany loans for the sole purpose of stripping earnings to the 
law’s limit.  This proposal would establish a fair and reasonable limit for each company by 
basing it on the worldwide enterprise’s own funding decisions.   
 
To evaluate this proposal’s effectiveness, we should also ask if there are ways MNEs could work 
around these rules to achieve tax-advantaged results.  It is true MNEs that incur higher trade 
interest expenses can allow their CFCs to deduct more intercompany interest under this proposal.  
So it is possible MNEs could increase trade interest expenses, and this would allow them to 
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leverage certain subsidiaries more intercompany debt, and thus more earnings could be stripped 
from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions.  However to do this, the MNE would be reducing its pre-
tax earnings by increasing additional trade debt expenses, which would moderate such actions.  
In addition, banks and other lenders will not want to extend more debt than a firm can be 
expected to repay.  Lenders are also more likely to demand loan collateral or covenants that can 
place limits on a firm’s freedom to conduct its business operations.  So there are several forces 
that constrain such a tax strategy.  In addition, these are marketplace forces that may act to limit 
a firm’s debt.  Market forces that constrain debt can frequently be more effective than tax rules, 
which can sometimes be evaded or become dated. 
Conclusion 
The U.S. federal government is facing some of the largest budget deficits in its entire history.  
The Congressional Budget Office has said the projected budget deficits are unsustainable, and 
that the federal government needs to close the budget gap through reduced spending and/or  
increased revenue.  One way  
the U.S. government could increase tax revenue is through tightening its thin 
capitalization/interest deduction rules.  Experience has demonstrated that existing U.S. thin 
capitalization rules can be avoided.  U.S. tax authorities should be concerned with thin 
capitalization/interest deduction rules, as the U.S. income tax rate is one of the highest in the 
world, and thus the country is an attractive target for earning’s stripping activities.  In addition, 
the U.S. has left its thin capitalization/interest deduction rules essentially unchanged since 1989, 
while many other countries have been regularly reviewing and modifying these rules to ensure 
they strike the right balance between raising tax revenue and attracting FDI.   
 
 
This paper has reviewed a number of regulatory approaches to control excessively leveraged 
financing structures, and proposes that the worldwide enterprise’s ratio of interest expense to 
EBITDA should determine a subsidiary’s tax deductible interest expense limit.  This approach 
achieves many of the objectives that define a high quality tax law by supporting the certainty 
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principle, the efficiency principle, the fairness principle, capital import neutrality, and the 
effectiveness principle.  As tax authorities in the United States look for ways in which to increase 
tax revenue, they should consider this proposal.  Other countries may want to consider this 
regulatory approach as well, as they seek to control excessively leveraged financing structures of 
firms operating within their borders. 
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Abstract 
 
Companies throughout the world are restructuring their supply chains to reduce costs and 
improve efficiency.  As they do this, activities are frequently being transferred to countries 
imposing lower income tax rates.  Recent evidence indicates some firms are linking supply chain 
decisions with income tax planning, to construct a tax efficient supply chain that aims to 
maximize net income.  While other papers have discussed various elements of a tax efficient 
supply chain, this paper specifically focuses on the income tax considerations a firm should 
consider when constructing a tax efficient supply chain.  In particular, the tax model of the 
Multi-National Enterprise (MNE) is analyzed to determine the best opportunities for optimizing 
net income.  The various legal entities a MNE forms to conduct business, including sales 
companies, distribution centers, manufacturing companies, procurement organizations and 
shared service providers are analyzed to identify key factors the MNE should consider when 
restructuring its supply chain.  The paper also proposes ways firms can support their position 
when tax authorities audit their supply chain restructurings. 
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Introduction 
 
Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) are restructuring supply chains to reduce their cost structures.  
As trade barriers fall and communications technologies improve, it has become easier and more 
cost effective to manage business operations across international borders.  This has motivated 
businesses to centralize, reorganize and relocate many business processes to perform them in the 
most efficient manner.  While they do this, many businesses are shifting business activities from 
high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions.  This trend has not escaped tax authorities in high-tax 
jurisdictions, who are concerned with the lost tax revenue. 
 
Schwarz and Castro (2006) write, “The globalization of markets and products and the 
development of technology have created an impetus for specialization within multinational 
groups.  The co-existence of low-cost and high-cost jurisdictions drives cost reduction strategies, 
including transportation costs as well as those associated with labor-intensive activities.”  They 
write, “Whether motivated by commercial or tax reasons, some countries have observed a 
reduction in tax revenues when modern business models are adopted compared with more 
traditional models” (p. 187).  They noted that tax practitioners from France, South Africa, 
Switzerland, Mexico, Argentina and the United States have all observed this trend.  Companies 
are restructuring their supply chains and simultaneously reducing their income tax obligations. 
 
This paper demonstrates that MNEs should link income tax and supply chain considerations 
when restructuring their supply chains, and they should aim to maximize net income when doing 
so.  This recommendation differs from the great majority of supply chain papers, which have 
generally recommended businesses should seek to minimize pre-tax costs.    One of the most 
important activities for both supply chain and tax organizations is determining where to locate 
business operations, so these organizations should collaborate to make optimal decisions.  This 
paper explains how linking supply chain and income tax analysis can lead to better decisions and 
improve net income.  It contributes to knowledge of this process by evaluating the MNE’s 
international tax model and specifically evaluating a variety of legal organizations within the 
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MNE to determine the best opportunities for integrated supply chain and income tax planning.  
This paper also identifies a number of tax issues firms need to consider when making these 
important decisions.   
Literature Review 
For the most part, supply chain literature and tax articles have been strictly separated, and little 
literature has attempted to link the supply chain with tax considerations.  Experts in these 
activities have traditionally focused either on the supply chain or income taxes, and have 
published their work in their respective journals.  But recently there have been some articles that 
have demonstrated these activities are becoming increasingly linked. 
 
From a supply chain perspective, Beamon (1998) reviewed supply chain literature to identify the 
best measures of supply chain performance.  One of Beamon’s conclusions was that firms were 
frequently encouraged to reduce pre-tax costs, not maximize net income.  Skjett-Larsen, Schary, 
Mikkola and Kotzab (2006) identified six measures of supply chain success, and only one 
measure employed net income.  Most of the recommended measures of supply chain success 
have not included income taxes, presumably because they are outside a supply chain manager’s 
control.   
 
Cohen and Mallik (1997) explicitly recognized that supply chain restructurings did create 
opportunities to reduce taxes simultaneously.  However they acknowledged at that time that 
integrating supply chain and tax decisions was a relatively new concept, stating: “Analytical 
modeling in this field, however, is relatively new” (p. 201). 
 
Irving, Kilponen, Marakaian and Klitgaard (2005) suggested supply chain management decisions 
should include tax considerations.  They proposed that including tax considerations into supply 
chain decisions could improve net income for many large enterprises.  They made the business 
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case for linking supply chain and tax decisions, and provided several examples in which such an 
approach could improve an organization’s net income. 
 
Schwarz and Castro (2006) summarized a discussion held to discuss the tax impact of supply 
chain restructurings at a tax conference in 2005.  Their article demonstrated that supply chain 
restructurings were eroding the tax base in many high-tax countries.  They showed that supply 
chain restructurings were creating many new issues for tax authorities and businesses, not all of 
which could be immediately answered.  One key concern was how supply chain restructurings 
were changing the risks and responsibilities of subsidiaries, and whether these changes merited 
transfer pricing changes.  These discussions led the OECD to form a working group to study the 
issues further (p. 187). 
 
The International Transfer Pricing Journal recently featured six articles focusing upon the tax 
consequences of supply chain restructurings.29  Authors representing Belgium, France, the 
Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States each discussed developments in 
their country.  Tax authorities in these high income-tax countries are concerned that supply chain 
restructurings are reducing their tax revenue.  The articles emphasized recent developments in 
those countries, and what actions tax authorities were contemplating or taking to preserve their 
tax base.  These articles again demonstrated that supply chain restructurings were becoming an 
important tax issue, and that the topics are becoming linked. 
 
Romalis (2007) analyzed the impact of low income taxes and falling trade costs upon Ireland’s 
economy.  He argued that while low income taxes were important, they were not the only factor 
that contributed to the growth of the Irish economy in the 1990’s.  He noted that the reduction in 
income tax rates did not immediately trigger an increase in investments and exports there.  He 
argued “that an important trigger for the rapid growth of international trade and FDI has been a 
                                                                
29 See International Transfer Pricing Journal, Comparative Survey:  Supply Chain Management,  Number 4, 
July/August 2006 
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decline in technological and policy barriers to international trade in the 1990s” (p. 460).   
Romalis argued that Ireland’s economic growth was “explained by an interaction of low taxation 
of capital and declining international trade costs” (p. 468).  Romalis’s paper provides further 
support for the position that income taxes and supply chain costs can work together to stimulate 
investment in countries in low-tax countries.   
 
Anderson, Murphy and Reeve (2002) also focused upon the importance taxes play upon supply 
chain decisions.  Their focus was specifically upon state income, franchise, employment and 
property taxes within the United States.  Lewis (2009) also focused on the impact of supply 
chain decisions upon taxes, but specifically addressed Value Added Tax (VAT) issues, where 
such taxes are imposed.  Both articles again provided support for the position that tax and supply 
chain decisions are merging, but they did not address national income tax issues, which is the 
focus of this paper. 
 
Income Tax Efficient Supply Chain Planning 
Income tax rates vary substantially from country to country.  While corporate profits are taxed at 
nearly 40% in high-tax countries, such as Japan,30 income tax rates are as low as 2% in other 
jurisdictions, such as Puerto Rico.31  Low tax jurisdictions are commonly called tax havens.  
Such countries typically assess low or no income taxes to attract investment from MNEs, 
generating local jobs.  MNEs can substantially reduce income taxes by moving business 
operations to tax havens.   
 
Transferring operations abroad can frequently draw scrutiny from tax authorities, as these 
business decisions can reduce government tax revenue.  Therefore firms must be careful to 
comply with local and international tax laws.  While tax laws differ from one country another, 
                                                                
30 OECD Tax Database, 2006; see http://www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase; see Table II.1, Combined Corporate Income 
Tax Rate, 2006 
31 13 L.P.R.A. § 10101, Puerto Rico Tax Laws 
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most international tax laws do not discourage firms from pursuing legal means to minimize 
taxes.  The US perspective may be summarized by several well-known statements of the late US 
Supreme Court Justice Learned Hand.  Judge Hand wrote:  “Over and over again courts have 
said there is nothing sinister in so arranging one’s affairs to keep taxes as low as possible.  
Everybody does so, rich and poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more 
than the law allows: taxes are enforced extractions, not voluntary contributions.  To demand 
more in the name of morals is mere cant.”32  In another opinion Judge Hand wrote: “Any one 
may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose 
that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s 
taxes…” 33   
As income taxes are often one of a firm’s largest costs, firms engage in tax planning to minimize 
this expense.  Tax planning is the use of legal means to arrange business activities to minimize 
tax obligations.   International tax laws do not prevent MNEs from organizing their operations to 
reduce taxes, but firms must be careful to use only legal strategies to reduce tax obligations.  
MNEs must comply with international tax laws, and not cross the line that distinguishes tax 
minimization from tax evasion.  Tax evasion is generally defined as taking illegal action to 
reduce tax obligations.  Tax evasion penalties differ from country to country, but in some nations 
they can be substantial, and provide strong incentive to comply with tax laws.  For example, in 
the United States 40% transfer pricing penalties can be added to the tax assessment, along with 
additional interest charges.34 
Tax laws are frequently considered complex, and international tax laws are even more so, as they 
frequently differ between countries.  However there are certain common principles to which 
firms must adhere. Two important international tax standards are the arm’s-length standard and 
the business purpose doctrine. 
 
 
                                                                
32 Commissioner v. Newman, 47-1 USTC¶9175, 35 AFTR 857, 159 F.2d 848 (CA-2, 1947) 
33 Gregory v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 809, 810-811 (2d Cir. 1934) 
34 IRC §6662 
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The arm’s-length standard governs how related parties value product sales and services between 
entities.  When a MNE operates in more than one country, it typically creates a new legal entity 
to facilitate legal operations in that jurisdiction.  Often that entity needs to buy or sell products 
from other legal entities within the same worldwide enterprise.  US Treasury Regulations state 
“In determining the true taxable income of a controlled taxpayer, the standard to be applied in 
every case is that of a taxpayer dealing at arm’s length with an uncontrolled taxpayer.”35  The 
arm’s-length standard is supported in many other countries, and is cited as the key principle in 
the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multi-National Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations.36  
 
The business purpose doctrine says a business transaction should have some purpose other than 
tax reduction.  Jones (2006) states “a transaction should not be effective for tax purposes unless 
it has a genuine business purpose other than tax avoidance.  The lack of any business purpose by 
the participants can render a transaction meaningless, at least from the perspective of the IRS, 
even if the transaction literally complies with the law” (p. 85).   This places limitations on Judge 
Hand’s statements.  Judge Hand said tax reduction is a legitimate objective, but the business 
purpose doctrine says tax reduction cannot be the sole purpose.  For this reason, tax practitioners 
frequently emphasize the operational benefits of restructurings that also reduce tax liabilities.  
They can argue to tax authorities that a restructuring was done for primarily to achieve 
operational goals, and that tax reductions were a byproduct of restructurings conducted to 
achieve other business objectives.    
 
Selecting a business location involves many considerations, so MNEs can generally find a 
legitimate business purpose for transferring operations elsewhere.  Business objectives might 
include proximity to customers, risk diversification, low wage rates, or easy access to materials 
suppliers.  However not all businesses transfer operations to low tax countries, as there are other 
considerations.  There are many factors firms evaluate when determining where to locate 
                                                                
35 Treasury Regulation §1.482(1)(b)(1) 
36 Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multi-National Enterprises and Tax Administrations,  (June, 2001). OECD 
Publishing, 254 pages. 
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operations, such as employee skills and availability, political stability, and an adequate local 
infrastructure, among other factors.  Supply chain costs are an important consideration.  
Companies seeking to maximize profits need to balance income tax savings against these other 
factors.  Income taxes may be reduced by operating in a low-tax jurisdiction, but transferring 
operations to another location will impact supply chain costs.  A firm will ideally identify an 
alternative that will reduce both income taxes and supply chain costs.  But in many cases it may 
not be possible to minimize both income taxes and supply chain costs.  One alternative might 
reduce income taxes, but simultaneously increase supply chain costs.  Another might reduce 
supply chain costs but at the same time increase income taxes.  Since income tax and supply 
chain costs may simultaneously change when business activities are moved from one country to 
another, they should be analyzed jointly. 
 
The Income Tax Efficient Supply Chain 
International tax and supply chain planning are frequently viewed as unrelated activities.  Supply 
chain managers and tax directors have different proficiencies and their reporting relationships 
differ.  Supply chain management is a line activity, the department generally reports to 
manufacturing or operations managers, and it is staffed by supply chain and manufacturing 
analysts.  In contrast, tax is a staff activity, the department typically reports to the Chief 
Financial Officer, and tax departments employ tax attorneys and tax accountants.  As a result, 
these departments may not collaborate, at least historically.   Thus supply chain and income tax 
decisions were often made by different organizations operating independently. 
 
In addition, tax and supply chain organizations often attempt to achieve different objectives.  
Beamon (1998) showed that the most popular performance metric for supply chain managers is 
pre-tax cost minimization (p. 289).  In contrast, tax departments seek to maximize net income, 
while complying with tax laws.  Differing objectives also discourage collaboration.   
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Despite this separation, one of the most important activities for both supply chain organizations 
and tax departments is recommending where to locate business processes.  Supply chain 
departments determine where to procure materials, manufacture products, and distribute finished 
goods.  These location decisions can have a substantial impact on income tax obligations, as tax 
rates vary substantially from country to country.   The evidence suggests that in many cases these 
impacts were analyzed independently, but in recent years it has become more common to link 
supply chain and income tax planning.   
 
This is because decisions made to reduce income taxes can also have a major impact upon supply 
chain costs.  If a MNE decides to manufacture or distribute goods in one country for tax 
purposes, it will have an impact upon supply chain costs, including duties, tariffs and distribution 
costs.   For this reason, supply chain organizations and tax departments should collaborate to 
achieve a common goal of maximizing net income.  When supply chain organizations aim to 
minimize pre-tax supply chain costs, they ignore income tax impact.  Tax departments limit their 
potential to increase net income when they do not contribute to supply chain decisions.  It 
appears this has become clearer to many firms in recent years, and that many are beginning to 
link these activities.  
 
Describing the situation in the United States, Wright (2006) comments: “Supply chain 
management structures are increasingly used by multinational enterprises (MNEs)” (p. 202).  
Wright says “Such business activities give rise to transfer pricing opportunities that, many times, 
result in a reduction of taxable income in high-tax jurisdictions.  The tax authorities in high-tax 
jurisdictions have, as a result of the changes in taxable income in their jurisdictions, become very 
interested in auditing these structures” (p. 202).   
 
Tax authorities in France are also concerned about lost tax revenue.  According to Douvier 
(2006), “For a number of years, supply chain management (SCM) structures have been 
implemented in Europe in order to respond to the demand of clients, to reduce costs and to allow 
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efficiency to the benefit of both the clients and the companies themselves.  Additionally, the 
implementation of such structures may permit tax reductions” (p. 178).   
 
Tax authorities in the Netherlands believe this is one of their most important issues.  Kuppens 
and Oosterhoff (2006) write, “Cross-border restructuring of multinational enterprises (MNEs) is 
an issue that is high on the agenda of the Dutch tax authorities.  In fact, the trend towards 
outsourcing; transferring production and other activities to countries with low labor costs; and 
moving leadership and risk-taking functions to low-tax countries are all elements that may 
trigger loss of employment and a reduction of the taxable base in the Netherlands.  The relevant 
tax aspects of such changes are closely monitored by the tax authorities” (p. 183).  
 
Some authors argue supply chain restructurings are driven primarily by operational objectives, 
rather than tax considerations.  Casley, Pope and Hohtoulas (2006) focused upon developments 
in the United Kingdom.  They write, “The impact of the supply chain model on tax is probably 
not always at the forefront of the managers’ minds” (p. 194).  However they acknowledge tax 
considerations are equally important.  They write, “Whether the decisions made increase or 
decrease the MNE’s effective tax rate is often a secondary consideration, but no less important” 
(p. 194).  Whether motivated primarily or secondarily by tax considerations, some MNEs are 
simultaneously restructuring their supply chain and reducing their income tax obligations. 
 
Romalis (2007) took a very different approach from the other articles cited.  Romalis focused 
specifically on the growth of Ireland’s economy in the 1990’s, and tried to determine what 
triggered its rapid economic growth.  Romalis writes that “an economy that is characterized by 
low taxation of capital (and that has no other flaws that implicitly tax capital) becomes an ideal 
location for export-based capital intensive industries when trade costs are low” (p. 460). Citing 
reductions in worldwide duties, EU tariffs, the Single Market Program, and technological 
improvements that reduced trade costs, Romalis argued that reduction in trade costs have 
contributed significantly to Ireland’s growth in export-oriented trade (p. 460).  “Different rates of 
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capital taxation, when combined with different capital intensities in production, are a powerful 
force generating international trade.  The model can be used to analyze the effects of declining 
trade costs on a small economy that levies low taxes on capital.  Its international trade begins to 
expand greatly” (p. 461).  Romalis showed that much of Ireland’s growth is in export-oriented, 
capital intensive manufacturing industries.   
 
Romalis argued that low income tax rates were not solely responsible for the growth of the Irish 
economy.  He writes, “Because the Irish tax rate on foreign capital has been low for decades it 
alone cannot explain why the most impressive growth performance occurred in the mid- to late 
1990s.  This was a period where measured international trade costs for so many goods and 
services became very small” (p. 465-466).  Romalis notes that a variety of trade policy and 
technology improvements contributed to Ireland’s growth.  These include worldwide reductions 
in tariffs, the Single Market Program, and improved computer and communications technologies 
that made it easier to manage business processes cost-effectively across international borders.  
However Romalis’s observations were not limited to Ireland.  Romalis writes, “The tax 
advantage is enough to attract capital from large countries, and as a result per-capita GDP in 
small countries rises.  But large trade costs still result in large countries preserving most of their 
capital intensive-industries.  As trade costs fall the advantage of locating in large markets 
diminishes, so the location of capital is mostly driven by favorable taxation” (p. 464). 
 
Romalis’s conclusions have been supported by several studies that have focused upon the Puerto 
Rico economy.  In particular, they have sought to explain the growth of the pharmaceutical 
industry there.  Bram, Martinez and Steindel (2008) argued that the growth of that industry in 
Puerto Rico was the result of both low tax rates, enacted in section 936 of the US tax code, and 
low supply chain costs.  Referring to the low tax rates they write “In practice, the provision 
appeared to encourage siting in Puerto Rico of plants producing high-profit, easily transportable 
items such as pharmaceuticals and electronic components” (p. 3).  Scherer (1997) reached the 
same conclusion, writing “Because drug manufacturing and transportation costs are modest in 
relation to product prices and because the geographic locus of patent rights ownership is easily 
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transferred, the pharmaceutical companies have been particularly aggressive in obtaining U.S. 
federal income tax credits by locating their production operations in Puerto Rico” (p. 107).  To 
summarize, low tax rates become particularly attractive when products are very profitable and 
the tax savings are not offset by high distribution and other supply chain costs. 
Restructuring the Supply Chain 
According to Beamon (1998), the supply chain is an integrated process in which a number of 
business entities, including materials suppliers, manufacturers, distributors and retailers work 
together to acquire raw materials, convert materials into finished goods, and deliver products to 
customers (p. 281).  Skjett-Larsen, Schary, Mikkola and Kotzab (2006) write, “It is propelled by 
the realization that no organization can be good at all things, and by the expanding reach and 
ease of access to information and communication technology” (p. 17).  In recent years 
optimizing the supply chain has received considerable attention in business and academia, driven 
by the desire to reduce cost structures, improve customer satisfaction and increase operating 
efficiency. 
The supply chain includes two sub-processes.  The first, production planning and inventory 
control, includes manufacturing and inventory storage policies.  The second, distribution and 
logistics, delivers finished goods to customers.  Distribution costs include can include shipping 
costs, tariffs, and all other costs related to delivering finished goods to customers.  An overview 
follows: 
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------------------------------->    --------------------------------------------------> 
Production Planning and                     Distribution and Logistics 
Inventory Control                              
                                           Figure 1:  The Supply Chain Process 
 
As mentioned, MNEs are changing the way they manage the supply chain.  Reduced barriers to 
trade, agreements to reduce tariffs and duties, outsourcing alternatives and increased focus on 
core competencies have all generated interest in supply chain management.  Reducing trade 
barriers has driven trade costs down, and lower trade costs have enabled companies to locate 
business operations where they can be performed most efficiently.  Kuppens and Oosterhoff 
(2006) write:  “The competitive environment in a global economy has accelerated change among 
MNEs.  Companies are increasingly focused on product specialization and optimization of their 
entire value chain.  Business restructuring is often geared towards centralizing key functions and 
decision making, and this is enabled by more transparency and availability of data through 
information technology.  Such changes typically entail a transfer of functions and risks from a 
local-country level to one central location” (p. 183).  Improved communications technologies 
have also enabled supply chain process improvements.  According to Verlinden and Costermans, 
(2006) “The transaction costs are further nose-diving due to cheaper telecommunications and the 
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emergence of the Internet” (p. 173).  Cost-effective communications technologies, such as the 
Internet and Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) information systems, make it easier to manage 
business processes across international boundaries.  Both enable rapid and cost-effective 
information flows across national borders, enabling centralized management and removing 
redundant processes. 
 
Cohen and Mallik (1997) write there has been “a movement away from the classic multinational 
style of operating relatively autonomous domestic firms in each country of operation.  The global 
supply chain is characterized by the linkage of decision making at all levels of the firm’s supply 
chain, i.e., across regional, functional and even interfirm boundaries” (p. 193).  For example, 
IBM’s CEO recently told The Economist  (April 7, 2007) IBM is dramatically altering the roles 
and responsibilities of its subsidiaries: 
 
“Sam Palmisano, IBM’s boss, foresees nothing less than the redesign of the 
multinational company.  In his scheme, multinationals began when 19th-century 
firms set up sales offices abroad for goods shipped from factories at home.  
Firms later created smaller ‘Mini Me’ versions of the parent company across the 
world.  Now Mr. Palmisano wants to piece together worldwide operations, 
putting together different activities wherever they are done best, paying no heed 
to arbitrary geographic boundaries.  That is why, for example, IBM now has over 
50,000 employees in India, and ambitious plans for further expansion there.  
Even as India has become the company’s second-biggest operation outside 
America, it has moved the head of procurement from New York to Shenzhen in 
China” (p. 11). 
 
In short, supply chain management has become a key business process.  Corporations are 
centralizing business processes to perform activities where they can be done most efficiently, 
frequently ignoring national boundaries.  Improved information systems, trade agreements and 
tariff reductions have reduced trade costs and enabled supply chain restructurings.  Casley, Pope 
and Hohtoulas (2006) write, “When geographic markets were more distinct, transport was more 
expensive, communication harder and information less widespread, supply chains were easier to 
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understand and national businesses within an MNE more likely to operate on a stand-alone basis.  
This is no longer true; reductions in trade barriers coupled with the increasing need to capture 
increased value or greater cost effectiveness, has caused many MNEs to rethink their supply 
chains to cater for these changes in the global economy” (p. 194).   
 
At the same time, tax issues permeate supply chain decisions.  Supply chain decisions determine 
in what location a business operates, which determines both the types of taxes levied, and the tax 
rates.  These operational decisions can also change the roles and responsibilities of a subsidiary, 
which may also have transfer pricing implications.  Supply chain decisions can impact income 
taxes, property taxes, value-added taxes, and sales taxes.  While this paper’s focus is directed 
towards income taxes, these other taxes can also be important considerations and should not be 
ignored. 
Measuring the Supply Chain 
An effective supply chain must achieve many objectives.  To satisfy customers, the supply chain 
must deliver products to customers where and when they want them.   Minimizing inventory 
levels and obsolescence are important operating efficiency objectives.  Firms also want to 
minimize supply chain risks, such as unreliable suppliers and operating in unstable locations.  
And cost containment is generally a key business objective.   Effective supply chains must 
balance these goals, improve profits, and ultimately add shareholder value. 
 
Beamon (1998) surveyed significant supply chain management literature (p. 281-294).  
Beamon’s article reviewed 29 supply chain management articles, and identified ten supply chain 
performance measures, shown below: 
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Objective   Performance Measure   # Articles 
Financial Goals  Minimize Cost                                             13 
    Maximize Net Profit             1 
Inventory Management Minimize Average Inventory                       2 
Minimize Obsolete Inventory            1 
Customer Satisfaction  Minimize product demand variance             4 
Maximize on time delivery            3 
Minimize stockout probability           2  
Maximize available system capacity            1   
Multiple Goals  Maximize buyer-supplier benefits                1 
    Minimize activity days and total cost           1 
Total                                                            29 
 
Only one of the 29 articles recommended supply chain managers should aim to maximize net 
income.  Similarly, Skjett-Larsen, Schary, Mikkola and Kotzab (2006) identified six frameworks 
to evaluate the supply chain (p. 322).  Four emphasize cost management, and two stress business 
process success.  Only one of the six measures, Return on Assets, employs net income, which is 
impacted by income taxes.  And while that measure uses net income to measure supply chain 
efficiency, their work does not discuss the trade-offs that may exist between income tax and 
supply chain objectives, or explain how focusing on net income can change traditional supply 
chain management. 
 
However net income is a primary driver of shareholder value.   In recent years many have 
debated whether net income or cash flow is a better measure of shareholder value.  But 
proponents of both measures agree the figures should be calculated net of income taxes. A study 
by Bartov, Goldberg and Kim (2001) analyzed the value of net income versus free cash flow in a 
number of countries, with different financial reporting rules.  They believed prior studies had 
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demonstrated that in the United States “the explanatory power of earnings is superior to cash 
flows” (p. 108).  They attempted to determine if this result could be extended to other countries.  
Bartov, Goldberg and Kim concluded “Our findings provide support for earnings having greater 
relative explanatory power over cash flows in the Anglo-Saxon countries, but not in Germany 
and Japan” (p. 129).  In the latter countries net income was not necessarily superior to cash flow; 
cash flow was determined to be equally good in many situations.    Given that net income is 
considered the best measure of firm performance in many countries, and of equivalent value with 
free cash flow in other countries, this paper will emphasize measuring and improving net 
income.   
 
The other supply chain measures proposed generally support maximizing net income.  These 
metrics focus on activities controllable by supply chain managers and are justifiable when they 
contribute to profit maximization.  At first glance, all of these measures appear to support 
maximizing net income.  But in some instances the most popular metric, pre-tax cost 
minimization, may actually conflict with net income maximization.  And cost minimization, 
while an important business metric, is not the most important driver of shareholder value. 
 
Cost Minimization and Profit Maximization 
 
To illustrate this, consider the following example.  A supply chain manager must decide between 
two manufacturing locations.  The first option minimizes supply chain costs, and is closer to 
suppliers and customers.  The second location is further from suppliers and customers, and 
wages are higher.  Per unit manufacturing costs are shown below: 
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Cost per unit Option One:  Lower 
Supply Chain Costs 
Option Two: 
HigherSupply Chain Costs 
Inbound Logistics $2 $4 
Materials $30 $30 
Labor $10 $20 
Shipping/Outbound Logistics $2 $4 
Total Supply Chain Costs $44 $58 
Table 1:  Supply Chain Costs 
If a supply chain manager’s goal is to minimize supply chain costs the first option is superior.  
Inbound logistics, wages and outbound logistics costs are lower.  But reducing supply chain cost 
does not necessarily maximize net income.  The income tax impact may outweigh supply chain 
savings.  If income taxes are considered, the second option may be superior.  Suppose a transfer 
price of $200 from both locations, and a lower income tax rate in the second location. 
 Option One: Lower 
Supply Chain Costs 
Option Two:  Higher 
Supply Chain Costs 
Difference 
(1-2) 
Transfer Price $200 $200 -- 
Total Supply 
Chain Costs 
$44 $58 ($14) 
Operating Profit $156 $142 $14 
Tax Rate 35% 25% 10% 
Taxes $54.60 $35.50 $19.10 
Net Profit $101.40 $106.50 ($5.10) 
Table 2:  Net Profit Comparison 
 
While option one minimizes supply chain costs, option two maximizes net income.  
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This is a not merely a theoretical concern; it has very practical consequences.  Businesses 
regularly reshape their supply chains, looking for ways to reduce their cost structure, and 
improve inventory management and customer satisfaction.  MNEs now regularly transfer 
business operations from one country to another.  Supply chain decisions that ignore tax impact 
may actually reduce net income and shareholder value.  Businesses should consider tax 
consequences to make optimal supply chain decisions, and the evidence indicates many have 
begun to do so.  Tax authorities in a variety of countries have observed this activity and are 
concerned with the implications on their revenue. 
 
The previous example assumes the same $200 transfer price from either location.  IRS §482 
regulations identify five acceptable transfer pricing methodologies for transfers of tangible 
products.  Three of the five methods specified in US transfer pricing law should generate the 
same transfer price.  The “comparable uncontrolled price method,” “resale price method,” and 
the “comparable profits” method should each achieve this result. 
 
IRS regulations state: “The comparable uncontrolled price method evaluates whether the amount 
charged in a controlled transaction is arm’s length by reference to the amount charged in 
comparable uncontrolled transaction.”37  In this approach, transfer prices should be determined 
by evaluating external prices for comparable sales, which serve as the same reference point for 
transfer price calculation.  Concerning the second method the regulations state:  “The resale price 
method measures the value of functions performed, and is ordinarily used in cases involving the 
purchase and resale of tangible goods in which the reseller has not added substantial value to the 
tangible goods by physically altering the goods before resale.”38  Treasury regulations say: “If an 
applicable resale price (in the uncontrolled transaction) of the property involved in the controlled 
transaction is $100 and the appropriate gross margin is 20%, then an arms-length result of the 
controlled sale is $80 ($100 minus (20% x $100)).39  This would be the appropriate transfer price 
from all internal suppliers.  The third approach, the comparable profits method, is very similar to 
                                                                
37 IRS Regulation §1.482-3(b)(1) 
38 Ibid 
39 Ibid 
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the resale price method, but the organization’s operating profit is evaluated instead of gross 
profit.  “Under the comparable profits method, the determination of an arms-length result is 
based on the amount of operating profit that the tested party would have earned on related party 
transactions if its profit level indicator were equal to that of an uncontrolled comparable, and 
applying the profit level indicator to the financial data related to the tested party’s most narrowly 
identifiable business activity for which data incorporating the controlled transaction is 
available…”40   
 
Under each of these three methods, the purchaser’s transfer price should be the same, without 
regard to which internal supplier provided the product.  Furthermore, IRS regulations do not 
permit taxpayers to pick and choose from the five methods when determining transfer pricing 
policies.  The firm is bound by the best method rule, which says: “The arm’s length result of a 
controlled transaction must be determined under the method that, under the facts and 
circumstances, provides the most reliable measure of an arm’s length result.”41  The IRS directs 
taxpayers to select the method that best supports the arms-length principle, not the most 
advantageous method.  If one of the three methods above is the most reliable basis for 
determining arms-length results, it must be used.  As Gresik (2001) writes “The ‘best method’ 
provisions legally obligate the transnational to prove its method best approximates an arms-
length price” (p. 810). 
 
Within the United States, the IRS imposes substantial penalties for not complying with transfer 
pricing laws.   First, the IRS can adjust transfer prices to bring them in compliance with the 
arms-length standard.42  In addition, the IRS can impose substantial penalties on top of the 
adjustment.  These penalties not tax deductible. 43  Many believe these penalties have motivated 
US-based firms to comply more carefully with transfer pricing laws.  Skinner (2005) writes, 
“Procedural changes have made it less attractive to litigate transfer pricing disputes.  First, 
                                                                
40 IRS Regulation §1.482-5(b) 
41 IRS Regulation §1.482-1(c)(1) 
42 IRC §482 
43 IRC §6662(e), §6662(h) 
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Congress provided for transfer pricing penalties equal to 20% and 40% of the ultimate §482 
adjustment.  The trigger for penalties is $5 million of aggregate misstatements.  For a 
multinational corporation with billions of dollars of inter-company transactions, this threshold is 
easily reached” (p. 186).   The 20% penalty is for “accuracy-related” issues, and the 40% penalty 
is assessed for “gross misstatement.”44  And on top of the transfer pricing adjustment and the 
non-deductible penalty, firms must also pay accrued interest.45  In one well known transfer 
pricing case, in 2006 the IRS reached a $3.4 billion transfer pricing settlement with 
GlaxoSmithKline. 
International Tax Planning 
When businesses expand across international boundaries, they frequently create foreign branches 
or subsidiaries to facilitate doing business.  MNEs form these organizations to comply with legal 
requirements and determine tax obligations.  When they form organizations in another country 
the local tax laws govern business activities conducted there.   
International businesses frequently transfer inventory and fixed assets from one country to 
another.  MNEs might invent products in one country, manufacture them in a second, store them 
in a third, and sell them to customers in a fourth location.  Since these activities cross 
international boundaries, MNEs need to calculate income in each locale to comply with local tax 
laws.  Transfer prices for inventory, assets and services need to be calculated based on the arm’s-
length standard.  
 
Determining an arm’s-length transfer price is not always easy to do.  Comparable trade prices are 
usually the starting point to determine a transfer price, but it may be challenging to find such 
prices.  Gresik (2001) writes, “If a well-functioning market for intermediate goods exists, the 
appropriate value to place on the transfer is rather easy for tax authorities to determine.  
However, with transnationals the transferred assets are specialized enough that comparable 
products produced by firms not related to the transnational do not exist or they are intangible in 
nature” (p. 808).  In addition, this is particularly true when the MNE is vertically integrated, and 
                                                                
44 IRC §6662 
45 Ibid 
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it transfers work-in-process inventory between business entities.  Firms may not sell similar, 
partially-completed goods to external customers, making external price comparisons difficult to 
obtain.  Centralized supply chain planning may increase work-in-process inventory transfers, as 
businesses shift manufacturing processes to the most efficient location.   
 
Transfer prices determine the revenue and income earned, as thus the taxes owed, in various 
jurisdictions.  They are important both to tax authorities and MNEs.  Income tax rates can vary 
substantially between countries.  As previously mentioned, income tax rates can range from 2% 
in Puerto Rico to nearly 40% in Japan.  Due to substantial tax rate differences, businesses have 
an incentive to seek locations that minimize their worldwide tax expense, while complying with 
international tax laws. 
MNEs frequently form subsidiaries to perform a specific business purpose.  These objectives 
may include inventing products, manufacturing products, distributing them, or selling goods and 
services.  Forming subsidiaries to perform specific activities facilitates functional-based tax 
planning.  According to Irving, Kilponen, Markarian and Klitgaard (2005), this approach 
supports a:  
 
“principle that underlies many of the world’s taxing regimes:  The income on 
which a company is taxed should reflect the functions the company performs, the 
risks the company takes on, and the assets the company has at its disposal.  More 
specifically, companies earn separately identifiable economic returns on the 
functions they perform, the risks they take, and the assets they own or have 
developed.  These distinctions are muted when an enterprise operates worldwide 
on a vertically integrated basis.  However, they become significant once a 
company begins to isolate functions, risk, or assets in specific entities within the 
corporate group and ultimately deploys them in certain jurisdictions” (p. 59). 
 
Creating entities for specific purposes facilitates transfer price determination.  If external price 
comparisons are not available, one alternative is to determine an arm’s-length return for a 
specific business activity.  For example, suppose a US-based business decides to sell products in 
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Canada.  It plans to continue inventing and manufacturing products in the United States, and to 
sell them in the United States and Canada.  It forms a Canadian sales subsidiary to sell products 
there.  Its products are unique, and comparable trade prices are difficult to establish.  However it 
can determine profit margins for comparable sales companies.  Transfer prices could be 
calculated so the Canadian subsidiary could achieve a gross margin or a return on sales figure 
comparable to similar trade businesses.   
 
To facilitate these profit comparisons, MNEs may create several entities in the same country, if 
they are formed for different business purposes.  If a firm conducted manufacturing, and sales in 
the same country, they might be organized into separate entities to support transfer pricing 
analysis.  At a minimum, they need to calculate financial results for these activities separately.  
Combining manufacturing and sales activities into one financial statement would make it very 
difficult to determine if the firm’s profits were appropriate for the activities performed or risks 
borne there. 
 
Larger MNEs may have elaborate value chains.  These activities might include research and 
development, manufacturing, distribution, and sales.  In the following graphical depiction, the 
MNE’s arms-length transfer pricing policies must apportion profit between legal entities. 
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Note:  Intellectual Property Development, the Manufacturing Corporation, the Distribution Center, and the Sales 
Corporation are all part of the same Multi-National Enterprise (MNE), and transfer prices need to be determined to 
apportion profits (or losses) between them.. 
Figure 2:  Income Tax Planning 
In this model, the intellectual property owner invents products and transfers the right to build 
them to the manufacturing corporation.  After production is complete, the manufacturing 
corporation ships products to the distribution center, which stores them until they are sold.  The 
sales corporation makes the trade customer sale.  As the MNE operates in four different 
countries, it must pay income taxes in each.  Tax rates may differ, so the MNE will want to 
structure its operations to minimize tax obligations, while complying with tax laws and the 
arm’s-length standard.   
 
As Irving, Kilponen, Markarian and Klitgaard (2005) write, “Because income, and therefore 
income taxation, typically follows functions performed, risks assumed and assets deployed, 
companies often achieve tax savings by locating various aspects of their business processes in 
tax favored jurisdictions” (p. 58).  For example, the firms could assign certain risks, such as 
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warranty obligations, to the legal corporation that has the highest profit potential, located in a 
low-tax jurisdiction.   Because it absorbs the most risk, it should earn the highest profit.  At the 
same time, organizations that accept less risk, often in high-tax jurisdictions, merit less profit. 
 
This approach increases total business risk.  If profitable, the MNE lowers its tax rate.  But if the 
MNE records losses, they are absorbed in the low-tax jurisdiction, and its worldwide tax rate 
increases.  But this is the risk the firm knowingly takes to reduce its worldwide tax rate.  If a firm 
believes it can consistently earn high profit margins, it is a risk worth taking. 
 
Tax Law: Exemption versus Tax Credits 
As discussed, companies operating abroad form subsidiaries to conduct business.  They do this to 
comply with local laws and determine tax obligations.  However, tax laws differ substantially 
from country to country.  In general, parent countries tax business earnings using one of two 
methodologies.  The majority tax only domestic earnings, while several countries tax worldwide 
earnings. 
Taxing only domestic earnings is the simplest and most popular approach.  In other words, the 
parent-country levies income taxes only on the domestic entity, and ignores income earned by 
foreign subsidiaries.  Overseas subsidiary profits are taxed by those jurisdictions. The following 
example illustrates that approach.  For clarity, all figures will be presented in dollars. 
 
Suppose a German-based corporation owns a Mexican subsidiary.    The company earns 
$200,000 in Germany, and $100,000 in Mexico.  If the German tax rate is 39% and the Mexican 
tax rate is 50%, it would owe $78,000 German income tax, and $50,000 in Mexico.  Income 
earned in Mexico would have no impact on taxes owed in Germany, and the company’s 
worldwide tax rate would be 42.7%.    
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German-based Firm German Parent Mexican Sub. Worldwide Results 
Earnings $200,000 $100,000 $300,000 
Tax Expense $78,000 $50,000 $128,000 
Tax Rate 39% 50% 42.7% 
Table 3:  International Tax Exemption System 
In contrast to the exemption system, several countries tax the worldwide earnings of businesses 
headquartered there.  Gresik (2001) notes Italy, Japan, Norway, the United Kingdom the United 
States all currently use this approach (p. 802), though the United Kingdom may move to an 
exemption system (Weiner, 2007, p. 214).  Since taxing profits twice would put its firms at a 
competitive disadvantage, these countries allow companies to take a credit for taxes paid 
abroad.46  The following example shows both how tax credits work, and it illustrates certain 
problems the US Congress decided to rectify. 
 
Suppose a US-based company earned $200,000 in the United States and $100,000 in Mexico.  
The US tax rate is 35%.  The firm owes $105,000 in worldwide taxes on its $300,000 pre-tax 
earnings.  If the company paid $50,000 Mexican taxes, it could take a credit for that amount on 
its U.S. tax return.  This would reduce its U.S, tax obligation to $55,000. 
US-based 
Firm 
Worldwide 
Earnings  
Mexican 
Subsidiary 
Foreign Tax 
Credit  
U.S. Tax 
Obligation  
Pre-Tax 
Earnings 
$300,000 $100,000 -- $200,000 
Tax 
Expense/(Credit) 
$105,000 $50,000 ($50,000) $55,000 
Tax Rate 35% 50% -- 27.5% 
Table 4:  Foreign Tax Credits 
 
                                                                
46 IRC §901(a) explains Foreign Tax Credits, and §901(b) explains eligibility requirements 
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In the above example, Mexico’s high tax rates reduced the firm’s US tax obligations and 
domestic tax rate.  This potential caused the US Congress to place limitations on foreign tax 
credits.  One law limits foreign tax credits to the percentage of foreign-sourced income.47   Using 
the example above, a US-based corporation would first calculate a pre-credit tax obligation of 
$105,000, or 35% of its $300,000 in worldwide earnings.  Its foreign tax credit is limited to 
$35,000, which is one-third of its worldwide earnings, reflecting its foreign-sourced income 
share of the total.  Its US tax obligation is determined by subtracting the foreign tax credit of 
$35,000 from the $105,000 figure.  It owes $70,000 U.S. income tax, and its worldwide tax 
expense would be $120,000, shown below: 
 
US-based Firm Pre-credit  
obligation 
(1) 
Mexican 
Subsidiary(2) 
Foreign Tax 
Credit (3) 
U.S. Tax 
Obligation 
(4) 
Consolidated. 
Taxes 
(2) + (4) 
Earnings $300,000 $100,000 -- $200,000 $300,000 
Tax 
Expense/(Credit) 
 
$105,000* 
$50,000 
 
($35,000)** 
 
$70,000*** 
 
$120,000**** 
Tax Rate 35% 50% -- 35% 40% 
Table 5:  Foreign Tax Credits Limited by share of Foreign Sourced Income 
* 35% of $300,000 is the pre-credit tax obligation 
** As foreign-sourced earnings are one-third of total earnings, the tax credit is limited to one-third of $105,000  
*** The $105,000 in pre-credit worldwide tax obligation in column 1, less the $35,000 tax credit in column 3 
**** $50,000 in Mexican income taxes in column 2 plus $70,000 in U.S. taxes in column 4 
 
This limitation created an incentive to earn foreign-sourced income and increase the foreign tax 
credit.  Creative tax departments have found ways to do this, such as transferring cash offshore to 
earn interest income abroad.  To limit this, a second US tax credit law requires MNEs to separate 
                                                                
47 For an explanation of foreign sourced income, see IRC §904(a) 
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earnings into several “baskets of income.”48  Foreign tax credits earned in one basket cannot 
offset tax obligations from another basket.   This prevents the company from increasing foreign 
tax credits by shifting passive income overseas.  The passive interest income may not be used to 
generate a tax credit for the active income, which is earned from the sale of products or services.   
 
Thus foreign tax credits are valuable, and need to be earned in the correct basket. In the absence 
of sufficient foreign tax credits, a company’s worldwide tax rate can increase.  US-based firms 
need to monitor foreign tax credits to determine if they can defer all income taxes on foreign 
earnings.  Tax credit policies in Italy, Japan, Norway and the United Kingdom should be 
investigated separately.    
 
MNEs based in tax credit countries do not permanently reduce taxes by operating in tax havens, 
at least in theory.    As Gresik (2001) writes, “The main advantage of deferral to transnationals is 
the ability to avoid paying home taxes that are reinvested in the foreign operations” (p. 803).  
Firms defer tax US tax obligations until the subsidiary repatriates cash to the parent company.  
Nonetheless, due to the time value of money, deferring taxes is valuable.  In addition, tax 
authorities sometimes temporarily reduce income tax rates on repatriated funds.  This encourages 
cash transfers and generates tax revenue, though at a reduced rate.  Knowing this, many 
companies defer repatriation until tax rates are temporarily reduced.  For example, the American 
Jobs Creation Act of 2004 reduced the tax rate on repatriated funds to 5.25% for that year, which 
motivated MNEs to transfer funds to their US-based parents.49  Thus, in many cases firms do not 
merely defer tax obligations.  They permanently reduce their worldwide tax rate.  For these 
reasons MNEs frequently organize their business activities to defer tax obligations, even if the 
parent country taxes worldwide earnings.   
 
 
                                                                
48 IRC §904(d) 
49 H.R. 4520, “The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004,” United States Congress Ways and Means Committee, 
June 4, 2004 
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Opportunities to Create an Income Tax Efficient Supply Chain 
While tax efficient supply chain management has received some attention in academic journal, 
pre-tax cost minimization has been analyzed in much more detail.  Cohen and Mallik (1997) 
write, “Finally, the global supply chain can take advantage of diversity in the international 
environment by recognizing and exploiting regional differences, i.e., in the level of product and 
process technology expertise, labor force capabilities, input factor costs, local tax rates, and the 
capabilities of off-shore vendors” (p. 194).   However the article did not explain how firms can 
pursue these opportunities.  The authors said:  “Effective management of the activities dispersed 
throughout the global supply chain can result in lower production and distribution costs via the 
allocation of value-adding activities to facilities, tax minimization via transfer pricing between 
entities operating in different tax jurisdictions, financial arbitrage via international cash flow 
management…” (p. 201).  As mentioned, they stated in 1997 that modeling of these 
opportunities was just beginning.  By 2006 a number of articles cited in this paper demonstrated 
that tax authorities in many high-tax jurisdictions had noticed supply chain restructurings were 
reducing their tax revenue.   
 
As discussed, some businesses today say they prefer to ignore geographic boundaries when 
restructuring supply chains.  While these boundaries may appear arbitrary, they can have a 
material impact on income tax obligations.  Thus it is a mistake to ignore taxes.  For many 
companies it is their largest single expense.  Supply chain analysis should explicitly consider 
international boundaries when they impact income tax obligations, and net income should be a 
key measure of supply chain success. 
 
To determine where the best tax and supply chain planning opportunities exist, the MNE’s 
functional and legal model will be analyzed.  The sales corporation, the distribution center, the 
manufacturing corporation, procurement organizations and shared service providers will be 
analyzed in turn to determine the optimal alternatives for income tax efficient supply chain 
planning. 
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Sales Corporations and Permanent Establishment 
When international sales are minimal, businesses frequently sell their products to trade 
customers through other firms.  The firm can sell products to a locally-based business that 
imports the goods and resells them to trade customers.  In this situation, the MNE has no legal 
presence in that nation, earns no money within its borders, and thus pays no income taxes there. 
 
As sales increase abroad, MNEs frequently hire their own employees.  Salaried staff becomes 
more cost effective than selling through a third party.  Businesses can also achieve greater 
business process control managing their own employees, so they may choose to establish a 
foreign branch or subsidiary.   
 
Crossing international boundaries requires firms to address international tax complexities.  Tax 
treaties simplify this process.  Tax treaties are agreements between two countries that define tax 
requirements for parties covered by those treaties, and they normally supersede more general tax 
laws.  Jones (2006) writes a tax treaty “is a bilateral agreement between the governments of two 
countries defining and limiting each country’s respective tax jurisdiction.  The treaty provisions 
pertain only to individuals and corporations that are residents of either country and override the 
countries’ general jurisdictional rules.  Under a typical treaty, a firm’s income is taxable only by 
the country of residence (the home country) unless the firm maintains a permanent establishment 
in the other country (the host country)” (p. 324).  
 
Tax treaties may resolve potential international tax law disputes.  For example, two countries 
may use different rules to define residency, and both may determine the same taxpayer resides in 
their country.  Residing in two jurisdictions could significantly increase the taxpayer’s 
obligations.  Treaties help resolve such issues.  Businesses find treaties clarify tax obligations 
and may reduce taxes.  Not only do they help the taxpayer, countries support tax agreements to 
stimulate investment, jobs and economic growth. 
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The United States, United Nations, and OECD have created model treaties countries use to 
negotiate agreements.  Each has merits, but some believe the OECD Treaty is becoming the most 
influential.  According to Streng (2009), “Because the OECD Model is under regular review this 
model treaty has become the real “yardstick” for constructing and revising bilateral income tax 
treaties around the world.” As Streng writes, “Consequently, even the U.S. Treasury Department 
representatives are often influenced by the OECD Model, more than their traditional perspective 
of starting negotiations from the U.S. Model Treaty” (p. 13-14).  For this reason, this paper will 
focus on the OECD Model Treaty. 
 
That treaty is frequently used to define the term “permanent establishment.”  According to it, 
permanent establishment refers to “a fixed place of business through which the business of an 
enterprise is wholly or partly carried on.”50  A fixed place of business specifically includes a 
place of management, a branch, and office, a factory, a workshop or any site developed to extract 
natural resources.51  The OECD Model Treaty provides a number of exceptions, in general 
permitting organizations to conduct limited support and auxiliary activities without triggering 
permanent establishment and local income tax obligations.  Examples cited include permitting 
“the use of facilities for the purpose of storage, display or delivery of goods or merchandise,”52 
or “solely for the processing by another enterprise,”53 or “any other activity of a preparatory or 
auxiliary character.”54  The treaty identifies a number of similar support examples that do not 
constitute permanent establishment.55 
 
Permanent establishment can also be created when significant business activities are conducted 
locally.  For example, negotiating contracts triggers permanent establishment.  Specifically, the 
OECD Model Treaty states when a person “in a Contracting State (has) an authority to conclude 
contracts in the name of the enterprise, that enterprise shall be deemed to have permanent 
                                                                
50 “OECD Articles of the Model Convention With Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital,” Article 5, Section 1 
51 Ibid, Article 5, Section 2 
52 Ibid, Article 5, Section 4(a) 
53 Ibid, Article 5, Section 4(c) 
54 Ibid, Article 5, Section 4(e) 
55 Ibid, Article 5, Section 4(a-f) 
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establishment in that State with respect of any activities which that person undertakes for the 
enterprise.”56  This does not apply to contracts negotiated for the support and auxiliary activities 
cited in the previous paragraph.  
 
Permanent establishment definitions can differ from country to country.  Verlinden and 
Costermans (2006) write that when conflicts arise “The treaty definition (based upon the OECD 
Model Treaty) prevails over the definition under domestic law” (p. 175, comments in 
parentheses in the original), at least according to Belgium law.  However permanent 
establishment rules are being reviewed in some countries, in large part due to supply chain 
restructurings.  To illustrate this, developments in one country, the United Kingdom, will be 
reviewed.   
 
Within the United Kingdom two key issues are examined.  According to Casley, Pope and 
Hohtoulas (2006) the first is “if the principal is carrying on a business through a fixed base in the 
United Kingdom” (p. 200).   The second is “if the UK Company is a dependent agent of the 
principal” (p. 200).   The second issue is drawing more scrutiny within the United Kingdom.  If 
the UK Company “habitually exercises an authority to conclude contracts in the name of the 
principal” (p. 200) then it can be viewed as a dependent agent, and permanent establishment may 
be suspected.  A number of issues need to be examined closely to determine the outcome.  If 
customer credit decisions are made in the UK, this suggests permanent establishment.  
Companies sometimes employ a non-contracting disclosed arrangement to avoid permanent 
establishment, but tax authorities may go beyond legal agreements and examine how business is 
actually conducted.  “In practice, drawing the dividing line between contracting and non-
contracting is not always simple.  HMRC is likely to argue that having the principal actually 
‘sign’ the contracts with customers may not be sufficient if all they do in reality is rubber stamp 
the terms and conditions including price, discounts etc. that have already been ostensibly agreed 
to by the local agent” (p. 200).  Ultimately the key issues are whether the UK organization is 
accepting risk and making key business decisions, not only contractually, but in practice.  When 
                                                                
56 Ibid, Article 5, Section 5.  The word “has” was inserted by the author of this article. 
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risk is assumed or business decisions are made within the United Kingdom, it is more likely that 
UK tax authorities will assert permanent establishment.  But all of the facts and circumstances 
are evaluated by tax authorities, and judgment is applied, especially in light of supply chain 
restructurings that test the law’s limits.  Developments in other countries should be investigated 
separately. 
 
Tax impact is more difficult to determine when bilateral tax treaties do not exist.  Jones (2006) 
says, “If a U.S. firm conducts any business in a country that does not have an income tax treaty 
with the United States, the host country’s jurisdiction depends on its unique tax laws” (p. 324).   
In the absence of a tax treaty, the firm needs to research the local tax laws.  Jones says “This 
determination is often subjective and results in considerable uncertainty for the firm.  Moreover, 
the requisite level of business activity in non-treaty countries is often much less than the 
maintenance of a permanent establishment in the country” (p. 324).  For these reasons firms find 
it is easier to expand into countries in which bilateral tax treaties exist. 
 
Whether or not the MNE forms an overseas branch or sales corporation, MNEs frequently 
expand into new markets to increase sales and profits.  For technologically-advanced products, 
demand is strongest in the most industrialized countries.  Developed countries also impose 
relatively high corporate income tax rates.  As a result, sales corporations are poor opportunities 
to improve profits through an income tax efficient supply chain.  There are no simple ways 
expand into large, prosperous markets and keep taxes low.   
 
To demonstrate this, consider the population, GDP and income tax rate of G-7 countries, which 
are some of the world’s largest economies.  While these are some of the world’s largest markets, 
the tax rates are substantially higher than in many tax havens, to be shown subsequently.  The 
following table shows these figures for each G-7 country: 
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Country Population 
(000 omitted) 
GDP (in 
million $) 
Per Capita 
GDP 
Max. Corporate 
Tax Rate--2007 
U.S.A. 301,110 $10,320.6 $34,275 39.3%57* 
United Kingdom 60,776 $1,530.27 $25,179 30.0% 
Canada 33,390 $767.14 $22,975 36.1% 
France 63,713 $1,382.76 $21,703 34.4% 
Germany 82,401 $1,925.87 $23,272 38.9% 
Italy 58,148 $1,100.71 $18,929 33.0% 
Japan 127,43358 $4,803.2059 $37,692 39.5460 
Table 6:  G-7 Population, GDP and Corporate Income Tax Rates 
* The United States tax rate includes both the Federal tax rate of 35.0% and an average State 
ncome tax rate. 
 
High tax rates rarely discourage companies from selling products in these populous and wealthy 
countries.  For example, if strong Japanese demand exists for a company’s products, a 40% tax 
rate is unlikely to prevent market entry.  As long as marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost the 
sales are profitable, despite the relatively high share due the Japanese government.  Avoiding the 
large Japanese market or selling through Japanese companies may be financially unattractive 
alternatives. 
 
A few companies have successfully bypassed local sales corporations and sold products from 
another jurisdiction.  They need to avoid permanent establishment to do this.  In most industries 
this is not possible, as it is essential to have local sales and service organizations there to provide 
                                                                
57  OECD Tax Database, 2007; see http://www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase; see Table II.1, Combined Corporate 
Income Tax Rate, 2007.  Note that the U.S. rate includes both Federal taxes (35.0%) and an average State tax rate. 
58  “World Population Statistics”; http://www.geohive.com/default.aspx; July 1, 2007 
59 “Historical Gross Domestic Product,” World Bank Development Indicators, 12/19/2006 
60 OECD Tax Database, 2007; see http://www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase; see Table II.1, Combined Corporate Income 
Tax Rate, 2007 
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customer support.  But other business models are possible.   Simpson (2005) writes, “Microsoft 
and others are now going further.  Microsoft delivers its Windows products to European 
customers straight from Ireland, and the profits go straight back to Ireland.  Since most of the 
profits from Microsoft programs are in the form of copyright licensing fees, ‘it is likely that low 
or nil taxes are payable in the other EU states,’ says John Ward, a tax professor at the University 
of Ulster in Belfast, Northern Ireland” (p. 1). 
 
To keep its tax rate low, Microsoft needs to avoid permanent establishment issues associated 
with these sales.  Microsoft has structured its tax model to locate revenue recognition and risk 
with its Irish subsidiary.  In some cases software firms can distribute products and provide 
support over the Internet, creating opportunities not available in other industries.  To achieve its 
tax objectives, the sales into Europe need to be conducted from Ireland. 
 
Organizations within an MNE must collaborate to make this work successfully.  Software firms 
may be able to do this more successfully than others, in large part due to the ease of Internet 
distribution and overseas product support.  But if the selling agent can avoid permanent 
establishment, the approach above should be considered.  To accomplish this, product marketing 
needs to determine whether they can sell and support products successfully without a local 
presence.  Legal departments need to do an in-depth examination of permanent establishment 
laws.  The tax department can analyze the tax impact.  And supply chain organizations can 
quantify manufacturing and distribution costs. 
Distribution Centers 
Distribution centers receive finished goods from manufacturing corporations, and later deliver 
products to sales corporations.  They add value by reducing the number of delivery nodes 
between manufacturing organizations and retail customers, by consolidating storage, and by 
efficiently and promptly delivering customer goods.     
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Companies do not need distribution centers in each country the firm sells products.  The 
enterprise can thus determine how many are needed by focusing upon customer requirements 
and cost management.  Companies frequently centralize distribution activities to achieve 
economies of scale.  Many MNEs create regional distribution centers to service several 
countries.  For example, Skjett-Larsen, Schary, Mikkola and Kotzab (2006) write, “Many firms 
in Europe rely on one or a few distribution centers servicing all customers within a time window 
of 24-72 hours, depending upon the location of customers” (p. 134).  Centralization strategies 
may create an opportunity to create an income tax efficient supply chain.   
 
If the parent-country exempts foreign earnings from domestic taxation distribution centers may 
be good opportunities to create a tax efficient supply chain.  MNEs can permanently avoid 
domestic income taxes, and parent-country tax laws do not restrict distribution centers.  
Economic efficiency can determine the number of distribution centers, not legal requirements.  
To analyze the opportunity, the supply chain organization can calculate operational and 
distribution costs.  The tax department can project transfer prices and calculate tax benefits.  
Together they can project distribution center net income in various locations, and recommend the 
best location. 
 
However when the parent-country taxes worldwide earnings, tax laws should be reviewed 
closely.  For example, US tax laws limit distribution center opportunities.  As mentioned, the US 
taxes worldwide earnings, permits tax credits, and defers domestic taxation until the subsidiary 
repatriates funds to the parent. However tax laws deny deferral in certain situations.  US tax code 
“Subpart F” requires immediate taxation of overseas entities in certain situations.61  As Jones 
(2006) writes::   
“Not all foreign source income earned by a CFC must be constructively 
repatriated to its U.S. shareholders.  Only narrowly defined categories of income 
(labeled Subpart F income in the Internal Revenue Code) are treated as 
constructive dividends.  Conceptually, Subpart F income is artificial income 
                                                                
61 Subpart F is found in IRC §951-§964 
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because it has no commercial or economic connection to the CFC’s home 
country.  Subpart F has many complex components, one of the more important of 
which is income derived from the sale of goods if (1) the CFC either buys the 
goods from or sells the goods to a related party and (2) the goods are neither 
manufactured nor sold for use within the CFC’s home country” (p. 334-335). 
 
Subpart F applies to distribution centers in certain situations.    Suppose a MNE formed a 
distribution center in a low-tax jurisdiction in which it neither manufactured nor sold goods.  The 
income earned by this distribution center would be subject to Subpart F and would be 
immediately taxable in the United States.62  If the U.S. tax rate is higher than the local tax rate 
the difference between the two cannot be deferred, and is owed to the US treasury.   According 
to Lemein, McDonald and Lipeles (2007) when Subpart F applies “Shareholders have to 
recognize the income regardless whether the U.S. Shareholders receive an actual dividend from 
the CFC or not” (p. 5).  Thus a US-headquartered firm would not be able to defer US tax 
obligations in this situation. 
 
However not all distribution centers are subject to Subpart F.  It does not apply when a 
distribution center is located in the same country the company either builds or sells products.  As 
an example, suppose a firm manufactures products in Singapore, and needs to form a Southeast 
Asia distribution center.   Subpart F would not apply to a Singapore-based distribution center, as 
the company manufactures goods there.  The low Singapore tax rate would apply.  Locating the 
distribution center in a third country could increase the tax rate from 18% (Singapore’s rate) to 
35% (the US Federal rate).  In this case the MNE would reduce income taxes if it located the 
distribution center in Singapore.  The MNE should weigh these savings against supply chain 
costs and other business objectives. 
 
 
                                                                
62 IRC §941 
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Similar laws in other tax credit countries (Italy, Japan, Norway, and the United Kingdom) should 
be investigated separately.  However the issues posed by US tax law demonstrate that to 
maximize net income, supply chain and tax organizations should collaborate. 
Manufacturing Corporations 
As demonstrated, sales companies show limited potential to create a tax efficient supply chain.  
Most businesses need a local presence to sell their goods and services, which triggers permanent 
establishment and local income tax obligations.  Tax rates are comparatively high in the 
developed countries.  While Microsoft’s Irish sales strategy has been very successful, few 
businesses can sell and support products without a local presence. 
 
Distribution centers can be attractive opportunities to integrate supply chain and tax planning, 
particularly if the parent country exempts earnings from domestic taxation.  However in some 
tax credit countries, such as the United States, tax laws do not permit deferral in many situations.  
Close attention to international tax laws is required when the parent-country taxes worldwide 
earnings.   
 
Manufacturing corporations may be the best opportunity to integrate supply chain and tax 
planning.  To achieve economies of scale, most businesses prefer to concentrate manufacturing 
resources and limit the number of manufacturing sites.  This makes manufacturing site selection 
very important.  Many factors motivate manufacturing site location, including local wage rates, 
employee skill sets, inbound and outbound logistics costs, access to materials and parts, 
proximity to customers, transportation services, the local regulatory environment, political 
stability, and income tax rates.  From a tax perspective, manufacturing corporations do not face 
the Subpart F tax laws facing distribution centers.  Manufacturing products requires technology, 
skills and fixed assets, thus creating business substance international tax laws generally support.  
As a result, MNEs frequently designate the manufacturing corporation the profit center for 
residual or superior earnings.  It may also be assigned certain risks, such as the cost of product 
failure or warranty costs.  One organization often takes the most risk in a MNE, and earns 
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superior rates of return when the business does well.  It absorbs losses when the business 
performs poorly.  Other entities frequently accept less risk, and earn modest but consistent 
returns for services performed, whether the entire business succeeds or struggles. 
 
To illustrate this, suppose a MNE manufactures products in one country, distributes them in a 
second, and sells products in a third.  Furthermore, this business consistently earns superior rates 
of return, akin to the high earnings earned by Microsoft’s operating system business.  The 
business must establish transfer prices to achieve arm’s-length results.  The MNE can structure 
its transfer pricing so the sales corporation and distribution centers earn adequate profits.  The 
earnings must be sufficient to satisfy tax authorities, who compare results with many trade 
businesses performing similar functions, few of which are so successful.  The income need not 
be above average, simply because the entire business is very profitable.  The manufacturing 
corporation realizes the superior profits and also accepts the risk of loss, should the business 
perform poorly.   
 
Describing a similar structure, Irving, Kilponen, Markarian and Klitgaard (2005) commented:   
“Similarly, a foreign affiliate engaged in manufacturing often will earn returns 
not only for the underlying manufacturing activity—which is essentially a 
service—but also for the risks associated with owning raw materials, work-in-
process, and other inventory.  It will also earn returns for its manufacturing 
know-how in the form of proprietary processes.  Here again, the economic 
returns ascribed to the assumption of risks and ownership of assets and 
intangibles can result in the foreign affiliate earning a significant level of 
income” (p. 60).    
 
Some countries seek to attract manufacturing, and offer low tax rates to attract businesses there.  
Often these countries are relatively small, and low tax rates attract jobs that spillover into the 
local economy.  Singapore, Ireland and Puerto Rico are all small jurisdictions offering low 
income tax rates to attract manufacturing activities.  Lowering tax rates can actually increase 
government revenue, as the additional taxes paid by a few major employers can offset broad tax 
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reductions.  Moreover, lower tax rates generate jobs with a multiplier effect, as support activities 
increase to supply necessary services.  The following table shows the population, GDP, and tax 
rates in those popular tax havens: 
 
 
Location 
Population 
(000 
omitted) 
Gross Domestic 
Product (in 
billion dollars) 
Per 
Capita 
GDP 
Corporate 
Tax Rate 
Ireland 4,109 $110.74 $26,951 12.5% 63 
Puerto Rico 3,944 $67.71 $17,168 2-7% 64 
Singapore 4,53365 $94.5166 $20,849 18% 67 
 
Table 7:  Population, GDP and tax rates in selected tax havens 
While these are the published income tax rates there, some countries also negotiate even lower 
tax rates when they want to attract desirable businesses.  Businesses with excellent growth 
prospects and that contribute to an educated workforce can sometimes negotiate lower tax rates. 
 
The MNE and tax haven may both benefit.  The business can substantially reduce its tax 
obligations by shifting operations to a country with low tax rates.  The tax haven attracts jobs, 
develops the local economy, and may actually increase tax revenue. When the country’s 
population is small, the tax revenue can be significant.  Simpson (2005) reports that Microsoft’s 
taxes paid one year in Ireland amounted to $77 for each citizen (p. 1).   
  
 
                                                                
63 OECD Tax Database, 2006; see http://www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase; see Table II.1, Combined Corporate Income 
Tax Rate, 2006 
64 13 L.P.R.A. § 10101, Puerto Rico Tax Laws 
65 “World Population Statistics”; http://www.geohive.com/default.aspx;  July 1, 2007 
66 “Historical Gross Domestic Product,” World Bank Development Indicators, 12/19/2006 
67 Singapore Income Tax Act , (CAP 134) Part XI, Section 43 
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Thus MNEs frequently organize their business to locate their most profitable organization in tax 
havens, such as Singapore, Ireland and Puerto Rico.  The manufacturing corporation and/or 
intellectual property owner is frequently that activity.  To align risk and reward and support their 
tax strategy, the more profitable legal organization accepts the most business risk.   
 
This structure creates an opportunity to earn superior rates of return in low-tax locations.    The 
high returns earned by the manufacturing corporation or intellectual property owner are not 
visible to tax authorities in other jurisdictions.  Furthermore, their governments have no legal 
claim to profits recognized by the risk-taking organization.  Tax authorities in the residual profit 
center enjoy the earnings recognized and taxes paid there. 
 
In summary, for many MNEs manufacturing corporations may be the best opportunity to develop 
an income tax efficient supply chain.   The MNE can determine the number of manufacturing 
sites by economic necessity, and may want to achieve economies of scale by limiting the number 
of manufacturing sites.  Manufacturing products creates business substance international tax laws 
support, so these organizations are not encumbered by limitations such as Subpart F.   From a tax 
perspective, manufacturing organizations can be structured as the designated risk-taker within 
the enterprise, eligible to earn high rates of return if the business succeeds.  A number of tax 
havens offer low tax rates and offer incentives to attract manufacturing activities, particularly in 
high-technology industries.  For these reasons manufacturing site selection offers many firms an 
excellent opportunity to create an income tax efficient supply chain.   
 
Procurement Organizations 
As previously discussed, historically MNEs created autonomous overseas subsidiaries, 
responsible many business processes.  More recently MNEs have restructured supply chains to 
centralize business processes where they can be performed most efficiently.  Trent and Moncza 
(2003) found that MNEs are shifting from purchasing materials domestically to sourcing 
materials globally, and that the purchasing function increasingly crosses international borders (p. 
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26).  According to Casley, Pope and Hohtoulas (2006) in the United Kingdom “There has been 
an increased tendency for groups to centralize their purchasing activity and pool a group’s 
purchasing power.  Potential procurement savings often quoted can range from 5% to 20%, 
depending on industries and a group’s starting point” (p. 196).   They write cost savings are 
achieved through: “better negotiations, volume, improved relationships with suppliers and well 
coordinated logistics from better order and delivery processes” (p. 196).  According to Verlinden 
and Costermans (2006) Belgium has also attracted international procurement organizations (p. 
173).    
 
Centralization strategies differ from company to company, depending upon unique business 
needs.  But frequently procurement organizations manage this activity for several international 
sites.  As an example, a company could have one procurement organization for the U.S., another 
for Europe, and a third in Southeast Asia.  The IPO can produce cost savings while supporting 
local needs.   
 
IPOs are an opportunity to link supply chain and tax planning.  They need to recover their costs 
and operate profitably, so IPOs sell goods and services to related parties at arms-length prices.  
Firms should consider tax ramifications when locating that activity.  Irving, Kilponen, Markarian 
and Klitgaard (2005) noted, “Linking these two concepts, it is possible for companies to 
centralize their procurement functions, proprietary procurement processes, and know-how into 
specific corporate entities in low-tax jurisdictions.  These ‘procurement companies,’ are entitled, 
from a tax perspective, to charge other corporate entities an arm’s length amount for the value-
added procurement activities undertaken on their behalf” (p. 59). A graphical depiction follows: 
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 The IPO leverage its purchasing power to reduce costs of parts and materials from external suppliers.  
Figure 3:  International Procurement Organizations 
 
Once again, MNEs need to investigate the parent country’s relevant tax laws.  If the parent 
country exempts foreign subsidiaries from domestic taxation, the procurement offices can reduce 
the enterprise’s worldwide tax rate.  But this may not be possible if the parent country taxes 
worldwide earnings.  Within the United States, Subpart F governs IPO tax obligations in certain 
situations.  If the IPO is located in the same country it purchases goods or sells goods, the local 
income tax rate applies.68  But if the IPO is located in a third country, in which the firm neither 
buys nor sell goods, the US rate applies.  This is relevant if the MNE operates in a tax haven.  
For example, if a US-parent company manufactured goods in Ireland, and formed an IPO there, 
                                                                
68 Subpart F is found in IRC §951-§964 
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the local 12.5% income tax rate would apply.  Locating the IPO in a country where it had no 
operations could trigger Subpart F and the 35% US federal tax rate. The 22.5% difference 
between the worldwide and local tax rate would be owed to the US Treasury.69 
 
Compensation for centralized purchasing is likely to be a cost-plus markup.  It may be difficult 
to obtain comparable prices for such procurement services.  While independent parties procure 
goods for clients, they frequently assume more risk than internal purchasing organizations.  
Verlinden and Costermans (2006) write, “Group central purchasers, will, however, often not 
perform functions or assume risks that are similar to many independent parties, as for example, 
commercial risks may differ” (p. 173).   OECD Guidelines suggest cost-plus compensation is 
most appropriate when comparable transactions cannot be identified.  Verlinden and Costermans 
(2006) write “In the absence of uncontrolled comparables and assuming that the central 
purchaser’s involvement is that of order centralization without an entrepreneurial role, it is likely 
to receive remuneration based on a cost-plus methodology” (p. 173). 
Shared Service Providers 
In addition to IPOs, MNEs have centralized other activities to provide support across 
international boundaries.  Wright (2006) states “This occurs for a variety of reasons, e.g. cost 
reduction strategies that result in centralization of regional support functions…” (p. 202).  
Wright (2006) says centralized business processes include “various regional support functions 
such as finance, marketing, information technology (IT) and human resources (HR)” (p. 202).  
Verlinden and Costermans (2006) have also observed the growth of shared service providers in 
Belgium (p. 172).  For example, the MNE might centralize certain accounting functions, such as 
payroll, accounts receivable collections, or accounts payable.  Or it might create a regional 
information technology center, to meet the IT needs in a number of countries.  These 
organizations should also consider local tax rates when making location decisions.  In addition, 
since they are not involved in the buying and selling of goods, they do not face Subpart F 
restrictions. According to Wright,” a cost-plus markup is ordinarily used to bill both 
manufacturing and reselling affiliates for the services they have received” (p. 202).  It can be 
                                                                
69 Ibid 
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difficult to find comparable organizations providing similar services and assuming comparable 
business risks. 
Defending the Income Tax Efficient Supply Chain 
As explained earlier, tax authorities are becoming concerned with the tax impact of supply chain 
restructurings.  High income tax jurisdictions, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, the Netherlands, Spain and Belgium, believe supply chain restructurings are reducing 
their tax revenue, so they are paying more attention to this activity.  According to Casley, Pope 
and Hohtoulas (2006), “In the United Kingdom, the level of attention from the tax authorities has 
increased to match the greater flexibility with which MNEs approach their supply chain” (p. 
194).  As tax practitioners frequently have to defend these restructurings to tax auditors, what 
actions can they take to support their position? 
 
First, tax practitioners need to explain the business rationale for the supply chain restructuring, to 
satisfy the business purpose doctrine.  They should be able to identify clearly how the 
restructuring improves the supply chain, customer satisfaction, or the pre-tax cost structure.  
Reduced trade barriers and improved communication technologies have created many 
opportunities to restructure and improve supply chains, and to eliminate overhead by centralizing 
many processes, so in most cases this should not be difficult to do.  Restructuring the supply 
chain once, considering both operational and tax consequences, helps to satisfy the business 
purpose doctrine.  Reengineering the business process first, and later moving an activity solely 
for tax purposes, increases audit risk.  Tax authorities can argue the latter action was done solely 
to reduce taxes and the business purpose doctrine may not be satisfied.  This is one more reason 
why tax departments and supply chain organizations should collaborate when making location 
decisions.  
 
Second, it is essential to comply with the arm’s length transfer pricing principle.  As Casley, 
Pope and Hohtoulas (2006) write, “A primary requirement for tax purposes is to price the 
transactions arising from the supply chain model on an arm’s length basis” (p. 194).  This may 
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seem obvious, but when an MNE restructures its supply chain, and changes responsibilities and 
risk within the enterprise, it may neglect to review its transfer pricing policies.  When the supply 
chain is restructured, the risks and responsibilities of a subsidiary may materially change, and 
transfer pricing policies should be evaluated.  If the tax department does not participate in the 
restructuring, it may incorrectly assume their transfer pricing policies need no modification.  
Schwarz and Castro (2006) write, “In the context of multinational enterprises, these changes lead 
to changes in the risk profile of the entities within the group and consequently in the profitability 
of operations in countries where activities take place.  The changes may result in overall changes 
in the group’s profitability or a shift in the jurisdiction where profits arise—away from the place 
where activities are undertaken to the place where risks are assumed or functions are moved” (p. 
187).  Restructuring the international supply chain necessitates reviewing transfer pricing 
policies, and this may not happen if the tax department is not at least aware of supply chain 
changes. 
 
Third, it is important is to ensure documentation is current, legal agreements between business 
entities are still valid, and the impact on transfer pricing policies documented.  As Casley, Pope 
and Hohtoulas (2006) write, “As ever, the answer is also to ensure that the transfer pricing model 
adopted is solidly and competently implemented, namely that legal contracts reflect functional 
reality; that intercompany transactions are properly priced; that appropriate documentation and 
controls are in place; and that PE risks have been addressed” (p. 201).  Concerning the French 
perspective, Douvier (2006) writes, “However, if (1) the taxpayer has prepared adequate 
documentation in anticipation of a tax audit and if that documentation supports the new 
methodology, (2) comparables have been gathered and (3) the functions have been modified and 
the risks shifted out of France, the risk that the tax authorities will be successful in their 
challenge is technically remote” (p. 182). 
 
Tax authorities in Europe and the United States may use different approaches to challenge 
restructurings.  In Europe tax authorities frequently first question whether permanent 
establishment laws have been breached.   In the 2006 issue of International Transfer Pricing 
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Journal five articles written from a European perspective (United Kingdom, Belgium, France, 
Spain and the Netherlands) said local tax authorities looked closely at this issue.  Referring to a 
meeting of the OECD’s Center for Tax Policy Administration (CTPA), one article said:  “One of 
the key questions of the CTPA Roundtable pertained to the notion of a deemed PE created by 
activities of a limited function for the foreign related parties for which a local entity is acting.”70  
Therefore it is important for tax practitioners in Europe to be aware of the permanent 
establishment rules and developments in these countries. 
 
Within the United States, tax authorities do not focus often on permanent establishment.  
According to Wright (2006), “In many countries, the permanent establishment (PE) rules are 
used to attack these structures.  Such is not the case in the United States, however, as the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) typically uses the transfer pricing rules to evaluate whether the supply 
chain restructuring is acceptable…In virtually all cases, the IRS moves immediately to the 
transfer pricing question, without alleging the existence of a PE” (p. 202).  According to that 
author, the IRS prefers to use other code sections or regulations to attack the tax consequences of 
the restructuring.  The IRS lost a permanent establishment case, Tasei Fire & Machine Insurance 
Co., Ltd. Et al v. Commissioner (1995), which may make it reluctant to litigate permanent 
establishment.71  Wright (2006) says “Thus it is important, from a U.S. perspective, to obtain 
professional international tax assistance when planning a supply chain restructuring” (p. 202). 
 
Some believe tax authorities need to provide more guidance on these issues.  Carreno and Oliete 
(2006) write “There is an urgent need for clear guidance” (p. 193).  However business process 
changes frequently proceed more rapidly than tax law, so it is likely tax practitioners will need to 
defend restructurings without the benefit of detailed guidelines from tax authorities. 
 
 
                                                                
70 See International Transfer Pricing Journal,  July/August, 2006, page 189 
71 Tasei Fire & Machine Insurance Co., Ltd. Et al v. Commissioner, (Tax Ct. 1995).   
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Conclusion 
 
MNEs around the world are restructuring their supply chains to achieve operational objectives.  
These restructurings may also shift business operations to low-tax jurisdictions.  Tax authorities 
in many high income tax countries are very aware of these restructurings, and are concerned with 
lost tax revenue.  For this reason alone, tax departments need to understand supply chain 
developments.  They need to document these activities and defend the firm’s actions to tax 
authorities. 
 
While historically supply chain papers have emphasized pre-tax cost minimization, there is 
evidence in recent years that firms are explicitly considering income taxes when they make 
supply chain decisions.   For many firms it is one of their largest expenses, and ignoring its 
impact is a mistake.  Most studies suggest net income is the single best measure of firm 
performance, so firm’s should focus on improving that figure. 
 
Encouraging supply organizations and tax departments to collaborate has many advantages.  
Through collaboration firms can make better supply chain decisions that aim to improve net 
income, the key driver of shareholder value.  Beyond this tax departments need to be informed 
about supply chain restructurings to satisfy tax authorities.  Tax departments need to document 
these changes.  Legal agreements between business entities may need to be rewritten, and 
transfer pricing policies may need to be altered, to reflect changes in risk and responsibility.  Tax 
departments will need to prepare documentation for tax authorities demonstrating the 
restructuring satisfies the business purpose doctrine.  Ignoring these responsibilities increases the 
risk of an unsatisfactory tax audit and related penalties. 
 
The corporation’s functional and legal model has also been analyzed to determine where the best 
opportunities exist to link supply chain and tax planning and improve a firm’s net income.  In 
most situations the sales company is not a good opportunity, due to high tax rates in developed 
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countries, and the need to provide local sales and service support.  In some cases it may be 
possible to make sales from a third country located in a low tax location. However this may not 
be possible for most businesses to do.  The seller needs to be very careful not to create a 
permanent establishment in the local country it is trying to bypass, and most businesses may not 
be able to sell and support products without a local presence.  
 
Distribution centers and International Procurement Offices have potential, but applicable tax 
laws should be examined, to determine if parent-country tax laws limit this opportunity, as 
Subpart F does in the United States.  
 
Shared service providers are another good opportunity.  As mentioned, many MNEs are forming 
centralized IT services, accounting functions, or Human Resource organizations that support a 
number of countries.  In many cases these activities are funded through cost-plus markups upon 
services provided.  It makes sense to consider income tax rates when determining where to locate 
these activities. 
 
Manufacturing companies may present the best opportunity for many firms.   Manufacturing 
products creates business substance international tax laws support.  Employees must be hired and 
trained, manufacturing know-how must be transferred, and assets must be purchased, installed 
and used.   The manufacturing organization often assumes the most business risk, and earns 
superior profits when the business is successful.  Since tax havens often seek to attract 
manufacturing activities, income tax rates are frequently low in these locations.  As mentioned, 
much of the growth in both Ireland and Puerto Rico has been in manufacturing activities.   
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Abstract 
U.S. corporate income tax rates are now the highest in the world.  And unlike most countries, the 
U.S. also taxes the overseas profits of its Multinational Enterprises (MNEs). Worldwide taxation 
can increase a firm’s tax obligations, and substantially complicates the process of calculating 
those liabilities.  To avoid these costs and challenges, in the prior decade a number U.S.-based 
MNEs moved their corporate headquarters overseas through corporate inversions, which were 
reincorporation transactions that had negligible impact upon a company’s operating activities.  In 
response, the U.S. Congress enacted IRC §7874 in 2003, which was designed to curtail this 
activity.  This law appears to have substantially reduced corporate inversions.  However there are 
signs more firms may consider moving their headquarters abroad.  This paper analyzes the most 
recent developments in this field, and explains new approaches U.S.-based MNEs might use to 
escape U.S. international tax laws. 
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Background 
 
In the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, a number of large, U.S.-based Multinational Entities (MNEs) 
transferred their corporate home abroad through corporate inversions.  In corporate inversions 
these U.S.-based firms reincorporated to nearby tax havens to reduce their tax obligations.  In 
general these were paper transactions that moved the Multinational Enterprise’s (MNE’s) 
corporate home, but had little or no impact upon the firm’s operations.  As the U.S. Office of Tax 
Policy (2002) wrote:  “Although an inversion transaction requires significant restructuring as a 
corporate law matter, the effect of such a transaction on the actual management and operation of 
the inverted company is generally limited” (p. 15). 
 
While inverting firms said this action was necessary to compete effectively against foreign 
businesses, corporate inversions created considerable controversy within the United States.  U.S. 
legislators and tax officials were concerned with the foregone tax revenue, according to the 
Office of Tax Policy (p. 2).  Corporate executives were criticized for moving their corporate 
home abroad (Godar, O’Connor and Taylor, 2005, p. 1).  In response, in 2003 the U.S. Congress 
enacted IRC §7874, which appears to have substantially reduced inversion activity.   
 
In explaining inversions, many U.S.-headquartered firms said American tax laws substantially 
increased their cost of doing business.  Furthermore, currently the United States corporate 
income tax rates are the highest in the world.  While many countries have lowered their income 
tax rates in recent years, the United States has maintained comparatively high income taxes.  In 
addition, U.S.-headquartered businesses are penalized by very complex international rules that 
tax the firm’s worldwide income, and substantially complicate the process of determining tax 
obligations.  These tax policies increase the U.S.-based MNE’s cost of doing business.  In 
contrast, most other countries impose lower income tax rates and do not tax overseas profits.  
U.S.-headquartered firms bear substantial tax costs, and must wonder whether there are 
significant offsetting benefits.  So companies might ask themselves: is there a way to escape the 
burden of high U.S. income tax rates and complex tax rules?  
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In the late 1990’s and early 2000’s a number of U.S.-based MNEs accomplished this through 
corporate inversions.  The U.S. Office of Tax Policy (2002) defined an inversion as “a 
transaction through which the corporate structure of a U.S.-based multinational group is altered 
so that a new foreign corporation, typically located in a low- or no-tax country, replaces the 
existing U.S. parent corporation as the parent of the corporate group” (p. 1).  In most cases 
inversions were legal transactions in which a new corporate home was found, but left the firm’s 
business operations effectively untouched.  In addition to reincorporating their headquarters 
abroad, the firms generally transferred ownership of their Controlled Foreign Corporations 
(CFCs) to the overseas headquarters or another overseas entity.  The Office of Tax Policy wrote: 
“This basic reincorporation outside the United States often is accompanied by a series of other 
restructuring steps.  Most commonly, the associated restructuring involves a shift outside the 
United States of the ownership of the group’s existing foreign operations, accomplished through 
the transfer of the existing foreign operations to the new foreign parent corporation or a foreign 
subsidiary thereof” (p. 4).  By transferring their overseas operations to foreign entities, those 
inverted businesses lowered their worldwide tax rate.  They also simplified the process of 
calculating tax obligations by avoiding worldwide income taxation. 
 
While corporate inversions generally reduced the firm’s tax rate, they reduced the U.S. treasury’s 
tax collections. They also generated negative publicity.  Corporate managers who supported 
inversions were often denounced as unpatriotic and immoral (Godar, O’Connor and Taylor, 
2005, p. 1).  In response, the U.S. Congress passed IRC §7874, which was designed to preserve 
U.S. tax revenue.  IRC §7874 did not prohibit corporate inversions, but said the U.S. would 
continue to tax inverted corporations as domestic entities, as long 60% or more of the firm’s 
stock was held by the same shareholders before and after the inversion.  The law has generally 
been considered successful at achieving its intended objective, as the pace of U.S. corporate 
inversions appears to have slowed since that law was passed (VanderWolk, 2010, pp. 1-2, and 
Leitner and Glicklich, 2009, p. 515). 
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Since IRC §7874 was enacted corporate inversions have attracted less attention.  But it is 
possible this will change in the near future.  The U.S corporate income tax rate is now one of the 
world’s highest.  Furthermore, corporate income tax rates are declining in many other countries, 
and more countries are exempting worldwide income from domestic taxation.  High tax rates and 
worldwide taxation policies may make the U.S. a less attractive headquarters location.  Moving 
abroad might be an escape route more will consider, and there are still ways this can be 
accomplished, despite IRC §7874 and supporting Treasury Regulations. 
 
As mentioned, the pace of corporate inversions appears to have slowed since IRC §7874 was 
passed.  But some tax professionals believe they may become more frequent in the future.   
Leitner and Glicklich (2009) say privately held U.S. firms are continuing to invert.  They write, 
“The tide has slowed, but the anti-inversion rules have not successfully eliminated all 
expatriation activity, especially in privately held U.S. companies” (p. 515).  VanderWolk (2010) 
believes §7874 has been effective at limiting inversions of public companies, but this may 
change.  He writes: “Section 7874 is widely believed to have had a severe chilling effect on 
inversions of publicly held corporations, but they may stage a comeback.  In addition to 
potentially increased tax costs due to new international tax rules, factors such as reduced 
unrealized gain due to the economic downturn of 2008-2009 and rapid growth in foreign markets 
may lead to more inversions in the future” (p. 1-2).  As an example, a U.S.-based firm, Ensco, 
recently moved its headquarters to the United Kingdom.  This action, in addition to 
VanderWolk’s comments, indicates that analyzing recent developments in corporate inversion 
activity is merited.  
  
This paper contributes to knowledge of international tax issues by analyzing the most recent 
developments in corporate inversions. Current developments include comparatively high U.S. 
income tax rates, new Treasury Regulations designed to limit tax-motivated corporate inversions, 
and the relocation of a publicly-held firm, Ensco, from the United States to the United Kingdom.  
This paper explains why and how U.S.-headquartered MNEs firms may re-domicile their 
headquarters abroad to escape U.S. tax laws.  This paper also offers a distinction between 
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corporate inversions and corporate re-domiciling, in which firms not only reincorporate, but shift 
the management and control of a MNE from one country to another.  This paper suggests 
corporate re-domiciling may be one approach firms will use to escape U.S. tax laws.  
 
Literature Review 
Between 1999 and 2003 a number of U.S.-based multinationals moved their corporate 
headquarters abroad.  The expatriating firms included six members of the S&P 500 index: 
Cooper Industries, Ingersoll Rand, Nabors Industries, Noble Drilling, Transocean and Tyco 
(Desai and Hines, 2002, p. 416).  Stanley Works was also a member of the S&P 500 index and 
announced plans to invert72.  However before the inversion was completed it decided to halt the 
transaction (Desai, 2009, p. 1285).  These corporate inversions attracted considerable attention in 
business and general circulation media, and generated concerns about the possible loss of 
government tax revenue.  In response, the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Tax Policy 
analyzed the motivations, methods, and implications of U.S. corporate inversions.  Their report, 
Corporate Inversion Transactions: Tax Policy Implications was released in May, 2002. 
 
The Office of Tax Policy report explained several legal approaches firms employed to effect 
corporate inversions.  The report identified the potential tax consequence of corporate inversions, 
and also analyzed the non-tax issues firms considered before making an inversion decision.  The 
report identified the tax advantages firms realized through moving their headquarters abroad, and 
offered a number of suggestions that would make inverting less attractive to U.S.-based MNEs. 
 
In their September, 2002 article, Desai and Hines identified the causes of corporate inversions, 
and analyzed the consequences of these transactions, for firms and their investors.  Their paper 
also explained both the process by which firms inverted, and advantages businesses realized as a 
result.  In addition, Desai and Hines reached a number of significant conclusions.  One was that 
                                                                
72 In all cases I have used the name of the firm at the time of the proposed corporate inversion, as cited by Desai and 
Hines, 2002, pp. 418-420.  Several of the firms have changed their name since then. 
 
152 
 
favorable investor reaction to an inversion announcement could not be explained solely by a 
reduction in foreign tax obligations.  They believed investors were also anticipating a reduction 
in taxes paid on U.S.-sourced income.  Second, Desai and Hines concluded that inverting 
corporations were likely to have extensive international holdings.  This suggested to Desai and 
Hines that avoiding U.S. taxes on foreign-sourced income was a key motivation for inverting.  
They also demonstrated that the stock market reacted more favorably to inversion 
announcements when the firms were highly leveraged.  This indicated to Desai and Hines that 
the U.S. interest allocation rules, which shifted corporate interest expenses to non-U.S. 
subsidiaries, were also important factors motivating corporate inversions.   
 
Seida and Wempe (2004) conducted a detailed study of twelve corporate inversions.  They found 
the effective tax rate for inverted corporations decreased substantially after the inversion.  While 
tax rates also decreased for firms that did not invert, inverted firms realized much steeper 
reductions in their worldwide tax rate than did firms that did not invert.  Seida and Wempe also 
concluded the decrease in the inverted firms’ tax rate could not be explained solely by a decrease 
in taxes paid on foreign earnings.  They showed that several of these companies reduced taxes by 
leveraging their U.S. subsidiary with intercompany debt, and shifting interest income from the 
United States to other countries imposing lower tax rates.  Their work confirmed Desai and 
Hines’s suggestion that through corporate inversions firms also found ways to shift taxable 
income out of the United States.  In addition, Seida and Wempe concluded that laws meant to 
control the leverage of U.S. based firms were sometimes ineffective at preventing earnings 
stripping activities.  
 
Kane and Rock (2007) looked at corporate inversions from a global perspective, evaluating 
international tax policies in a number of locations, including the United States, Canada, the EU 
and Israel.  They explained that there are two general approaches to determine where a firm is 
headquartered.  One method is to determine where the parent company is legally incorporated, 
know as place of incorporation.  The second approach focuses on more substantive issues, such 
as where key business decisions are made, and where the firm’s assets and employees are 
153 
 
located.  This is the firm’s “real seat.”  Kane and Rock argued that real seat rules should be used 
to determine a firm’s tax home, as place of incorporation rules made it too easy to relocate a firm 
solely through legal transactions, often to a site in which the MNE has little or no business 
presence.  They also argued that U.S. tax laws, which tax worldwide income at high levels and 
use place of incorporation rules to determine a firm’s tax home, made the U.S. vulnerable to 
corporate inversions.  
 
Rubinger (2007) evaluated IRC §7874 and the related Treasury Regulations supporting that law.  
Like Kane and Rock, Rubinger noted that the U.S. used place of incorporation rules to determine 
a firm’s tax home.  He said most other countries, including the U.K., use real seat rules.  
Rubinger explained how these different approaches could be used to facilitate a tax-motivated 
inversion.  He noted that IRC §7874 does not apply when a U.S.-based firm inverts to a country 
in which the firm has a substantial business presence.  Thus if a U.S.-based MNE had significant 
business activities in the U.K., it could reincorporate there and avoid being taxed as a U.S.-
headquartered enterprise.  However the U.K. uses real seat rules to determine a MNE’s corporate 
home.  Thus the firm could also move the firm’s management and control activities to a third 
country with even lower tax rates.  The third country would be the real seat of corporate 
management, so it should be subject to that country’s tax policies under U.K. rules and tax 
treaties.  For example, if a U.S.-based MNE legally inverted to the U.K. and simultaneously 
moved its management and control activities to Hungary, it could take advantage of the low 
taxes in the latter country.  Rubinger demonstrated that in spite of the complexities of IRC 
§7874, there are still ways firms can escape U.S. tax rules.  
 
VanderWolk (2010) reviewed the legislative history of IRC §7874 and new, supporting Treasury 
Regulations that were released in June, 2009.  VanderWolk analyzed both the new and prior 
Temporary Regulations.  He showed the prior Treasury Regulations gave businesses better 
guidance than the new Treasury Regulations.  The earlier regulations provided taxpayers with 
detailed examples to demonstrate how the regulations should be interpreted, and offered 
taxpayers a safe harbor to determine when they had a substantial business presence in another 
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country.  In contrast, the new regulations deleted examples that provided taxpayers with such 
guidance, and removed the safe harbor.  These actions will make it harder for taxpayers to know 
if they are complying with that law, and make §7874 more difficult to enforce.  VanderWolk 
argued that the new regulations provide taxpayers with too little clarity. 
Inversion Activity before and after IRC 7874 
As mentioned, IRC 7874 appears to have significantly reduced corporate inversion activity.  This 
can be shown by reviewing the history of inversion activity of members of the S&P 500 before 
and after the passage of IRC 7874, which became effective on March 4, 2003.  Desai and Hines 
(2002) identified six members of the S&P 500 index that inverted between 1997 and 2002.  
Those firms are shown below: 
 
Corporate Inversions 
Firm NYSE ticker 
symbol 
Year of 
inversion 
Original 
Corporate 
Home 
New 
Corporate 
Home 
Tyco TYC 1997 United States Bermuda 
Transocean RIG 1999 United States Cayman 
Islands 
Cooper 
Industries 
CBE 2001 United States Bermuda 
Ingersoll-
Rand 
IR 2001 United States Bermuda 
Nabor 
Industries 
NBR 2002 United States Bermuda 
Noble 
Drilling 
NE 2002 United States Cayman 
Islands 
 
For this article, the author looked at firms that were in the S&P 500 index as of March 4, 2003, 
to determine how many of those firms moved their headquarters out of the United States between 
that date and December 27, 2010.  Standard and Poor’s provided a list of the five hundred 
members of that index as of March 4, 2003. The current corporate home for each firm was 
researched by reviewing each firm’s most recent SEC filings.  Over that time period, 
approximately 145 firms were removed from the index for a variety of reasons, such as an 
acquisition, going private, financial problems, or financial irregularities.  Since March 4, 2003 no 
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member of the S&P 500 index that was headquartered in the United States has moved its 
headquarters abroad.   This information supports the comments of VanderWolk, (2010, pp. 1-2), 
and Leitner and Glicklich (2009, p. 515) that IRC 7874 has been effective at preventing new 
corporate inversions of U.S. based firms, particularly publicly held enterprises73.   
 
For this paper the author also looked at the current corporate home for the six S&P 500 members 
that inverted prior to March 4, 2003, the date when IRC 7874 took effect.  It is worthwhile 
noting that five of those six firms moved their corporate headquarters again.  One of the six 
firms, Tyco, split into three firms in 2008, each of which has found a new headquarters location.  
Only one of the original six firms, Nabor Industries, has not relocated again.  The following table 
shows the former and new headquarters of those businesses: 
 
HQ Relocations of Inverted Corporations 
Firm New firm name 
(if applicable) 
Year of 
relocation 
NYSE 
Ticker 
Symbol 
Prior 
Corporate 
Headquarters 
New Corporate 
Headquarters 
Transocean No change 2008 RIG Cayman 
Islands 
Switzerland 74 
Cooper 
Industries 
No change 2009 CBE Bermuda Ireland 75 
Ingersoll Rand No change 2009 IR Bermuda Ireland 76 
Noble Drilling.  Noble Corp.77 2009 NE Cayman 
Islands 
Switzerland 78 
Tyco  Tyco 
Electronics 
2009 TEL Bermuda Switzerland 79 
Tyco Tyco 2008 TYC Bermuda Switzerland 80 
                                                                
73 It should be noted that in 2007 Halliburton, a member of the S&P 500, announced it was opening a headquarters 
location in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.  However according to its most recent 10-K, filed February 17, 2010, its 
primary headquarters is still in Houston, Texas, and the Dubai site is identified as a second headquarters.  According 
to the 10-K it is still taxed as U.S. headquartered firm. 
74 See Transocean 10-K, filed February 24, 2010 page 5. 
75 See Cooper Industries 10-K, filed February 19, 2010, page 2. 
76 See Ingersoll Rand 10-K, filed February 26, 2010, page 5. 
77 Noble Corp. is the successor to Noble Drilling.  See Noble Corporation 10-K, filed February 29, 2008, page 1. 
78 See Noble Corp. 10-K, filed February 26, 2010, page 2. 
79 See Tyco Electronics 10-K, filed November 10, 2010, page 58. 
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International 
Tyco Covidien 2010 COV Bermuda Ireland 81 
 
Thus it appears Ireland and Switzerland are becoming favored sites for companies that inverted 
prior to the passage of IRC 7874.  The motivations for these subsequent moves may merit further 
study.  Nonetheless, it appears IRC 7874 was effective at preventing new U.S. corporate 
inversions, particularly for large, publicly held businesses.  Six members of the S&P 500 index 
moved their headquarters out of the United States between 1997 and 2002.  However no 
members of the S&P 500 index moved their headquarters out of the United States after March 4, 
2003, the date when §7874 became effective. 
 
U.S. Income Tax Rates 
A number of factors contributed to the growth of U.S. corporate inversions during the late 1990’s 
and early 2000’s.  Three primary causes were: 1) high U.S. corporate income tax rates; 2) the 
U.S. policy of taxing a MNE’s worldwide income; and 3) the ease with which a corporate 
inversion could be accomplished.  These three factors will be explained in turn. 
 
According to their public statements, many firms inverted to reduce their corporate income tax 
rate.  In the prior wave of corporate inversions (1997-2002), U.S.-headquartered firms found 
they could substantially reduce their income tax obligations by reincorporating abroad.  
Campbell (2004) reviewed published reports from a number of firms to identify the tax savings.  
She reported:  “Ingersoll-Rand Co., Cooper Industries, and Tyco International are among the 
most significant expatriating nomads, expecting to save $450 million dollars collectively in tax.  
Ingersoll-Rand Co. of New Jersey, one of Stanley Works’ competitors, will save $40 to $60 
million a year due to its reincorporation in Bermuda.  As a result of its incorporation abroad, a 
spokesman for Cooper Industries, another of Stanley Works’ competitors, said that it has saved 
about $13 million in taxes during the last fiscal quarter ending June 30.  Tyco International Ltd. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
80 See Tyco International 10-K, filed November 12, 2010 page 6. 
81 See Covidien 10-K, filed November 22, 2010, page 1. 
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has estimated that it will save an estimated $400 million in U.S. taxes as a result of its conversion 
to a Bermuda Corporation” (pp. 113-114).   The firms did not articulate any operational benefits 
generated by an inversion; these were exclusively tax-motivated actions.  As Kane and Rock 
(2007) wrote: “In the United States the issue has been brought to the fore by the occurrence of 
several high profile corporate ‘inversion’ transactions.  Such transactions, which typically 
involve reincorporating the parent company of a US multinational offshore, are unabashedly all 
about tax reduction” (p. 1). 
 
U.S.-based firms also argued the country’s high tax rates and policies put them at a competitive 
disadvantage with respect to their key competitors.  Campbell (2004) wrote: “Stanley Works 
cited several reasons for its proposal to reincorporate outside the United States.  The statement 
by Stanley Works noted that the tax treatment of foreign source income by the U.S. tax system 
does not enable U.S.-based multinational corporations to compete on a ‘level playing field’ in an 
increasingly globalized economy” (p. 108).  Stanley Works argued this could make it difficult to 
price its products and services competitively, and grow sales and market share.   However it 
should be noted Stanley Works ultimately decided to halt its inversion after unfavorable 
publicity, a close shareholder vote, and a threatened investigation into possible irregularities in 
that vote (Desai, 2009, p. 1285).  
 
The corporate inversions prompted the Congress and tax officials to examine this activity.  The 
Office of Tax Policy (2002) studied corporate inversions, and reported: “While the so-called 
corporate inversion transactions are not new, there has been a marked increase in the frequency, 
size and profile of the transactions” (p. 1).  A primary concern was that more firms would invert, 
and this would decrease U.S. tax revenue.  The report stated:  “Inappropriate shifting of income 
from the U.S. companies in the corporate group to the foreign parent or its foreign subsidiaries 
represents an erosion of the U.S. corporate tax base” (p. 2).   Additional corporate inversions 
would not only reduce tax revenue, they could also undermine confidence that the U.S. tax 
system is just.  The report stated: “Moreover, exploitation of inappropriate income-shifting 
opportunities erodes confidence in the fairness of the tax system” (p. 2). 
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High U.S. corporate tax rates were an important force motivating corporate inversions.  A 2005 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study analyzed U.S. corporate income tax rates through 
2003, the year IRC §7874 was enacted.   It showed that beginning in the early 1990’s U.S. 
corporate income tax rates were among the highest in the world (p. 26).  The difference grew 
larger by 2003, the last year studied.  In 2003 U.S. income tax rates were substantially higher 
than in other OECD countries.  The CBO (2005) said:  “Among all OECD countries in 2003, the 
United States’ top statutory corporate tax rate was the third highest; it was also higher than the 
top statutory rates in approximately 90 percent of those countries.  The United States’ top rate of 
39.3% was 6.3 percentage points higher than the median for all OECD countries…” (p. 14). 
 
The CBO report notes that corporate income tax rates declined substantially between the mid-
1980’s and 2003.  It says:  “After large reductions in statutory corporate tax rates by Ireland, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States in the mid-1980’s, other OECD countries also cut their 
rates, perhaps out of concern that they would lose investments or part of their tax base—for 
example when corporations moved their operations to a lower-tax country” (p. xi).  The report 
demonstrated the U.S. had maintained relatively consistent tax rates, while those in other 
countries continued to decline.  The report showed the U.S. was not keeping pace with falling 
worldwide corporate income tax rates. 
 
Furthermore, worldwide corporate income tax rates have fallen since that report was prepared.  
In 2003 Germany’s highest corporate income tax rate was 39.6%, Italy’s was 38.3%, and 
Canada’s was 35.6% (p. 22).  According to OECD information these countries have enacted 
lower rates since 2003.  Thus since 2003 U.S. corporate income tax rates have become even less 
competitive.  The following table shows income tax rates in effect for 2010.82  U.S. tax rates in 
2010 were the second highest in the world, exceeded only marginally by Japan’s income tax rate.   
 
 
                                                                
82 The table below was retrieved from the OECD’s web site on July 9, 2010.  See 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase.  See Table II.1. 
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Corporate Income Tax Rates—2010 
 
In the previous table, the second column identifies the highest marginal tax rate imposed by the 
national government.  Countries with progressive or graduated tax systems frequently impose 
lower income taxes upon firms or individuals with lower earnings; the above table identifies the 
maximum tax rate countries levy, which is generally levied upon firms with high earnings.  
Country (1) Central 
government 
corporate 
income tax 
rate (2) 
Adjusted central 
government 
corporate income 
tax rate (3) 
Sub-central 
governmen
t corporate 
income tax 
rate (4) 
Combined 
corporate income 
tax rate-2010 (5) 
the sum of 
columns 3 + 4 
Australia 30.00 30.00  30.00 
Austria 25.00 25.00  25.00 
Belgium 33.99 33.99  33.99 
Canada 18.00 18.00 11.50 29.50 
Chile 17.00 17.00  17.00 
Czech Republic 19.00 19.00  19.00 
Denmark 25.00 25.00  25.00 
Finland 26.00 26.00  26.00 
France 34.43 34.43  34.43 
Germany 15.83 15.83 14.35 30.18 
Greece 24.00 24.00  24.00 
Hungary 19.00 19.00  19.00 
Iceland 15.00 15.00  15.00 
Ireland 12.50 12.50  12.50 
Italy 27.50 27.50  27.50 
Japan 30.00 27.99 11.55 39.54 
Korea 22.00 22.00 2.20 24.20 
Luxembourg 21.84 21.84 6.75 28.59 
Mexico 30.00 30.00  30.00 
Netherlands 25.50 25.50  25.50 
Norway 30.00 30.00  30.00 
Poland 19.00 19.00  19.00 
Portugal 25.00 25.00 1.50 26.50 
Slovak Republic 19.00 19.00  19.00 
Spain 30.00 30.00  30.00 
Sweden 26.30 26.30  26.30 
Switzerland 8.50 6.70 14.47 21.17 
Turkey 20.00 20.00  20.00 
United Kingdom 28.00 28.00  28.00 
United States 35.00 32.70 6.51 39.21 
Average    25.84 
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Some countries also levy income taxes to support local governments, or what the OECD calls 
sub-central governments, and may permit tax deductions or tax credits for these payments.  The 
third column shows the federal income tax rate after deductions or credits for local government 
tax payments are calculated.  The fourth column identifies the tax rate imposed by local 
governments.  The fifth column is the key figure, as it compares the net corporate income tax 
rate in a country, after the impact of local corporate taxes is included.  It is the sum of columns 
three and four.  It shows that in 2010 the combined income tax rate in the United States was 
39.21%, and was only exceeded by Japan’s combined income tax rate of 39.54%.  The U.S. rate 
was also 13.37 points above the OECD simple average of 25.84%.  Also, while the U.S. 
corporate income tax rates will remain flat during 2011 and 2012, the U.S. federal income tax 
rate is scheduled to increase by another 4.6 points in 2013, the rate in effect during 2001.83  
 
High U.S. corporate income tax rates may motivate future inversions.  In the late 1990’s and 
early 2000’s U.S. firms inverted to tax havens.  If IRC §7874 makes it difficult to invert to a tax 
haven, substantial benefits can still be realized by relocating to other countries, if this can be 
accomplished.  In addition, the United States taxes worldwide income, while most countries in 
the world tax only the income earned within their borders, to be described below.   
 
Worldwide versus Territorial Tax Systems 
As shown, U.S. income tax rates are significantly higher than those found in other countries. 
When a U.S.-based MNE earns profits in the United States, it is clear these income tax rates 
apply.  However this raises a critical question:  if a U.S. based MNE earns profits in another 
country, what country is entitled to tax those profits, and what tax rates should apply? 
 
In general, countries take one of two approaches when taxing a MNE’s earnings.  Several 
countries tax all of a MNE’s worldwide income, wherever it is earned.  Most countries tax only 
                                                                
83 See Public Law 111-312, signed into law on December 17, 2010 
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the profits earned within their borders, even if the MNE earns profits abroad.  These two 
approaches are generally called “worldwide taxation” and “territorial taxation.”  The U.S. 
enforces worldwide taxation policies.   
 
Campbell (2004) writes:  “The worldwide system is one where a domestic corporation must pay 
income tax to its home country on all income regardless of the source from which it was 
derived” (p. 99).  Thus income earned in a foreign jurisdiction is subject to domestic taxation.  
Conceptually the U.S. taxes the worldwide income of its residents, however in practice there are 
limitations on this approach.  Writing in 2002, Desai and Hines stated the United Kingdom, Italy, 
Japan, Norway and Greece also taxed worldwide income (p. 412).        
 
Taxing a MNE’s worldwide income is theoretically justified on the grounds there are worldwide 
benefits to citizenship or residence, even when a business operates abroad.  Doernberg (2008) 
writes: “With respect to taxation, a country may claim that all income earned by a citizen or a 
company incorporated in that country is subject to taxation because of the legal connection to 
that country” (p. 7).  Because of that legal link, governments provide services to businesses 
operating abroad, such as overseas consulates, income tax treaties, and defense of property 
rights.  In return for such benefits, individuals and businesses are expected to pay taxes to 
support the parent country’s government. 
This approach was first tested in the United States Supreme Court case, Cook v. Tait.84  In that 
decision, Justice McKenna wrote that worldwide taxation:  “is based on the presumption that 
government by its very nature benefits the citizen and his property wherever found. “  Isenbergh 
(2005) describes the Court opinion this way:  “Thus, along with whatever protections and 
benefits it confers, U.S. citizenship brings worldwide income taxation with it as its price, a quid 
pro quo expressly invoked in Cook v. Tait as justifying worldwide taxation of U.S. citizens” (p. 
19).  However the United States is one of a small number of countries that claims worldwide 
taxing authority based on citizenship or residence (Doernberg, 2008, p. 7). 
                                                                
84 Cook. V. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924) 
162 
 
 
Within the United States the central taxing issue has shifted from U.S. citizenship to residency. 
Isenbergh (2005) writes:  “Individual residents of the United States, regardless of nationality, are 
exposed to U.S. tax on their worldwide incomes…Residence is therefore the first and most 
important touchstone of U.S. taxation for foreign nationals” (p. 20).  Thus the worldwide tax 
system is frequently identified as a “residence-based” international tax system (Avi-Yonah, 
2008, p. 2). 
 
Determining an individual’s tax residence can sometimes be a complicated topic, as the IRS 
Code defines residency several ways, depending upon the issue at stake.  But for businesses it is 
clearer.  As Desai and Hines (2002) write:  “From a legal standpoint, the definition of American 
tax residence is reasonably straightforward: a corporation is ‘American’ for tax purposes if it is 
incorporated in the United States.  Firms choose their sites of incorporation, and, under current 
U.S. law, a company need not produce or sell anything in the country that serves as its tax home” 
(p. 410).  Thus the central issue is where the parent firm is incorporated or chartered.85  Whether 
the firm actually produces goods or services in that location is not pertinent in most cases, but 
this topic will be discussed in more detail shortly. 
 
An alternative to worldwide taxation is levying taxes based only on income earned within a 
nation’s borders, or within its territory.  This is frequently called a “territorial” tax system 
(Doernberg, 2008, p. 7).  In a territorial system a country taxes only domestically earned income, 
and it exempts income earned in other jurisdictions.  Doernberg (2008) writes “A territorial 
connection justifies the exercise of taxing jurisdiction because a taxpayer can be expected to 
share the costs of running a country which makes possible the production of income, its 
maintenance and investments, and its use through consumption” (pp. 7-8).  In other words, when 
an individual or business earns income within a country’s borders, they should also pay for the 
government services that support commerce, such as necessary infrastructure and legal 
                                                                
85 See IRC 7701(a)(4) for corporate place of incorporation rules 
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protection.  Territorial policies are also called “source” tax systems, as the income is taxed only 
where it is earned, or sourced (Doernberg, 2008, p. 8).  In general the income earned in other 
jurisdictions is exempt from domestic taxation.  For this reason some call territorial tax policies 
“exemption” tax systems (Campbell, 2004, p. 98).  The majority of the world’s nations tax 
income earned with their territory, and exempt the income earned in other locations, even if the 
parent firm is headquartered in that country (Desai and Hines, 2002, p. 412). 
 
Conflicting worldwide and territorial tax policies create the potential to tax the same income 
twice.  Suppose a business is headquartered in the United States and it opens a subsidiary in a 
second country.  Both countries may claim the right to tax the MNE’s earnings in that second 
country.  The U.S. taxes worldwide income, while the second country may tax all income earned 
within its borders.  Double taxation would make it very difficult for firms to compete abroad, so 
most countries feel it is necessary to prevent this.  In general countries with worldwide taxation 
policies have enacted two key limitations on these rules, to mitigate their impact and allow their 
firms to be more competitive.  The first is to defer taxation of overseas profits until funds are 
transferred to the corporate home.  The second is to allow a tax credit for taxes paid overseas.   
 
In general, the U.S. and other countries defer taxation of overseas earnings until profits are 
repatriated to the home country.  As a U.S. Office of Tax Policy (2000) paper stated, “Thus by 
organizing a foreign corporation a taxpayer can, absent certain rules, defer U.S. taxation on 
foreign income until it is repatriated, for example, as a dividend” (p. ix).  Due to the time value 
of money, tax deferral can be an important benefit, particularly if the company defers domestic 
taxation for a sustained time period.    
 
The second limitation permits businesses to reduce their domestic tax obligations when taxes are 
paid in another country.  While the laws in the United States and other countries are quite 
complex, the general idea is that taxes paid to a foreign jurisdiction can be credited against the 
taxes due within the United States.  As the Office of Tax Policy (2000) writes:  “most 
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jurisdictions with worldwide systems, including the United States, allow a credit against 
domestic tax for foreign taxes imposed on income subject to domestic tax.  Under a worldwide 
system with a foreign tax credit, an item of foreign income generally is not taxed domestically to 
the extent it is taxed abroad” (pp. x-xi). 
 
In spite of deferral and foreign tax credits, worldwide tax policies can still increase the tax 
burden on a U.S.-headquartered business if the company repatriates funds to the United States.  
In those cases, a U.S.-based MNE has to pay taxes twice.  First, the overseas CFC has to pay 
taxes to the local government based on its earnings.  As U.S. income tax rates are the highest in 
the world, the parent firm frequently has to pay additional taxes to the U.S. government when it 
receives dividends from its CFCs.  The U.S. parent can take a foreign tax credit for taxes paid 
abroad, which reduces the tax impact.  But since U.S. tax rates exceed those found in most 
countries, additional taxes are still due the U.S. Treasury.  Desai and Hines (2002) wrote: “One 
consequence of the U.S. tax system is that a corporation considered to be American for tax 
purposes will typically face greater tax obligations on its foreign income than would the same 
company if it were considered to be, say, German for tax purposes” (p. 410).  And in addition to 
higher income taxes, worldwide tax policies add considerable complexity and cost to the process 
of determining tax obligations.  Even the Office of Tax Policy (2002) acknowledges this 
complexity, commenting on certain U.S. international tax policies: “no country has rules for the 
immediate taxation of foreign-source income that are comparable to the U.S. rules in terms of 
breadth and complexity” (p. 28).   Understanding the subtleties of foreign tax credit rules is 
generally considered challenging.  Complying with the complexity of the U.S. tax system can be 
expensive, as firms must either hire or develop expensive expertise to prepare worldwide tax 
returns.  These policies can also complicate cash management.  U.S.-based MNEs may want to 
use cash earned and invested overseas, but as intercompany dividends can trigger additional tax 
liabilities, firms may be reluctant to access those funds. 
 
As described, deferral and foreign tax credit rules can narrow several of the differences between 
worldwide and territorial taxation policies.  In addition, some countries enforcing territorial 
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policies have enacted rules that tax passive income earned abroad.  Avi-Yonah (2008) notes that 
the United States strengthened its worldwide tax system when it enacted Subpart F in 1962, 
which restricted deferral on passive income earned abroad.  He says the U.S. gradually expanded 
the law’s scope and strength through 1993 (p. 2).  He argues the U.S. tax policies on passive 
income encouraged many countries with territorial-based tax policies to develop similar rules, 
and they began to tax interest income earned abroad.  He writes:  “As a result, the traditional 
dividing line between global and territorial jurisdictions became blurred, so that it could be said 
that most countries tax foreign passive income of their residents, but they do not tax currently 
foreign source active income (which was entitled to deferral or exemption)” (p. 2).  Nonetheless, 
while worldwide and territorial tax systems may tax interest income similarly, there are major 
differences in how they tax active business income, so the distinction is still valid. 
 
As the U.S. imposes high income tax rates and taxes worldwide income, U.S.-headquartered 
firms face large tax obligations.  Desai and Hines (2002) described how the U.S. compares with 
other countries, stating that in such comparisons: “The United States tends to fare poorly in such 
calculations, since American companies owe taxes to the United States on their foreign incomes, 
while companies based in numerous other countries, including Germany, the Netherlands, 
Canada and France, not to mention most tax havens, owe little or no tax to their home 
governments on any foreign income” (p. 410).  Moreover, since Desai and Hines wrote that a 
number of countries have lowered income tax rates, while the U.S.’s have remained flat.  In 
addition, more countries are moving from worldwide to territorial-based tax systems.  Thus the 
U.S. may be less competitive today than it was when IRC §7874 was enacted. 
 
More countries are also moving towards territorial tax systems.  As mentioned earlier, in 2002 
Desai and Hines identified six countries that enforced worldwide tax systems.  However 
according to VanderWolk (2010) two of those countries, the United Kingdom and Japan, are 
taking steps towards territorial policies (pp. 15-16).  These actions can make their country’s tax 
policies more competitive internationally.  According to HMRC (2010), “An essential part of 
adapting a more territorial approach to the new rules will be moving from the current default 
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presumption that all activities that could have been undertaken in the UK would have been 
carried on here, had it not been for the tax advantages of the overseas location” (p. 4).   
According to Neubig and Angus (2009) “Japan’s recent adoption of a territorial tax system as 
part of a broader reform reduces the tax burden on the foreign-source income of Japanese 
multinational corporations by exempting dividends from non-Japanese subsidiaries from 
Japanese tax” (p. 252).    This is not to say that both countries have immediately adopted 
territorial tax systems; any such transition takes time.  But both are taking steps in that direction. 
Determining the MNE’s “Home” 
In many cases it is clear where a MNE is headquartered.  Businesses frequently begin operations 
in one country, file legal documents to incorporate there, and the owners and managers reside in 
that same nation.  Successful firms often expand internationally, and to do this they generally 
form local subsidiaries to comply with legal requirements, such as determining their local tax 
obligations.  However it is often clear the parent firm is headquartered in the first country, and 
the subsidiaries are CFCs managed by the parent firm. It is generally thought that Coca-Cola is 
an American firm, Novo Nordisk is Danish, Toyota is Japanese and Fiat is Italian, though they 
all have overseas subsidiaries.  In each case the parent company needs to comply with 
international tax laws applicable in its “home” country. 
 
However as the world has become more globalized, and large corporations operate in many 
countries, in some cases it may be more difficult to determine the MNE’s home.  Perhaps two 
similarly sized companies from different countries decide to merge, as German-based Daimler 
and U.S.-based Chrysler did in the 1990s.  The company may need to determine which one is the 
parent company, and which tax laws should govern the MNE.  Or perhaps a company finds the 
focus of its work shifting from one country to another, necessitating the transfer of senior 
executives from one country to another.  And in other cases a firm may incorporate a parent 
company in a new jurisdiction, as many U.S.-based firms did when they inverted to Caribbean 
tax havens.  In such cases it may not be entirely clear what international tax policies should 
govern the MNE.  There must be some way to determine which country’s international tax laws 
should apply.   
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Due to the tax implications, determining a parent company’s tax home is a critical issue.  Desai 
and Hines (2002) write:  “Tax authorities are keenly interested in the nationality of their 
companies for the simple reason that, if a multinational corporation is Japanese for tax purposes, 
then its foreign profits are subject to taxation in Japan, while if the same corporation were 
American, then the United States would receive any taxes due on foreign profits” (p. 410).  As 
mentioned, Japan has made changes to its laws since 2002, but the general point is still valid.  
Moreover, because the U.S. taxes worldwide income, a U.S.-based firm may owe taxes based on 
profits earned in Germany, for example.  But because Germany exempts foreign income, a firm 
headquartered in Germany does not owe that government taxes for profits earned in the United 
States.86 
 
Countries generally use one of two methodologies to determine a firm’s headquarters.  In some 
countries the key issue is where the parent firm is legally incorporated.  In other words, the 
location where the parent company’s incorporation papers are filed is the corporate home.87  In 
contrast, other countries seek to ascertain the focal point of the MNE’s operations, such as where 
key business decisions are made, or where the largest segment of the firm’s assets and employees 
are located.  Under this second approach, for example, if the parent company’s senior 
management works in a particular country, and the majority of its employees and its assets are 
located there, that country may be the parent firm’s home.  Again, as we investigate this topic in 
more detail, we will see that some countries use a combination of approaches to settle this issue, 
so the distinction between these methodologies is not clear in every case.  Nonetheless, this is a 
useful distinction, as most countries use one of these two means to determine the MNE’s 
corporate home.   
 
Kane and Rock (2007) describe the difference this way:  “Basically, in locating a corporation, a 
legal system can adopt either the ‘place of incorporation’ (POI) rules or some version of the ‘real 
                                                                
86 Desai and Hines (2002) identify the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Norway, Japan and Greece as 
countries that tax the worldwide income of residents, and that other countries generally exempt overseas income (p. 
412). 
87 See IRC 7701(a)(4) which prescribes Place of Incorporation rules to define corporate residency in the U.S. 
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seat’ (RS) rule.  Under the POI rule, the corporation’s location is determined by where it was 
incorporated, a purely formal criterion.  Under the RS rule, a corporation’s location depends 
upon some combination of factual elements, such as the location of the administrative 
headquarters or the location of the firm’s center of gravity, as determined by the location of the 
employees and assets.  The place of incorporation can bear on this determination but is not 
determinative” (p. 7).  In short, real seat jurisdictions emphasize business substance, while place 
of incorporation countries focus on the legal form. 
 
Not everyone believes place of incorporation rules are effective.  Campbell (2004) writes:  “In 
the U.S. corporate tax arena, no other basis for taxing corporations is considered, including 
nationality of owners, principal place of business, or where the primary management occurs.  
This opens up the U.S. system to the possibility of abuse by corporations that may take 
advantage of such an enormous loophole.  Because a corporation is not more than a piece of 
paper that is granted separate legal status, this simple basis for taxing corporations has been 
criticized for having such large tax consequences depending solely upon which sovereign issued 
the document rather than any other criteria” (p. 102).  As we will see later, U.S. laws have 
become a little more sophisticated since IRC §7874 was enacted, and in certain circumstances 
the U.S. uses “real seat” rules to reach a conclusion.  But Campbell’s description accurately 
describes U.S. laws before IRC §7874 became effective, and is still generally true. 
 
As mentioned, real seat jurisdictions determine the firm’s headquarters by emphasizing business 
substance and physical location.  The issues may be where senior managers and employees work, 
where business decisions are made, and where the firm’s assets reside.  The criteria can differ 
from country to country.  Most EU members rely upon “real seat” (RS) rules, though some 
countries may consider other issues.  Kane and Rock (2007) write: “With respect to corporate 
tax, on the whole, EU member states apply an RS location rule.  Again, however, there is 
blurring around the edges as we discuss in more detail” (p. 54).  U.K. tax policies focus on where 
business decisions are made.  Referring to U.K. rules, HMRC states:  “it has long been 
recognised that the residence of a company is determined according to where its central 
169 
 
management and control is to be found.”88  HMRC recently won a key case in which it argued a 
Dutch-incorporated firm was actually managed in the U.K., so it should be taxed there.89 
 
However, real seat rules are also imperfect, as creative firms may be able to work around them.  
In view of the tax benefits available, a company might move its management from one location 
to another solely to lower taxes.  However this requires more effort than merely filing legal 
papers, as place of incorporation rules require.  Real seat rules can also be criticized for being 
subjective.  It may not always be easy to identify where key management and business decisions 
are made, particularly when managers are working in separate locations, and meet over the 
phone or through videoconferencing equipment.  In practice, in many companies such decisions 
are sometimes made in a variety of locations, so it may be difficult to identify one site where 
these actions take place.  And the site may change from year to year.  So there may not always be 
a clear, unambiguous answer to the question: where is the real seat of company management?  
Taxpayers may also disagree with regulators, resulting in costly litigation.  In contrast, a place of 
incorporation rule generally provides a clear, straightforward answer. 
 
Determining a corporation’s home for tax and other purposes is likely to become increasingly 
difficult.  Desai (2009) writes:  “The archetypal multinational firm with a particular national 
identity is becoming obsolete as firms continue to maximize the opportunities created by global 
markets.  National identities can mutate with remarkable ease and firms are unbundling critical 
headquarters functions and reallocating them worldwide” (pp. 1271-1272).  In the future it may 
not be possible to determine with any certainty where a corporation’s “home” is. 
International Tax Policies and Jurisdictions 
As discussed, two important international tax issues are what businesses a country taxes, and 
what income it taxes.  In other words, does a country use place of incorporation (POI) rules or 
real seat (RS) rules to determine who it taxes?  And does it tax a firm’s worldwide income, or 
only the income earned within its territory? 
                                                                
88 See INTM120150—Company Residence.  Retrieved July 16, 2010 from http://www.hmrc.gov.uk 
89 See Laerstate BV v HMRC (2009) UKFTT 209 (TC). 
170 
 
 Kane and Rock (2007) created a matrix to display the four tax alternatives.  They write: “The 
conjunction of two possible locational rules (POI or RS) and two possible substantive regimes of 
taxation (worldwide or territorial) yields four possible combination of rules for any given 
jurisdiction”  (p. 16).  This can be a useful framework to display a country’s tax policies.  It can 
also help us understand the choices a MNE faces if it considers moving from one jurisdiction to 
another.  We can use this matrix as a starting point to demonstrate a country’s tax policies, but as 
we examine tax laws more closely, we will see that some countries use a combination of 
approaches.  
                                              
Substantive Corporate Tax Law and Location 
International Tax Policies 90 
 
Tax  
Locational  
Rule 
 
As mentioned, the U.S. taxes the worldwide income of its businesses.  In general the United 
States uses place of incorporation rules to determine where a MNE is headquartered.91  Thus 
Kane and Rock (2007) placed the United States in the matrix’s first box (p. 18), as this reflects 
the general approach the U.S. uses to tax its MNEs.  However, as we will see later, §7874 has 
introduced “real seat” rules in the United States in certain circumstances.   
 
Kane and Rock argue the U.S. Worldwide/POI tax policies made it particularly vulnerable to 
corporate inversions.  They write:  “For example, during the recent wave of corporate migrations 
out of the United States, it was observed that the problem had been aggravated by the fact that 
the United States applies worldwide taxation and applies a POI locational rule.  This 
                                                                
90 Kane and Rock (2007) developed the matrix.    
91 See IRC 7701(a)(4) 
 Worldwide Territorial 
Place of 
Incorporation 
(POI) 
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Worldwide/POI 
 
2 
Territorial/POI 
 
Real Seat (RS) 
 
            3 
Worldwide/ RS 
 
4 
Territorial/RS 
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combination appears lethal because it makes tax migration easier (as compared to an RS rule) 
and it makes tax migration more beneficial (as compared to a territorial system)” (p. 25).  In 
short, Kane and Rock felt the U.S. enforced unattractive policies that taxed worldwide income, 
which were exacerbated by high income tax rates.  In addition, the POI rules made it relatively 
easy to avoid its rates and policies.  If it is easy to escape complex and costly tax policies, why 
wouldn’t a firm find a new corporate home?  A number of U.S. companies decided to do so in 
the late 1990’s and early 2000’s. 
 
If a company wishes to escape Worldwide/POI tax policies, what policies will attract a firm?  All 
other factors being equal, the second box (Territorial/POI) and the fourth box (Territorial/RS) are 
attractive.  In both cases the MNE can escape costly and complex worldwide tax policies.  Of 
course if those countries offer lower income tax rates, these locations become even more 
desirable.  Unless it offers lower income tax rates, box three (Worldwide/ RS) is less attractive 
due to worldwide taxation policies. 
 
How does a firm choose between box two (Territorial/POI) and box four (Territorial/RS) 
jurisdictions?  It is easier, faster and cheaper to move to another POI jurisdiction than it is to 
move to a real seat jurisdiction.  Reincorporation papers are filed in a new jurisdiction, the firm’s 
attorneys take a series of legal steps to declare a new corporate home, but the firm’s business 
operations are not affected.  This can be accomplished quickly.  Moving to another POI 
jurisdiction does not require moving senior management, employees or assets, which real seat 
jurisdictions may require. Moving people and a corporate headquarters to a real seat location can 
be disruptive, costly and time-consuming.  A new headquarters has to be found and outfitted, and 
key employees may have to move.  The firm might lose valuable employees in the transition.  
But moving to another POI jurisdiction requires no such changes.  So moving to a box two 
jurisdiction (Territorial/POI) has significant advantages over moving to a box four country 
(Territorial/RS). 
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This is what U.S.-based MNEs did between 1997 and 2002.  All of the inverting firms identified 
by Desai and Hines (2004) reincorporated in the Cayman Islands or Bermuda (pp.  418-420). 
Both countries determine tax residence through place of incorporation rules.  According to the 
Office of Tax Policy’s study (2002) of corporate inversions: “While the jurisdiction of 
incorporation is changed in an inversion transaction, there need not be any change in the location 
of the corporation’s headquarters or its other business operations” (p. 15).    
 
In addition, the Cayman Island and Bermuda do not tax overseas income.  When describing 
those inversions the Office of Tax Policy (2002) wrote:  “To the extent the ownership of foreign 
subsidiaries has been shifted out of the former U.S. group to the new foreign parent or a foreign 
subsidiary thereof, an inversion transaction eliminates the U.S. corporate-level taxation of these 
foreign operations.  Accordingly, the significance of the foreign tax credit limitation (and the 
related rules concerning the allocation of expenses, including interest) to the inverted corporate 
group is reduced or eliminated, as foreign-source earnings of the corporate group will not be 
subject to U.S. tax” (p. 14).  In summary, two popular destinations for corporate inversions 
between 1997 and 2002 were the Cayman Islands and Bermuda, countries that both offered 
territorial tax policies and place of incorporation rules. 
 
Tax Consequences of Inversion Transactions 
While the legal mechanics of a corporate inversion can differ from firm to firm, in general 
inversions are structured as either stock sales, asset sales, or a mixture of the two.  They are 
generally taxable events.  As Desai and Hines (2002) wrote:  “U.S. law generally recognizes 
foreign inversions to be recognition events for capital gains purposes, meaning that taxpayers 
will incur capital gains tax liabilities for any previously unrecognized gains” (p. 416).  The 
structure of the transaction determines how the gain is calculated and what party is taxed.  But in 
any case, corporations considering an inversion need to weigh the immediate tax cost generated 
by the inversion against the longer term benefits of lower tax obligations and territorial taxation.  
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In all cases an inversion requires the incorporation of an entity in the new corporate home.  In the 
first category, stock sales, the new foreign parent then acquires the shares of the U.S. firm, which 
was formerly the corporate parent.  As Desai and Hines (2002) wrote: “In a taxable stock 
transfer, the new foreign parent company effectively exchanges its own shares for shares of the 
American company” (p. 416).  At the conclusion of the transaction, the shareholders own shares 
in the new foreign parent, rather than the U.S. firm.  According to the Office of Tax Policy:  
“The amount of taxable gain recognized is equal to the excess, if any, of the fair market value of 
the stock over the shareholder’s adjusted tax basis therein…” (p. 8).  The shareholders of the 
corporation are taxed on any gain recognized as a consequence of the stock sale (p. 8). 
 
In the second type of inversion, the new corporate parent acquires the assets of the U.S. entity.  
They are transferred between the U.S. entity and the new corporate parent at the fair market 
value of those assets.  Again, this is a taxable event.  As Desai and Hines write:  “In an asset 
inversion, all of the assets of the U.S. entity are transferred to the foreign entity (which has no 
material assets) in exchange for stock in the foreign entity, and a taxable gain is realized on the 
excess of the fair market value over the U.S. entity’s cost basis in those assets” (p. 417).  
However in this case the tax obligation is paid by the firm itself, rather than the shareholders 
(Office of Tax Policy, 2002, p. 8).  At the transaction’s conclusion, the shareholders own shares 
in the foreign entity.   
 
To summarize, it is the shareholders who are taxed when the transaction is structured as an 
exchange of stock.  Their taxable gain is the difference between the stock’s fair market value and 
its adjusted basis.  However the firm itself is taxed on asset sales.  Its gain is the difference 
between the fair market value of the assets and their basis.  Firms evaluate the financial impact of 
these alternatives when they decide how to structure an inversion.    
 
The third type of transaction is a mixture of a stock sale and an asset sale.  These are frequently 
called “drop down” transactions.  As the Office of Tax Policy (2002) stated: “The third category 
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of transaction that has been used to implement the reincorporation step involves elements of both 
stock and asset transfers.  In this type of transaction, the U.S. parent transfers its assets to a new 
foreign corporation, and then a portion of those assets is contributed immediately to a U.S. 
subsidiary of the new foreign parent,” which is the origin of the “drop down” terminology.  “To 
the extent that assets are contributed to a U.S. corporation, and therefore effectively remain in 
U.S. corporation solution, the result generally is the same as in a Stock Transaction…To the 
extent the foreign directly holds some of the assets of the former U.S. parent, the result generally 
is the same as in an Asset Transaction…” (p. 5).  Since the transaction is both a stock sale and an 
asset sale, the gain is taxed both ways.  Shareholders pay that portion of the gain related to the 
stock sale, determined by the difference between the shares’ value and their basis. The firm pays 
that portion of the gain triggered by the asset sales, and the gain is the difference between the fair 
market value of the assets and their cost basis (Office of Tax Policy, 2002, p. 9). 
 
In addition to the transactions involving the former U.S. parent, in general foreign subsidiaries 
are transferred from the former U.S. parent to the new foreign parent, or one of its overseas 
subsidiaries (Office of Tax Policy, 2002, p. 6).  Thus the U.S. parent is no longer responsible for 
paying taxes on the worldwide income of its overseas subsidiaries.  This is one of the key 
benefits of these transactions.  In addition, the Office of Tax Policy says many inversions have 
been accompanied by intercompany loans extended to the U.S. entity, which can shift a portion 
of the U.S. entity’s earnings to a low tax jurisdiction (p. 6).   
 
To summarize, corporate inversions generally trigger a taxable gain which cannot be deferred.   
As Desai and Hines (2002) said: “The costs of inversions include not only the administrative 
costs of undertaking inversion transactions, but also the capital gains tax liabilities they entail” 
(p. 431).  These costs need to be evaluated against the benefits of a corporate inversion, which 
include territorial taxation, lower income tax rates, and the opportunity to shift earnings from the 
U.S. entity through intercompany loans. 
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Non-tax Considerations 
Prior to an inversion, firms also need to determine if there are any non-tax issues which they 
should consider.  In general, inverting firms have not identified many issues which prevent them 
from structuring an inversion.  However since that time the U.S. government has begun to use its 
purchasing power to discourage corporate inversions, so this should be considered in the future.  
 
As mentioned, most corporate inversions had very little impact upon the day-to-day operations of 
a firm.  As the Office of Tax Policy report stated:  “the effect of such a transaction on the actual 
management and operation of the inverted firm is generally limited.  While the jurisdiction of 
incorporation is changed in an inversion transaction, there need not be any change in the location 
of the corporation’s headquarters or its other business operations” (p. 15).  Thus the potential 
impact upon business operations has not discouraged corporate inversions. 
 
Corporate inversions appear to have had little impact upon firms’ access to capital markets, as 
many MNEs are listed on several stock exchanges.  If anything, they may improve in certain 
circumstances.  A firm that recently moved its corporate headquarters from the United States to 
the United Kingdom, Ensco, believes its relocation will improve its visibility in worldwide 
markets, and may increase its access to international investors (Ensco proxy 
statement/prospectus, 2009, p. 44). 
 
Negative publicity may be one of the strongest arguments against corporate inversions.  
According to Godar, O’Connor, and Taylor (2005): “Politicians in the U.S. are labeling 
inversion, this movement of business incorporation locations to offshore tax haven, ‘unpatriotic’ 
and ‘immoral’” (p. 1).   Business executives may be concerned about the impact upon their 
personal reputation, and businesses may fear impact upon the value of the firm’s brand. 
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However, since IRC §7874 was passed, firms considering an inversion will also need to consider 
an additional risk.  Inverting firms may lose U.S. government contracts.  Effective July 1, 2009 
the Federal Government will not award contracts to inverted U.S. corporations.92  The U.S. 
government is using its purchasing power to discourage inversions.  The law can be waived 
when it is in the national interest to do business with a particular firm.  Nonetheless firms that do 
a significant portion of their business with the U.S. government will want to consider whether an 
inversion would reduce this revenue source. 
 
Section 7874 
IRC §7874 was passed as part of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.93  Its primary 
objective was preserving U.S. tax revenue.  The Senate Finance Committee’s Report explained 
the law as follows: “The Committee believes that inversion transactions resulting in a minimal 
presence in a foreign country of incorporation are a means of avoiding U.S. tax and should be 
curtailed.”94  It is generally believed the law has been at successful at achieving its objective.  
Leitner and Glicklich (2009) said that since §7874 was enacted “the tide has slowed” (p. 515). 
VanderWolk (2010) takes a stronger position, saying the law “is widely believed to have had a 
severe chilling effect on inversions of publicly held corporations” (p. 1).  As shown, between 
1997 and 2002 six members of the S&P 500 index moved their corporate home out of the United 
States, but since IRC 7874 was passed, no members of that index have done so. 
   
IRC §7874 does not prevent firms from inverting, and it may not be possible to enforce such a 
law.  However the law either: 1) eliminates the tax benefits associated with inverting; or 2) 
increases the tax cost of a corporate inversion.  In the first case §7874 ignores the inversion for 
tax purposes, and says the firm will continue to be taxed as a domestic entity.  In the second case 
it recognizes the inversion, but may increase the tax bill that is triggered by the transaction.  It 
does this by denying certain tax deductions that can reduce the taxable gain set in motion by the 
inversion.   
                                                                
92 See Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-8), Section 743 of Division D 
93 P.L. 108-357 (October 22, 2004).  
94 S. Rep. No. 108-192, 108th Cong., 1st Sess., at 142 (Nov. 7, 2003) 
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The law has three tests, all of which must be met for the law to apply.  The first applies when all, 
or substantially all, of a firm is acquired.  The test is met when “the entity completes after March 
4, 2003, the direct or indirect acquisition of substantially all of the properties held directly or 
indirectly by a domestic corporation or substantially all of the properties constituting a trade or 
business of a domestic partnership.”95  This section was prepared to cover the various legal 
techniques used to complete a corporate inversion.  As mentioned, in some cases inversions were 
structured as stock purchases, in other cases as asset purchases, and some were a combination of 
the two.  §7874 covers all of these events.   
 
The second test compares the firm’s ownership before and after an inversion.  If 80% of more of 
a firm’s shares were owned by the same shareholders before and after the inversion, the firm’s 
tax status does not change.  Section 7874(a)(3) says in this case the inverted firm “is treated as a 
domestic entity.”  In other words, the inversion will not be respected for tax purposes.  
Worldwide taxation and U.S. tax rates still apply.  For other corporate law purposes the firm is 
now a foreign corporation, but for tax purposes it is still treated as a domestic entity. 
 
However §7874 treats a firm as “surrogate foreign entity” when 60-80% of the firm’s shares are 
owned by the same shareholders before and after the inversion.96  Leitner and Glicklich (2009) 
explained this impact, stating “Under §7874(a), the taxable income of an expatriated entity 
during the 10-year period beginning on the date of the acquisition ‘shall in no event be less than’ 
the inversion gain of the expatriated entity.  In addition, the inversion gain cannot be offset by 
any credits to which an expatriated entity might otherwise be entitled” (pp. 515-516).  In short, 
the taxable gain triggered by the inversion cannot be reduced by net operating losses and tax 
credits.  VanderWolk (2010) says: “the phrase ‘surrogate foreign corporation’ has no meaning 
outside of section 7874” (p. 9).  Thus the only impact of this section is to deny tax credits and 
deductions that could reduce the firm’s tax obligation generated by the inversion.  Thus the exit 
tax for relocating abroad may increase, but the parent company will be taxed under the 
international tax laws applicable in its new corporate home.  
                                                                
95 IRC §7874(a)(2)(B)(i) 
96 §7874(a)(2)(B) 
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Finally, if less than 60% of the shareholders are the same before and after the inversion, §7874 
does not apply.  In such situations the inverted firm is a foreign entity. 
 
Determining an inverting firm’s tax status based on the number of shares that change hands 
seems like a curious approach.  Why should a firm’s tax status be determined by the number of 
shares that transfer ownership?  VanderWolk (2010) says Congress intended to permit corporate 
restructurings not motivated primarily by tax objectives (pp. 4-7).  If there was little or no change 
in the ownership of a firm, this indicated the transaction was structured only to avoid the U.S. tax 
system.  But if there was a substantial change in the ownership of a firm, this suggested that that 
“transactions would have sufficient non-tax effect to justify being respected for US tax purposes” 
(p. 4).  Still, one wonders whether this was the most effective way to determine if a transaction 
had non-tax purposes.  And it is not entirely clear why the lines were drawn at 60% and 80% 
continuity of ownership.  If 50-60% of shares remain in the same hands §7874 does not apply, 
but over half the shares are still owned by the same parties. 
 
The third test is whether the inverted firm has a substantial business presence in its new 
corporate home.  If the firm does not have such a presence in that location, §7874 applies.  The 
purpose is to prevent inversions to countries in which the MNE conducts minimal business, such 
as Caribbean tax havens.  This test compares the volume of work performed in the new corporate 
home to that done by the entire worldwide enterprise, or what §7874 calls “the expanded affiliate 
group (EAG).”   Section 7874 applies if “after the acquisition the expanded affiliate group which 
includes the entity does not have substantial business activities in the foreign country in which, 
or under the laws of which, the entity is created or organized, when compared to the total 
business activities of the expanded affiliate group.”97  If the firm does have a substantial business 
presence there, the inversion is respected. 
 
                                                                
97 7874(a)(2)(B)(iii) 
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However §7874 does not explain what constitutes a “substantial business presence.”  The 
subsequent Treasury Regulations provide more detail.  The substantial business presence test 
also introduces real seat rules into U.S. tax laws.  But they only apply as part of §7874.  Place of 
incorporation rules are still the standard used to determine whether firms are taxed as U.S. 
entities; no substantial business presence is necessary.  But to escape U.S. tax rules a firm needs 
to demonstrate it has a substantial business presence in that new corporate home.  Thus a firm 
that incorporates in the United States will be taxed as a U.S. entity, even if no business is 
conducted here.  If the same firm wants to flee the U.S. tax system, it has to demonstrate it has a 
substantial business presence in another location.  This appears inconsistent. 
 
One other section is noteworthy.  Section 7874(c)(2)(B) disregards “stock of such foreign 
corporation which is sold in a public offering.”  This section was drafted to prevent firms from 
simultaneously inverting and going public.  In most public offerings the ownership of a firm 
changes substantially, as privately held shares are sold to the public.  Without this section many 
U.S.-based firms might expatriate as part of an Initial Public Offering (IPO), since substantial 
ownership changes would allow the firm to escape §7874.   
 
VanderWolk (2010) summarized §7874 this way: “The new law effectively negated the tax 
benefits of inversions into tax haven parent corporations where the ownership of the group was 
not significantly affected by the restructuring.  If, on the other hand, there was a significant 
change in ownership, and if the change was not due to a public offering of shares in the foreign 
corporation, the new law sought only to impose US tax on gains accrued up to the date of 
expatriation, without offset by foreign tax credits or net operating loss carryovers.  If the group 
had substantial business activities in the foreign corporation’s country of incorporation, the new 
law would not apply” (p. 1).  It should also be noted VanderWolk is critical of the law, stating:    
“Section 7874 is the most extreme of the US international tax rules aimed at preserving 
residence-based taxation of foreign-source earnings of US multinationals.  The deemed 
domestication of a foreign corporation not managed or controlled in the United States, under the 
80-percent ownership change test of section 7874, is a radical assertion of tax jurisdiction in 
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context of international tax norms” (p. 16).   One can also question the logic underlying §7874, 
particularly the 80-percent and 60-percent tests.  In many ways real seat rules seem more logical; 
the country that taxes the MNE parent does so because that is where business decisions are 
made, where senior executives work, or where a large portion of the firm’s assets and employees 
reside.   
Treasury Regulations explain how the IRS interprets the substantial business presence test.  Two 
sets of Temporary Regulations were drafted on this topic.  The first regulations were in effect 
until June, 2009, and they included detailed examples to explain how the IRS interprets the law.  
They also included a safe harbor.  The safe harbor included tests to determine whether the 
substantial business presence test is met.  However they were replaced in June of 2009 with new 
Temporary Regulations, which do not provide a safe harbor nor do they provide examples to 
explain how the IRS interprets §7874.   
 
Both prior and current Temporary Regulations identify five factors to be considered when 
determining whether businesses have a substantial business presence in their new corporate 
home.  Those factors are:  1) the historical conduct of continuous business activities in that 
country prior to the inversion; 2) the presence of operational activities in that country, including 
property ownership, performance of services, and sales by EAG members; 3) the presence of 
substantial managerial activities by EAG employees in that country; 4) a substantial degree of 
ownership by investors residing in that country; and 5) strategic factors including “business 
activities in the foreign country that are material to the achievement of the EAG’s overall 
business objectives.”98  However it is unclear how important each factor is.  Both sets of 
regulations state: “The presence of absence of any factor, or of a particular number of factors, is 
not determinative.  Moreover, the weight given to any factor (whether or not set forth below) 
depends on a particular case.”99  The facts and circumstances in each case need to be evaluated 
separately. 
 
                                                                
98 Regs. §1.7874-2T(d)(1)(ii) 
99 Ibid 
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As mentioned, the prior regulations provided taxpayers with a safe harbor.  They stated taxpayers 
met the substantial business presence when all three measures were met.  The prior regulations 
said if “after the acquisition, the group employees based in the foreign country account for at 
least 10 percent (by headcount and compensation) of total group employees,”100 that measure is 
met.  If “the total value of group assets located in the foreign country is at least 10 percent of the 
total value of all group assets”101 the second measure is reached.  And when “the group sales 
made in the foreign country accounted for at least 10 percent of total group sales”102 the third 
measure is attained.  If the firm met or exceeded all three measures it had a substantial business 
presence in that location, and IRC §7874 did not apply.  But the Treasury Department replaced 
those regulations and eliminated the safe harbor in 2009, making it very difficult for taxpayers to 
know if the IRS will challenge a firm’s contention it has a substantial business presence in a new 
corporate home.  Since the substantial business presence test has not yet been litigated, 
businesses cannot look to court decisions, either. 
 
Leitner and Glicklich (2009) wrote:  “This safe harbor was removed from the new temporary 
regulations.  According to the Preamble, the IRS and Treasury Department were concerned that 
the safe harbor might apply to certain transactions that are inconsistent with the purposes of 
§7874.  For similar reasons, the examples in the former temporary regulations that illustrated the 
general application of the facts-and-circumstances test were also eliminated.  Whether the IRS 
believes that the thresholds in the safe harbor and the facts of the examples were simply too 
generous—or whether the IRS prefers to retain a level of subjectivity and uncertainty to deter 
taxpayers from relying on the substantiality exception—is not entirely clear.  However, a clue 
may exist where the Preamble notes that, in addition to the elimination of the safe harbor and 
examples, the question is whether the substantial business activities condition is satisfied will 
continue to be an area with respect to which the IRS will ordinarily not rule.  The implication is 
that the IRS is intentionally making it more difficult for taxpayers to rely on the substantiality 
exception” (p. 521).  Thus the IRS will not give taxpayers advance guidance on the topic; 
businesses have to invert first, and then learn if the IRS will challenge the firm’s position. 
                                                                
100 Prior Temporary Regs. §1.7874-2T(d)(2)(ii) 
101 Prior Temporary Regs. §1.7874-2T(d)(2)(iii) 
102 Prior Temporary Regs. §1.7874-2T(d)(2)(iv) 
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In some ways one can understand why the IRS dropped the safe harbor.  It had flaws.  Suppose a 
MNE had 89% of it employees, assets and sales in the United States, and 11% in Canada.  Under 
the safe harbor it would have a substantial business presence in Canada, and thus could choose to 
be taxed there.  But in that situation it seems that the corporation’s “real seat” would be the 
United States, if those rules applied.   
 
VanderWolk (2010) had further criticisms.  He wrote:  “For a group that conducts significant 
business activities in many different countries, the business-activities test would be impossible to 
satisfy if ‘substantial’ were interpreted to mean “at least 50 percent,” or even “at least 20 
percent.”  It is likely that many global businesses are spread over a large number of countries, 
such that no single country accounts for more than a single-digit percentage of the global 
business.  Did Congress intend to create a condition that could not be met, in practice, in some 
cases?  There is no evidence in the legislative history that this result was intended?” (pp. 11-12).   
 
Furthermore, the new regulations are vague.  VanderWolk (2010) wrote:  “The inability to know 
the tax consequences of a major transaction is a real problem, which only the IRS and Treasury 
(or Congress) can solve.  The sooner the IRS and Treasury can produce new guidance regarding 
the level of business activity in the foreign country or incorporation that will be considered 
‘substantial’ when compared to the total business activities of the group, the better for all 
concerned” (pp. 17-18).  However it seems unlikely such guidance will be forthcoming soon.  
The new regulations were released last year and they replaced more specific regulations that had 
been in effect from 2006-2009.  The lack of clarity in the new regulations appears to be a 
conscious strategy that reflects the Obama Administration’s intention to limit inversion activity. 
 
VanderWolk (2010) says this puts taxpayers in a difficult position, since they cannot be assured 
they comply with the substantial business presence test.  He writes, “In contrast to the bright line 
test of 80 percent ownership in section §7874(b), the business-activities test in section 
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§7874(a)(2)(B)(iii) draws a very fuzzy line, the crossing of which has enormous 
consequences…Unfortunately, the adjective ‘substantial’ is ambiguous” (p. 11).   
 
The Ensco Re-domiciliation 
Despite the added confusion created by the new Treasury Regulations, earlier in 2010 the oil 
drilling firm Ensco moved its corporate headquarters from the United States to the United 
Kingdom.  The Ensco action illustrates issues other U.S.-based firms might encounter in the 
future as they seek to escape high income tax rates and worldwide income tax policies.  The 
issues raised by this headquarters relocation may be faced by other firms in the future, so 
Ensco’s actions serve as a useful case study.   
 
Ensco is a drilling services firm that began operations in Texas in 1975.  It specializes in deep 
water drilling, an activity that has become more visible as oil exploration has shifted from coastal 
to deep ocean waters.  Ensco provides drilling services to oil companies around the world.     
During the fiscal year ending December 31, 2009 its revenue was approximately $1.9 billion, 
and its net income was $779 million.103 It employees approximately 3,700 people, and in 
December, 2010 its market capitalization was $6-$7 billion. 
 
In November, 2009 the firm announced its intention to “re-domicile” its corporate headquarters 
from the United States to England.  On December 22, 2009 its shareholders met in Texas to 
approve this action.  As of March, 2010 Ensco is headquartered in London, England. 
Ensco consistently says it has re-domiciled, and does not use the words “corporate inversion” to 
describe its actions.  Re-domiciliation can be distinguished from a corporate inversion in several 
important ways.  While a corporate inversion is generally a tax strategy that has little impact 
upon a firm’s operating activities, a re-domiciliation includes moving corporate offices and 
personnel move to a new site, where the worldwide enterprise can be managed more effectively.  
For example, Ensco announced it was moving key activities and officers to the United Kingdom 
                                                                
103 See 10-K for Ensco date February 25, 2010 at http://www.edgar.com 
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to improve access to customers and business operations. While a corporate inversion may be 
done only for tax purposes, a re-domiciliation should improve both operating performance and a 
firm’s tax rate.  Furthermore, in corporate inversions firms generally reincorporate to a tax 
haven, while in a re-domiciliation a firm moves its corporate home to a country in which it has a 
substantial business presence, or where the MNE is managed.  This is not necessarily a tax 
haven.  This paper proposes the following are key differences between prior corporate inversions 
and a re-domiciliation: 
Corporate Inversions and Re-domiciliation 
 
 Corporate Inversion Re-domiciliation 
Stated purpose Reduce income tax rate Improved management and 
control of MNE, and reduce 
income tax rate 
Relevant rules to determine 
MNE corporate home 
Place of incorporation rules 
determine MNE home 
Real seat rules determine 
MNE home 
Impact on operations Negligible—no significant 
impact upon how firm is 
managed 
Firm relocates headquarters 
operations to improve 
business management 
New corporate home Tax haven jurisdictions such as 
Bermuda and Cayman Islands 
Country in which firm has 
significant business 
activities; not necessarily a 
tax haven 
 
As previously mentioned, IRC §7874 applies when three tests are met.  The third is the 
substantial business presence test.  Expatriating firms must be taxed as domestic entities when 
the first two tests are realized, and “the expanded affiliate group which includes the entity does 
not have substantial business activities in the foreign country in which, or under the law of 
which, the entity is created or organized…”104  Ensco argues it has a substantial business 
presence in the U.K. and thus it is not subject to §7874.    
 
Ensco emphasized that it was moving management and control of the firm from the United 
States to the U.K.  Its proxy statement/prospectus says:  “Our Board of Directors expects that the 
                                                                
104 IRC§7874(a)(2)(B)(iii)   
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reorganization and relocation of our principal executive offices, including most of our senior 
executive officers and other key decision makers, to the U.K., would, among other anticipated 
benefits: enhance management efficiencies resulting from the U.K. time zone overlap with 
geographies where we operate, improve access to key customers located in the U.K. or Western 
Europe or who routinely travel to the U.K., enhance our access to European institutional 
investors, improve the general customer and investor perception we are an international 
driller…”105  In short, senior executives to London will manage the firm more effectively when 
they reside in the United Kingdom, since they will be closer to key customers, investors and 
operations.  As mentioned previously, U.K. tax laws state “that the residence of a company is 
determined according to where its central management and control is to be found.”106  This is 
similar to one of the substantial business presence factors in U.S. Treasury Regulations.  The 
third factor in those regulations states the IRS will evaluate:  “The performance in the foreign 
country of substantial managerial activities by the EAG members’ officers and employees who 
are based in the foreign country.”107  
 
Because it intends to be taxed under U.K. international laws, Ensco believes its tax rate will 
decrease.  Tax treaties are also an important consideration.  The proxy statement/prospectus says 
that re-domiciling its headquarters to London will “allow us to take advantage of the U.K.’s 
developed and favorable tax regime and extensive treaty network, and allow us to potentially 
achieve a global effective tax rate comparable to that of some of our global competitors…”108  
While Ensco was not relocating exclusively for tax reasons, there were still tax advantages to 
moving to the U.K.  Ensco also contended that U.S. worldwide tax policies and rates made it 
more difficult for them to compete effectively, a claim made in the prior era of corporate 
inversions.    
 
                                                                
105 See Ensco’s letter to its stockholders, written by Chairman of the Board Daniel W. Rabun, dated November 20, 
2009, included its merger prospectus.  Downloaded July 19, 2010 from  
http://www.enscous.com/Theme/Ensco/files/docs_financial/Ensco%20Special_Proxy_Statement.pdf 
106 See INTM120150—Company Residence 
107 IRC§7874(a)(2)(C) 
108 Ibid 
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Ensco was careful to distinguish its actions from prior corporate inversions, which generated 
adverse publicity.  Referring to prior transactions they wrote:  “In most cases, those corporations 
expatriated to tax haven jurisdictions in which the applicable U.S. multinational corporation had 
no (or minimal) historic business activities” (p. 40).  Ensco was moving to a country in which it 
had a substantial, historic business presence, and where it could manage its operations more 
effectively.  Furthermore, while the U.K.’s 28% tax rate is substantially lower than the U.S. rate, 
it is not considered a tax haven. 
 
Ensco’s prospectus/proxy statement explains the tax advantages of re-domiciling to England.  It 
says: “We believe that the merger should improve our ability to maintain a competitive 
worldwide effective tax rate because the U.K. corporate tax rate is lower than the U.S. corporate 
tax rate and because the U.K. has implemented a dividend exemption system that generally does 
not tax subject non-U.K. earnings to U.K. tax when such earnings are repatriated to the U.K. in 
the form of dividends from non-U.K. subsidiaries.  In addition, the U.K. Government is 
consulting on reform of the U.K. controlled foreign company rules (under which, in some 
circumstances, low-taxed profits of foreign subsidiaries of the U.K. companies may be taxed in 
the U.K.) with a view to moving towards a more territorial system of taxing foreign profits of 
U.K. companies” (p. 23).  Ensco is attracted to the U.K.’s lower tax rate and the steps it has 
taken towards a territorial tax system.  In the Kane and Rock model on page 22, the United 
Kingdom is moving from box three (Worldwide/RS) to box four (Territorial/RS).  And Ensco is 
moving from being taxed under box one policies (Worldwide/POI) to box four (Territorial/RS), 
using the substantial business presence test in IRC §7874 to achieve that objective. 
 
To escape §7874, Ensco’s proxy statement/prospectus specifically evaluates each of the five 
factors identified in the Treasury Regulations’ substantial business presence test, and explains 
how they support Ensco’s contention it has a substantial business presence in the U.K.  One 
factor concerns the firm’s historical presence in that country.  Its proxy statement says: 
“However, Ensco UK is a company formed under English law, and Ensco Delaware has, 
continuous and substantial business activities in the U.K. as a result of its longstanding North 
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Sea drilling activities and management and control over the Europe and Africa Business Unit, 
headquartered in Aberdeen, Scotland.  We therefore believe Ensco UK should not be treated as a 
U.S. corporation for U.S. federal income tax purposes under Section 7874” (p. 23).  It also notes 
that it began drilling activities in the United Kingdom’s North Sea in 1993, and had a local 
headquarters in Aberdeen, Scotland since 1994. 
 
The firm argues it has substantial managerial activities in the United Kingdom, another factor 
identified in U.S. Treasury Regulations.  Their proxy statement/prospectus says:  “After 
relocating to Aberdeen, Scotland in 1994, the U.K. headquarters have served an increasingly 
important managerial role within the Ensco Delaware expanded affiliate group.  The Aberdeen 
facility is the headquarters for the Europe and Africa Business Unit, which is one of four 
business units…” (p. 43).  The General Manager of that division and seven of his/her managers 
all live and work in Scotland.  Furthermore, Ensco expects further growth in the U.K., stating:  
“For the strategic business reasons discussed above, management in the U.K. has grown.  More 
importantly, for the same reasons, the Company expects the long-term historic growth of 
management in the U.K. to continue” (p. 43).  Ensco also says the firm’s senior managers will 
move to the U.K., effectively shifting the worldwide enterprise’s management to the U.K.  Thus 
it will comply with the U.K.’s international tax laws, which emphasize management and control 
when determining a MNE’s corporate home. 
 
Another factor to be considered is whether there is “A substantial degree of ownership of the 
EAG by investors resident in the foreign country.”109   The firm acknowledges that few of its 
current investors are U.K. residents, but they hope to change this.  Their proxy 
statement/prospectus states:  “The enhanced relationships with potential U.K. and European 
investors are likely to result in an expanded U.K. and European Union shareholder base.  
However it is unlikely that U.K. residents will comprise a substantial portion of Ensco’s 
shareholder base in the near term” (p. 44).  
 
                                                                
109 Regs. §1.7874-2T(d)(ii)(D) 
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Current and prior Treasury Regulations also evaluate whether the firm has strategic reasons for 
moving abroad.  The Treasury Regulation says one factor to be evaluated is: “The existence of 
business activities in the foreign country that are material to the achievement of the EAG’s 
overall business objectives.”110  Ensco says it is re-domiciling for strategic reasons.  While they 
began in the United States, they are growing more rapidly in international markets, and they 
want to be perceived as a global provider of deep water drilling services.  To substantiate this, 
Ensco explains how it began a U.S. firm, with an initial focus on drilling activities in the United 
States and the Gulf of Mexico.  However, since that time it has grown more rapidly in 
international markets.  They write: “Specifically, 94 percent of the proven worldwide oil reserves 
and 95 percent of proven worldwide gas reserves are located in the Foreign Drilling Markets.  By 
contrast, only 6 percent of the proven worldwide reserves and only 5 percent of the proven 
worldwide gas reserves are located in the U.S.” (p. 42).   The U.K. headquarters gives senior 
management easier access to operations in the North Sea, Mediterranean, Africa and other sites.  
They write: “Consistent with these global trends, we expect that we will derive approximately 86 
percent of our 2009 gross revenues from our operations is the Foreign Drilling Markets” (p. 42).  
Ensco says its goal is to expand internationally, and the U.K. location is a better site to achieve 
that objective (p. 43).  In short, they believe the U.K. is a better strategic location than the United 
States for a worldwide drilling services firm. 
 
The regulation’s fifth factor is whether the firm has substantial operational activities in its new 
corporate home.  Specific items to be evaluated include property in that country, the 
“performance of services by individuals in the foreign country which is owned by members of 
the EAG,”111  and sales made in that country by members of the EAG.  As discussed, under the 
safe harbor, if 10% of the worldwide enterprise’s assets, employees and sales are located in the 
new corporate home, the “EAG will be considered to have substantial business activities”112 in 
that location.  
   
                                                                
110 Regs. §1.7874-2T(d)(ii)(E) 
111 Regs. §1.7874-2T(d)(ii)(B)(2) 
112 Prior Regs. §1.7874-2T(d)(iii)(2) 
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Ensco says that under the former Treasury Regulations it met each of the safe harbor elements.  
Ensco’s proxy statement/prospectus states:  “The ratios of the ENSCO Delaware expanded 
affiliate group’s assets, employees and revenues in the U.K. compared to its worldwide assets, 
employees, and revenues exceeded the former 10 percent ‘safe harbor’ contained in the 2006 
Regulations for each calendar year from 2005 through 2008 and are projected to exceed the 
former ‘safe harbor’ in 2009.  The 2009 Regulations contain no ‘safe harbor’ or example to 
illustrate the application of the relevant factors to determine whether substantial business 
activities exist.  There is no judicial or administrative guidance on the meaning of ‘substantial 
business activities’ for purposes of Section 7874” (p. 41).  Thus Ensco argues it would have had 
a safe harbor under the prior regulations.  Ensco appears to believe it has a solid case.  The firm’s 
management determined it was strong enough that they proposed the re-domiciliation to its 
shareholders, though the regulations removed the safe harbor.  The shareholders supported the 
move, and the firm is now headquartered in London. 
 
However Ensco cannot be entirely sure its move will not be challenged by the IRS.  Thus it 
acknowledges in its proxy statement/prospectus: “Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is possible 
that the IRS may assert and ultimately establish that Ensco UK should be treated as a U.S. 
corporation for U.S. federal income tax purposes, under Section 7874 of the Code” (p. 46).  If 
this happened “we would become involved in a tax controversy with the IRS regarding possible 
additional U.S. tax liability” (p. 23).  The firm had no way to resolve this issue prior to re-
domiciling, and still took that action.   
Options Available to U.S. Firms 
Given the high cost and complexity of U.S. international tax policies, some firms may want to 
consider alternatives to American tax laws.  While other countries seek to attract MNEs through 
tax-friendly policies, the U.S. is trying to keep them from fleeing, at least for tax purposes.  What 
alternatives might American businesses consider?  Following are options firms and investors 
might evaluate, depending upon their circumstances.  In the examples below, I have tried to 
emphasize the most likely scenarios, rather than identify every option a firm could consider, 
however improbable. 
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Option one: Incorporate abroad from the outset 
If a firm has not yet incorporated it may want to consider doing so in a tax-friendly jurisdiction at 
inception.  The U.S. still relies primarily upon place of incorporation rules to determine what 
businesses it should tax.  There is nothing that prevents a firm from incorporating abroad during 
its start-up phase.  Thus in the Kane and Rock model the firm could start operation in the second 
box (Territorial/POI).  The firm could still be managed and directed within the United States, but 
its worldwide tax policies would not apply.    
 
The parent company could then form a U.S. subsidiary to conduct business here.  The firm is still 
subject to high taxes on U.S.-sourced earnings, but it can avoid the cost and complexity of 
worldwide taxation.  As mentioned, it may also be possible to extend loans from the overseas 
parent to the U.S. subsidiary, and strip a portion of its earnings from the United States to a low-
tax jurisdiction. 
 
The Office of Tax Policy (2002) recognized new businesses may not choose to incorporate in the 
U.S. stating: “As we formulate a response, however, we must not lose sight of the fact that an 
inversion is not the only route to accomplishing this type of reduction in taxes.  A U.S.-based 
start-up venture may incorporate overseas at the outset” (p. 2).  The U.S. tax system is costly and 
burdensome, and place of incorporation rules make it easy to incorporate abroad.   
 
Testifying before Congress in 1999, Intel’s Vice President of Tax, Robert Perlman, said this is 
what he would advise.  Perlman said:  “if I had known at Intel’s founding (over thirty years ago) 
what I know today about international tax rules, I would have advised the parent company be 
established outside the U.S.  This reflects the reality that our Tax Code competitively 
disadvantages multinationals simply because the parent is a U.S. corporation.”113   
 
                                                                
113 Perlman, R. (1999). International Tax Issues Relating to Globalization: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Finance, 
106th Congress 1. 
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Since that time the disparity between U.S. tax policies and those in other countries has grown.  
Today the U.S. tax rate is one of the world’s highest, and fewer countries are enforcing policies 
that tax worldwide income.    
 
Well-funded, high technology start-ups are often backed by sophisticated investors with 
international experience, and the advantages of incorporating abroad from inception are known.  
As the Office of Tax Policy noted:  “A start-up venture that contemplates both U.S. and foreign 
operations must choose a location for its corporate parent.  While the natural choice for a U.S.-
based venture may be a U.S. parent corporation, that often will not be the most tax efficient 
choice.  By forming initially through a foreign parent corporation, the venture can enjoy the 
same tax savings as would be available through a subsequent inversion transaction” (p. 18-19).  
When this was written inversions were easier to accomplish than today, so the motivation to 
incorporate overseas from the start today is even stronger.    At some point it seems possible that 
incorporating in the U.S. will not be the “natural choice,” as tax attorneys and CPAs advise 
clients to incorporate abroad from day one.  Such actions may not attract the same attention as 
corporate inversions by well-established, household names.  However in the long run it can be 
more damaging, as the U.S. economy and its tax base rely upon the success of new business 
ventures.   
Option two:  if you are merging with an overseas company, select that location as your 
corporate home 
As international trade and investment grow, cross-border mergers may become more frequent.  If 
tax policies continue to levy high tax rates and complex tax rules upon U.S.-headquartered firms, 
when firms merge or are acquired they may want to identify the overseas location as the 
corporate headquarters.  The Office of Tax Policy also acknowledged this was a threat, stating:  
“An existing U.S. group may be the subject of a takeover bid, either friendly or hostile, from a 
foreign-based company” (p. 2).  Their report said this could have a negative impact upon the 
U.S. economy in the long-run, stating:  “Moreover, these transactions can have significant 
adverse effect on the U.S. economy in the long term, as decisions affecting the future location of 
new investment, operations and facilities, and employment opportunities are made by what is a 
foreign-based company rather than a U.S.-based company” (p.2). 
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This is not be just a theoretical concern.  There is evidence this has happened.  According to Avi-
Yonah (2008):  “When Daimler bought Chrysler in 1998 to form Daimler Chrysler AG, Juergen 
Schrempf, the CEO of Daimler/Chrysler, testified before the US Senate Finance Committee that 
Subpart F was a major reason that the combined company was German and not American” (p. 6).  
While Schrempf said this was a significant factor, it should be noted that Avi-Yonah questioned 
this, and thought the German government and unions may have had a larger influence.  
Nonetheless, Schrempf’s comments indicate that taxes can play a role in such decisions.  And 
Avi-Yonah also commented:  “However, Schrempf addressed a broader phenomenon, which is 
that lawmakers are reasonably concerned about the impact of CFC rules on the decision where to 
incorporate MNEs.  This can be shown for the US by the trend in inversion transactions, in 
which US MNEs reincorporated in Bermuda in part to avoid Subpart F.  The trend was stopped 
by legislation in 2004, but the competitiveness issue continues” (p. 6).   But the Ensco re-
domiciliation indicates there are ways for some firms to work around IRC 7874. 
 
Depending upon the location of the acquiring firm, the merged company could be in any of the 
four boxes in the Kane and Rock table.  However since most countries apply territorial tax 
policies, the new firm is likely to be in the second or fourth box (Territorial/POI or 
Territorial/RS).  In this event it may be an opportune time to transfer CFCs to the new corporate 
parent, and escape worldwide taxation policies of those entities.  In addition, even if the 
acquiring firm is in either the first box (WW/POI) or the third box (WW/RS) it may make sense 
to designate that firm as the parent, due to the high U.S. income tax rate.  
 
Option three: find new investors as part of a corporate inversion 
As mentioned earlier, the U.S. laws governing corporate inversions are curious, in that a firm’s 
tax status can change when the firm attracts new investors.  If less than 20% of the firm’s shares 
change hands as part of a corporate inversion, the firm continues to be taxed as a domestic entity.  
If 20-40% of the shares change hands, the cost of expatriation can increase, as the firm cannot 
use NOLs and tax credits to reduce the exit tax.  And if more than 40% of the shares change 
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hands, IRC 7874 does not apply.  But in any case, if more than 20% of a firm’s shares change 
hands, the firm is no longer taxed as a domestic entity.   
 
There may be occasions when a firm seeks new investors and additional capital.  This may be an 
opportune time to invert.  Both new and existing shareholders benefit from a lower tax rate, as 
long as the firm is profitable.  As VanderWolk (2010) writes: “For some group owners, the 
effective transfer of more than 20 percent of their equity interest in the group to new investors 
via a private placement of FC [Foreign Corporation] stock, and the US tax cost of the related 
inversion, would be acceptable trade-offs for the future benefits to be derived from positioning 
the group outside the increasingly onerous US international tax rules” (p. 17).  And if more than 
40% of shares change hands, the firm can use NOL’s and tax credits to reduce the exit tax. 
 
But in either case, the firm is escaping IRC 7874 under its second test, and it is not concerned 
with the substantial business presence test.  That issue is irrelevant.  Thus the firm can invert, as 
opposed to re-domicile.  It can select a tax haven to be its new corporate home.  It can move 
from the first box (Worldwide/POI) to the second box (Territorial/POI).  It does not have to 
move its corporate headquarters or senior executives to the new site.  Its day-to-day operations 
can remain untouched.  Of course if it wanted to move its headquarters to a jurisdiction in the 
fourth box (Territorial/Real Seat) it would have the option of doing so.  But this would add 
expense, time and disruption associated with moving corporate offices and senior managers to a 
new country.  They would also need to be concerned with ensuring they complied with the real 
seat rules in the new jurisdiction. 
Option four: re-domicile to a country in which you believe you have a substantial business 
presence 
Re-domiciliation may be an attractive option for firms that have a substantial business presence 
in another country, particularly if that country has low income tax rates and enforces territorial 
tax policies.  And since the U.S. has very high income tax rates, and is one of the few countries 
to tax worldwide income, there may be many preferable locations.   
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For many MNEs, they might evaluate whether they have a substantial business presence in 
another G-7 country, as they may have extensive operations and a long history of conducting 
business there.  In 2011 the U.S. corporate tax rate is one of the highest in the world.  
Furthermore, the United States is the only G-7 country maintaining worldwide taxation policies.  
So there may be tax advantages to selecting one of these sites as the new corporate home, as 
Ensco did.   
 
In the Kane and Rock model, Ensco moved from the first box (WW/POI) to the fourth box 
(Territorial/RS), with the caveat that the U.K. is transitioning towards territorial taxation.  Ensco 
claimed it had a substantial business presence in the United Kingdom to escape IRC 7874.  In 
moving its corporate home to the U.K., it shifted management and control of the firm there to 
comply with U.K. rules.   
 
Leitner and Glicklich (2009) explained why firms may want to pursue this approach: “The U.S. 
continue to tax corporations on their worldwide income and the looming budgetary deficits make 
it unlikely that the U.S. will shift to a territorial system in the foreseeable future.  On the 
contrary, the Obama’s Administration’s 2010 budget included several significant revenue-raisers 
targeting U.S.-based multinationals.  These include the elimination of the use of check-the-box 
disregarded entities to reduce foreign taxation through debt financing arrangements and 
restrictions on the deductibility of interest attributable to debt that is allocable to foreign 
operations.  While the natural destination for expatriating U.S. corporations would seem to be 
traditional ‘tax havens’ or similar low-tax jurisdictions, other countries (such as Canada) that 
offer more favorable treatment of multinational corporations (in the form of lower corporate tax 
rates and the substantially complete exemption of foreign business income from Canadian tax) 
may also be attractive relocation alternatives for some companies” (Leitner and Glicklich, 2009, 
p. 522).  While Canada is not considered a tax haven, its 29.5% corporate income tax rate for 
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2010 114 is still far below the 39.2% U.S. rate.  Rates in Germany, the U.K, and Italy are 
scheduled to be approximately 10 points below the U.S. rate next year. 
 
Option five: invert to a country in which you have a substantial business presence, and then re-
domicile to a country with an even lower tax rate 
Another option was proposed by Rubinger in his 2007 article.  It is admittedly the most elaborate 
maneuver, and it is unlikely many firms would want to attempt it for several reasons to be 
explained.  Nonetheless, it may be a possibility for some firms, and it does illustrate the options 
that may exist. 
 
Rubinger proposed that a firm could escape U.S. taxation under IRC 7874 by demonstrating it 
had a substantial business presence in another jurisdiction, such as the United Kingdom.  The 
firm could invert to that country.  But rather than shift the management and control of the firm to 
the United Kingdom, it would shift that activity to another country with even more favorable tax 
policies.  He cited Hungary and Switzerland as two attractive locations, as they have low tax 
rates, territorial tax policies, and favorable tax treaties with the U.K.   
 
Rubinger (2007) says: “§7874 will apply only if, among other requirements, the expanded 
affiliated group does not have substantial business activities in the jurisdiction in which the new 
foreign parent is created or organized” (italicized in original).  “Therefore, if a U.S.-based 
multinational has substantial business activities in a high-tax foreign jurisdiction, such as the 
U.K., it will no longer be possible to invert by using a holding company created in a low-tax 
jurisdiction, such as Bermuda or Barbados, where there is little, if any presence.  Nevertheless, 
because §7874 is focused on the expanded affiliate group having substantial business activities in 
the jurisdiction where the foreign parent is created or organized, rather than where such entity is 
resident for foreign tax purposes, there may still be planning opportunities to avoid the reach of 
                                                                
114 According the Canada Revenue Agency, the Canadian corporate income tax rate decreased by 1.5 points in 2011, 
and will decrease by another 1.5 points in 2012.  Retrieved from http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/tx/bsnss/tcps/crptns/rts-
eng.html  on January 9, 2011. 
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§7874 in certain circumstances” (p. 45).  Since Rubinger wrote his article the U.K. has taken 
steps towards territorial taxation, but its income tax rates are still higher than, for example, 
Hungary’s.  
 
Rubinger (2007) writes:  “The management and control of the U.K. holding company is then 
moved to Hungary, causing the holding company to be treated as a resident of Hungary under the 
U.K.-Hungary income tax treaty” (p. 46).  According to Rubinger that tax treaty offers some 
benefits to firms managed and controlled in Hungary, such as no withholding on interest and 
royalties, and low taxes on dividends.  “In this scenario, §7874 would not appear to apply 
because the expanded affiliate group has substantial business activities in the jurisdiction where 
the foreign holding company is created or organized (i.e., the U.K.), even though such company 
is a resident of Hungary…” (p. 46).   
 
While Rubinger focused on the U.K., this is not the only location where this is possible.  
Conceptually a MNE might invert to any country in which it has a substantial business presence, 
and simultaneously re-domicile to a country with low tax rates, territorial tax policies, and 
favorable tax treaties. 
 
From a legal perspective, it appears Rubinger’s proposal is feasible.  However there are several 
practical issues which may make it unattractive to many U.S.-based companies.  While taxes are 
important, relocating a company from the United States to Hungary (or another low tax 
jurisdiction) may not make sense for many operational reasons.  Access to customers, capital 
markets and operations may suffer, and these are very important considerations.  In addition, 
Rubinger’s example relies in part on favorable tax treaties.  But tax treaties are not permanent; 
they can be renegotiated.  It would be very damaging and costly if a firm moved its headquarters 
overseas, and then saw many of the tax benefits disappear if countries renegotiated a tax treaty.  
Rubinger’s proposal may make sense if a firm expected to achieve operational improvements 
through relocation, but for other firms it may be too risky to consider. 
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Conclusion 
While IRC 7874 has generally been considered successful at limiting corporate inversions, the 
forces that motivated that activity have, if anything, grown stronger.  Those drivers include high 
U.S. corporate income tax rates, and complex, worldwide taxation policies.  As Leitner and 
Glicklich (2009) wrote, “The fundamental incentives that drove companies to flee the United 
States are still there for those that can avoid being subject to the anti-inversion rules” (p. 515). 
 
§7874 has made it more difficult to escape U.S. tax policies, but it has not made it impossible. 
Most start-up firms would be wise to incorporate abroad, unless they plan to do considerable 
business with the U.S. government.  When a domestic firm merges with a foreign enterprise, 
they might choose the latter to be the corporate parent, at least for tax purposes.  U.S. worldwide 
tax policies increase tax and administrative costs, and there are no signs this will change soon. 
 
IRC §7874 also includes several escape clauses U.S. firms might be wise to consider.  If they are 
attracting new investors, they might use that opportunity to invert to a tax haven.  If they believe 
they have a “substantial business presence” in another country, they might consider re-
domiciling to that location.  Tax rates and policies are more attractive in almost all other 
jurisdictions. 
 
These opportunities may not exist for all firms, but they do represent a threat to the U.S. tax base.  
While many countries are lowering tax rates and most enforce territorial international tax 
policies, the U.S. is maintaining high corporate tax rates and maintaining worldwide taxation.  In 
the short-run these policies may be effective, but in the future they may not be.  As the Office of 
Tax Policy (2002) report stated:  “Measures designed simply to halt inversion activity may 
address these transactions in the short-run, but there is a serious risk that measures targeted too 
narrowly would have the unintended effect of encouraging a shift to other forms of transactions 
to the detriment of the U.S. economy in the long run” (p. 2).   
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If the U.S. wants to attract businesses and investment there needs to be an incentive to make it 
their corporate home.  It is understandable that Congress has directed government agencies not to 
do business with inverted businesses.  However, this doesn’t address the real problem, and it 
only provides financial incentives to firms with substantial government contracts.  There needs to 
be some advantage to being headquartered in the United States.  Lower tax rates and more 
straightforward tax policies would be a more effective approach, as these would encourage all 
businesses to make the U.S. their corporate home. 
 
In the end, the United States needs to become a more attractive location for business investment, 
and its tax policies need to be competitive.  As Leitner and Glicklich (2009) said:  “Ultimately, if 
the U.S. wishes to remain a preferred location for multinationals, it will need to move to a more 
competitive international tax regime” (p. 522).  In 2002 the U.S. Office of Tax Policy said:  “A 
comprehensive review of the U.S. tax system, particularly the international tax rules, is both 
appropriate and timely.  Our overarching goal must be to maintain the position of the United 
States as the most desirable location in the world for place of incorporation, location of 
headquarters, and transaction of business” (p. 30).  Due to high income tax rates and worldwide 
tax policies, it seems the United States today is far short of that goal.   
 
The U.S. should also consider changing its place of incorporation rules.  As Kane and Rock 
noted, these rules are easy to manipulate, and made it simple for businesses to invert.  Today 
they make it easy for a start-up firm to select a corporate home where it may have little or no 
business presence.  Real seat rules focus on business substance and are more difficult to 
manipulate.  If it does consider real seat policies, the U.S. should consider rules in other 
countries and anticipate technological changes.  While the U.K rules focus on where 
management and control of a firm exists, one can imagine a world in which senior managers 
work in different countries and use advanced technologies to communicate and make key 
decisions.  In some cases it may be difficult to identify one country from which a firm is 
managed.   
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Finally, the U.S. should also consider rewriting IRC 7874.  Determining a firm’s tax status based 
on how many shares change hands does not seem like the most logical approach.  There should 
be better ways to determine whether a restructuring has objectives other than minimizing taxes.  
And the “substantial business presence” test within that law needs more clarity, as VanderWolk 
argues. Taxpayers, investors and even regulators deserve more certainty than the current rules 
provide. 
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Abstract 
 
Over the past decade many U.S.-based Multi-National Enterprises (MNEs) have reduced their 
worldwide tax rate, using Cost Sharing Agreements (CSAs) to transfer intellectual property 
rights to low-tax jurisdictions.  The U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has questioned whether 
businesses have valued these transfers appropriately.  In January, 2009 the IRS issued 
Temporary Regulations to govern IRS qualified CSAs, further refining the Investor Model it first 
proposed in 2005.  The Investor Model purports to value intellectual property contributions to 
CSAs in the same way third-party investors would, using risk-adjusted, time value of money 
principles.  The purpose of this paper is to explain the Investor Model, identify ways in which it 
has changed since 2005, and offer suggestions for improvement.  This paper also considers 
whether U.S.-based MNEs might want to seek “safe harbor” under the IRS’s regulations.  In the 
author’s view, the 2009 Temporary Regulations have improved key flaws in the 2005 Proposed 
Regulations, but a several important issues remain.  Further, since they were released, the IRS 
has lost several key cost sharing cases that may weaken the IRS’s position.  For these reasons the 
author does not recommend seeking “safe harbor” by structuring an IRS qualified CSA, and 
believe taxpayers should consider other alternatives, including an Advanced Pricing Agreement 
(APA).        
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Valuing Intellectual Property 
 
Intellectual property is a key driver of business success.  Intellectual property includes patents, 
copyrights, trademarks, and other intellectual know-how associated with development of 
technologically advanced products.  Intellectual property development is the most important 
business activity in many technologically advanced business sectors, such as software, 
electronics and pharmaceuticals.  Valuable intellectual property can create sustained superior 
earnings, so the stakes are high.  As an indication of the growing importance of intellectual 
property (IP), there is an emerging market for businesses that buy and sell IP, and conflicts 
between firms over intellectual property rights are frequently litigated.115     
 
This paper focuses upon the IRS’s Investor Model, which purports to value intellectual property 
using the same approach as a third party investor.  The U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
issued Temporary Regulations in 2009 that further refined the Investor Model it first proposed in 
2005.  The IRS Investor Model is an important subject for several reasons.  First, it impacts the 
way many U.S.-based Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) will value intellectual property for tax 
purposes, and this can have a significant impact upon both U.S. business tax obligations and 
Federal tax revenue.  Second, other organizations, such as OECD, are also evaluating how 
intangible assets should be taxed.  It has recently initiated a project to review its policies and 
make recommendations for improvement, so it may also want to evaluate the Investor Model. 
 
Intellectual property development can be viewed in two distinct ways, one geographic, and one 
legal.  A geographic perspective focuses upon the physical location scientists, engineers, and 
marketers develop intellectual property.  For example, Silicon Valley is known to be the location 
where many high-technology electronic products are developed.  In contrast, a legal perspective 
focuses upon where that property is owned, protected and taxed.  
                                                                
115 As an example, a firm owned by Microsoft’s co-founder. Paul Allen, has filed patent infringement lawsuits 
against Google, Facebook and eBay.  See “Microsoft Co-Founder Launches Patent War” Wall Street Journal, 
August 28, 2010.  That article also notes that Microsoft’s former chief technology officer, Nathan Myhrvold, has 
formed a firm named Intellectual Ventures to acquire and license patents. 
206 
 
U.S.-based MNEs have historically initiated development of intellectual property within U.S. 
geographic borders.  American intellectual property laws have generally protected and taxed 
profits generated by these assets.  In such situations, the geographic and legal views of 
intellectual property development are identical.  As U.S. firms have expanded abroad, some have 
drawn upon the talents of scientists and marketers overseas to develop intellectual property.   
From a geographic perspective, the intellectual property may be developed in several locations, 
but in many cases it has been owned, protected and taxed by American laws.  In such situations, 
companies typically provide an arm’s-length markup for services provided by overseas 
subsidiaries to fund development, record profits, and pay taxes in each jurisdiction. 
Cost Sharing Agreements 
Cost Sharing Agreements (CSAs) were introduced as an option to this model in 1968.  In CSAs 
two or more related legal corporations share intellectual property development costs.  According 
to U.S. tax law CSAs need to reflect “an effort in good faith by the participating members to bear 
their respective shares of all costs and risks of development on an arms-length basis.”116    The 
participating members of a CSA are related entities within the same MNE, and the IRS Investor 
Model only applies when these organization pool resources to develop intellectual property in an 
IRS qualified CSA. 
  
It is important to note that IRS qualified CSAs are designed to be a way for firms to establish a 
“safe harbor” with U.S. tax authorities.  At their essence, they are a way for firms to comply with 
IRS rules governing CSAs, and to achieve some assurance the IRS will not challenge the 
agreement, and assess back taxes and penalties for failure to comply with the arm’s length 
standard.  But no firm is required to form an IRS-sanctioned CSA and comply with all of its 
rules.  First of all, CSAs are not intended to be used by unrelated parties, should they agree to 
share costs and jointly fund research and development.  But second, there is no requirement that 
related parties fund joint development costs through an IRS qualified CSA.  They can choose to 
create a CSA outside of the IRS’s cost sharing, “safe harbor” rules, as long as they comply with 
the arm’s length standard.  However the IRS is less likely to challenge firms that operate under 
                                                                
116 1968 Regs. §1.482-2( d)(4) 
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its CSA regulations, as the IRS believes its regulations reflect arm’s length principles.  The IRS 
may be more likely to challenge firms that develop their own methodology.  IRS qualified CSAs 
are a way to achieve more assurance a CSA’s results will not be challenged by tax authorities, 
assuming the firm complies with the IRS’s regulations. 
 
U.S.-based MNEs have shared development costs with their overseas subsidiaries through IRS 
qualified CSAs since 1968.  When CSAs are formed, generally one member of the CSA transfers 
the right to use its intellectual property to the CSA, and other members of the CSA generally 
need to pay for the right to use those assets.  Current U.S. tax regulations state: “where a member 
of a group of controlled entities acquires an interest in the intangible property as a participating 
party in a bona fide cost sharing arrangement with respect to the development of such intangible 
property, the (IRS) shall not make allocations with respect to such acquisition except as may be 
appropriate to reflect each participant’s arm’s length share of the costs and risk of developing the 
property…”117  In short, if the CSA complies with IRS regulations the tax authorities will 
generally respect its results, unless they determine it violates the arms-length standard.  When 
these rules were first promulgated in 1968, the IRS gave MNEs little guidance concerning how 
they should value intangible property transfers and comply with the arm’s length standard. 
 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 introduced the "commensurate with income" standard, a key 
addition to U.S. transfer pricing law.  At that time Congress was concerned businesses were 
transferring intellectual property abroad with inadequate compensation, and there were few 
effective ways to value these transfers.  For that reason the following statement was added to the 
Internal Revenue Code (IRC):  “In the case of any transfer (or license) of intangible 
property…the income with respect to such transfer or license shall be commensurate with 
income attributable to the intangible.”118  In other words, the price paid for the property must be 
related to the income generated from it.  The relative importance of these standards, “arm’s-
length” and “commensurate with income,” plays an important part in U.S. transfer pricing law to 
                                                                
117 Ibid 
118 IRS §482 
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this day.  Do these standards support and complement each other, or are they two completely 
different standards?  Keates, Muyelle and Wright (2009) write: “The interpretation of 
‘commensurate with income’ has been subject to much debate since 1986.  At times, it seems 
that the IRS believes that the arm’s length standard has been replaced with a commensurate with 
income standard that allows the IRS to disregard third-party evidence (i.e. comparable third-
party transactions) in favour of economic analysis that effectively maximizes U.S. 
income…Indeed, the Tax Court, in its decision in Xilinx, Inc. v. Commissioner stated that the 
commensurate with income standard is intended to supplement and support, not supplant, the 
arm’s length standard” (p. 166).  Nonetheless, the relative importance of these standards, and 
how they interact with each other, is an actively debated topic. 
U.S. Tax Law and Treasury Regulations 
The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) is the most authoritative source of tax law within the United 
States.  The U.S. Congress passes the tax code and those laws are signed into law by the 
American president.  As such, the IRC represents the guiding principles by which individuals 
and businesses are taxed.  However the IRC frequently states general concepts, and needs to be 
supplemented by more detailed taxpayer guidance, that interpret the law and provide examples 
concerning how tax laws should be applied.  Hoffman, Raabe, Smith and Maloney (2008) write: 
“Regulations are issued by the U.S. Treasury Department under authority granted by Congress.  
Interpretive by nature, they provide taxpayers with considerable guidance on the meaning and 
application of the Code.  Although not issued by Congress, Regulations do carry considerable 
weight.  They are an important factor to consider in complying with tax law” (p. 1-21). 
 
Regulations are issued as Proposed Regulations, Temporary Regulations, or Final Regulations.  
In general, the Treasury Department first issues Proposed Regulations, and solicits taxpayer 
input on proposed rules before they are finalized.  During this period, the regulations carry little 
weight with courts.  When the regulations are finalized, they become tax law and are generally 
authoritative.  On occasion, however, taxpayers will argue that Final Regulations are inconsistent 
with the IRC, and sometimes courts will agree with taxpayers.  However the burden is on the 
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taxpayer to prove the regulations are inconsistent with the IRC, and such court rulings are not 
frequent. 
In January, 2009 the Treasury Department issued new rules defining its Investor Model, which 
govern IP valuation in a Cost Sharing Agreement.  The rules were simultaneously issued as 
Temporary and Proposed Regulations.  Hoffman, Raabe, Smith and Maloney (2008) write: 
“Sometimes the Treasury Department issues Temporary Regulations relating to matters where 
immediate guidance is critical” (p. 1-22).  They state: “Temporary Regulations have the same 
authoritative value as final Regulations and may be cited as precedent for three years.  
Temporary Regulations must also be issued as Proposed Regulations and automatically expire 
within three years after the date of issuance.  Temporary Regulations and the simultaneously 
issued Proposed Regulations carry more weight than traditional Proposed Regulations” (p. 1-22).  
The Treasury Department’s action in releasing the new rules as both Temporary and Proposed 
Regulations indicates it believes this is an important issue.  To distinguish them from other 
regulations, I will consistently refer to the January, 2009 regulations as Temporary Regulations, 
though they were released as both Temporary and Proposed Regulations.   
 
The Temporary Regulations replace Proposed Regulations governing CSAs, which were released 
in October, 2005.  The IRS Investor Model was first explained in the Proposed Regulations.    
The 2009 Temporary Regulations are similar to the 2005 Proposed Regulations, and explain six 
ways to value intangible property contributions to a CSA.  However, in response to taxpayer 
feedback, the Treasury Department modified and relaxed the regulations in a number of ways, 
which will be explained in this paper.  The 2009 Proposed Regulations now supplement the prior 
regulations that controlled CSAs, which were first released in the 1995.  I will refer to these rules 
as the 1995 Regulations. 
1995 Regulations 
When U.S. transfer pricing regulations were released in 1968, they included minimal taxpayer 
guidance concerning how firms could structure and value intangible property contributions to 
CSAs.  The first cost sharing regulations were released in 1995, and were effective as of January 
1, 1996.  The key features of CSAs described in the following paragraphs are still Treasury 
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Regulations, and they have not been modified by the Investor Model.  They describe the legal 
and organizational requirements that govern CSAs.  The Investor Model specifically addresses 
how intangible property should be valued within CSAs.  The new regulations also include 
additional organizational requirements intended to support Investor Model enforcement.    
 
As mentioned, a CSA is a contract between two or more parties to share the costs of developing 
intangible property.  In IRS qualified CSAs, costs are to be allocated in proportion to the benefits 
each participant expects to receive from the agreement.  IRS qualified requirements include two 
or more participants, a way for participants to share costs based on anticipated benefits, a process 
for making financial adjustments to the CSA, and documentation of the agreement.119  The 
participants share the costs of developing intangible property.  However they profit separately 
from the intellectual property created.    
 
Intangible development costs should include all operating expenses, and an arm’s length charge 
for property made available to the CSA.120   However there were conflicting views concerning 
whether certain costs, such as the value of stock options, should be shared in qualified CSAs.  
Many firms did not include stock option costs in CSAs, so the 1995 Regulations were modified 
in 2003 to state specifically that the value of stock-based compensation, such as stock options, 
must be included in the CSA.121  Stock option costs were litigated in a recent case, Xilinx Inc. v. 
Commissioner, which will be discussed later in this paper.122 
 
According to the 1995 Regulations, costs must be shared in proportion with “Reasonably 
Anticipated Benefits.”123  Reasonably Anticipated Benefits (RABs) are defined as “the aggregate 
benefits that (the controlled taxpayer) reasonably anticipates it will derive from covered 
                                                                
119 Reg. §1.482-7(b)(1)-(4) 
120 Reg. §1.482-7(d)(1)  
121 Reg. §1.482-7(d)(2)(i) 
122 Xilinx Inc. v. Commissioner, 598 F. 3d 1191, 9th Cir. (March 22, 2010). 
123 Reg. §1.482-7(f)(1) 
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intangibles.”124  Benefits are “additional income generated or costs saved by the use of the 
covered intangibles.”125 The 1995 Regulations state “the most reliable estimate of Reasonably 
Anticipated Benefits” should be used to measure a participant’s share of those benefits.126   
 
Reasonably Anticipated Benefits may be measured directly or indirectly.  The regulations favor 
direct measurement of the profits earned by an intangible asset.  However it is frequently 
difficult to measure precisely the profit generated by an intangible asset.  In most cases taxpayers 
use an indirect measure of profit, such as an estimate of profit earned per unit sold, to calculate 
the profit earned from intangible property. 127   
 
Related taxpayers need to make payments to share costs proportionately with Reasonably 
Anticipated Benefits.  For example, suppose Taxpayer X expects to receive 60% of the benefits 
from the intangible assets created, and Taxpayer Y expects 40%.  X should absorb 60% of the 
costs.  If that organization locally spends $1.1M per year developing intangible assets, while 
Taxpayer Y spends $900K per year developing the same intangible assets, X needs to make a 
cost contribution of $100K to Y, to apportion costs with RABs.  Once that cost contribution is 
made, costs are apportioned with the benefits each expects to receive from the intangible 
properties created. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
124 Reg. §1.482-7(e)(2)  
125 Reg. §1.482-7(e)(1) 
126 Reg. §1.482-7(f)(3)(i) 
127 See Audit Checklist, Doc. Set Four, directing IRS examiners to test Reasonably Anticipated Benefit shares 
against actual results. 
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Table I: Cost 
Contributions 
Taxpayer X Taxpayer Y 
Local Spending $1,100,000 $900,000 
Equalizing Payment 
(Receipt) 
$100,000 ($100,000) 
Net Cost $1,200,000 $800,000 
Reasonably 
Anticipated Benefits 
60% 40% 
 
However once the intangible assets are created, organizations exploit the benefits of those assets 
separately.  Actual profits earned will differ from RABs.   
 
Note that in the example above I have assumed each of the parties invests resources locally to 
create the IP funded in the Cost Sharing Agreement.  However there is no requirement that 
participants actually create Intellectual Property to be a member of a CSA.  Participants in a CSA 
can essentially be passive investors in the agreement, and provide only financial resources to 
support it.  Within the tax community, organizations that contribute only cash to CSAs are called 
“cash boxes.”128  Thus an organization’s contribution to a CSA might be only the cost 
contribution. 
 
The 1995 Regulations explicitly state other participants must compensate organizations for 
intangible asset contributions to the CSA.  This compensation is known as a “buy-in” payment.  
The regulations state:  “If a controlled participant makes pre-existing intangible property in 
which it owns an interest available to other controlled participants for purposes of research and 
development in the intangible development areas under a qualified cost sharing agreement, then 
                                                                
128 See The New U.S. Cost Sharing Regulations: Past, Present, and Future, by Shapiro, Chung and Klitgaard, M. 
published by Deloitte Development, LLC.  Retrieved from http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/us_tax_costsharingregs_020209(1).pdf  on September 17, 2011. 
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each such other controlled participant must make a buy-in payment to the owner.”129  Valuing 
this buy-in payment properly is a key objective of the Investor Model. 
 
The 1995 Regulations state the buy-in payment should equal “the arm’s length charge for the use 
of the intangible under the rules of Regulations §§1.482-1 and 1.482-4 through §1.482-6, 
multiplied by the controlled participant’s share of reasonably anticipated benefits.”130  These 
payments can be one-time payments, installment payments, or royalties.131  
 
For example, suppose taxpayers X, Y and Z form a CSA.  Based upon RABs, they agree to share 
costs 40%, 35%, and 25% respectively.  Taxpayer X contributes a pre-existing intangible asset 
worth $80K to the CSA.  X should receive $48K from the other two participants.  Y needs to 
make a $28K payment (35% of $80K), and Z should make a $20K payment (25% of $80K) to 
taxpayer X.   
Table II: Buy-in 
payments 
Taxpayer X Taxpayer Y Taxpayer Z 
Value of Intangible 
Asset Contributed 
$80,000 $0 $0 
Payment Made 
(Received) 
($48,000) $28,000 $20,000 
Net Cost $32,000 $28,000 $20,000 
Reasonably 
Anticipated Benefit 
Share 
 
40% 
 
35% 
 
25% 
 
The 1995 Regulations state that if a participant “bears costs of intangible development that over 
a period of years are consistently and materially greater than its share of reasonably anticipated 
                                                                
129 Reg. §1.482-7(g)(2) 
130 Reg. §1.482-7(g)(2) 
131 Reg. §1.482-7(g)(7(i)-(iii) 
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benefits, then the district director may conclude that the economic substance of the agreement 
between the controlled participants is inconsistent with the terms of the cost sharing 
arrangement.” 132  In such cases the IRS “may disregard such terms and impute an agreement 
consistent with the controlled participant’s code of conduct, under which a controlled participant 
that bore a disproportionately greater share of costs received additional interests in covered 
intangibles.”133  In other words, the IRS can revalue the buy-in, and charge the taxpayer with 
additional taxes, interest, and sometimes penalties.  Under the prior rules a taxpayer could also 
adjust buy-ins to the CSA to align costs and benefits more accurately, based on additional 
information and experience with the agreement. 
     Concern with 1995 Regulations 
Since the 1995 Regulations were enacted IRS qualified CSAs have become more popular with 
U.S.-based MNEs.  The IRS is concerned that CSA buy-ins are under-valued by U.S. taxpayers, 
reducing U.S. tax revenue.  When the Investor Model was first proposed in 2005 an IRS 
spokesman said: “Intellectual property is a special case that may be difficult to value.  The IRS is 
concerned that intellectual property is valued according to the arm’s length standard, and actively 
audits and contests transfers that do not meet this standard.”134   As an example, the IRS sued 
Veritas, a software firm, for $2.5 billion over the value of software licenses included in a CSA 
formed with its Irish subsidiary.  The Veritas case will also be discussed later in this paper, as it 
provides important insights and precedents concerning how U.S. courts may view the Investor 
Model when IRS/taxpayer disputes are litigated.  
 
When the Investor Model was first announced in 2005, the IRS explained its rationale for the 
new rules in the regulations’ preamble.  The IRS stated: “Experience in the administration of 
existing §1.482-7 has demonstrated the need for additional regulatory guidance to improve 
compliance with, and administration of, the cost sharing rules.  In particular, there is a need for 
additional guidance regarding the external contributions for which arm’s length consideration 
                                                                
132 Reg. §1.482-7(g)(5) 
133 Ibid 
134 “Wearing of the Green:  Irish Subsidiary Lets Microsoft Slash Taxes in U.S. and Europe,”  The Wall Street 
Journal; November, 7, 2005, page 1 
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must be provided as a condition of entering into a cost sharing arrangement.”135   According to 
the IRS, the Investor Model supports the arm’s-length transfer pricing standard; it is not a 
departure from it. 
 
Tobin (2006) also said the IRS Investor Model was motivated by the perception that prior CSA 
regulations allowed taxpayers to undervalue buy-in transactions.  Tobin wrote: “The IRS has 
been especially concerned that taxpayers, through the buy-in component of CSAs, have been 
transferring intangible assets outside the United States for less than arms-length consideration” 
(p. 31).  The Tax Executives Institute (TEI) agreed this was the IRS’s concern, writing “new 
rules proceed from an assumption that taxpayers use cost sharing abusively to disguise the 
transfer of intellectual property outside the United States to an affiliate (often located in a tax 
haven) at a value substantially less than the fair market value of the property” (2005, p. 629).  
However in general TEI did not agree with the IRS’s assumption; it argued that it is inherently 
difficult to value intellectual property accurately. 
Need for an Investor Model 
The IRS believes the Investor Model is necessary based on experience administering the 1995 
Regulations. It argues CSAs are unlike any other business arrangements.  This makes it difficult 
to identify arm’s-length transfer prices, and has prompted the IRS to develop a new regulatory 
approach.  To explain the unique features of CSAs, the IRS stated in its preamble to the 2005 
Proposed Regulations:   
 
“This guidance is necessary because of the fundamental differences in cost sharing 
arrangements between related parties as compared to any superficially similar 
arrangements that are entered into between unrelated parties.  Such other arrangements 
typically involve a materially different division of costs, risks, and benefits than in cost 
sharing arrangements under the regulations.  For example, other arrangements may 
contemplate joint, rather than separate, exploitation of results, or may tie the division of 
actual results to the magnitude of each party’s contributions (for example, by way of 
                                                                
135 Preamble to Proposed Regulations, 70 Fed. Reg. 51115, page 5, August 29, 2005.  
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preferential returns).  Those types of arrangements are not analogous to a cost sharing 
arrangement in which the controlled participants divide contributions in accordance with 
Reasonably Anticipated Benefits from separate exploitation of the resulting 
intangibles.”136  
 
The IRS also believes it lacks information available to the taxpayer, which puts it in a difficult 
position.  The IRS says it faces “an asymmetry of information vis-à-vis the taxpayer.  The 
taxpayer is in the best position to know its business and prospects.  The Commissioner faces real 
challenges in ascertaining the reliability of the ex ante expectations of taxpayer’s initial 
arrangements in light of significantly different ex post outcomes…” 137  Lacking accurate 
information concerning an investment’s prospects, it may appear to the IRS a taxpayer has 
structured an appropriate arm’s-length buy-in.  Years later, it may become apparent the price 
paid was far too low.  After the fact it may be impossible for the IRS to go back and revalue a 
CSA buy-in, as the statute of limitations expires three years after a tax return is filed, unless the 
IRS and taxpayer to keep a return open for review. 
 
Thus the IRS proposed its Investor Model to value intangible property.   While the Investor 
Model has many features, two concepts are central to it.  One is that investors explicitly consider 
both risk and return when making investments.  Thus safer investments merit lower returns, and 
riskier investments warrant higher returns.  When making investments, businesses and 
individuals generally look at their available options to determine where they can earn the best 
risk-adjusted returns.  Second, investors consider the time value of money when making 
investments.  Thus related organizations investing in a CSA should use these same principles.  
The preamble to the 2005 Proposed Regulations stated:  “Under this model, each controlled 
participant may be viewed as making an aggregate investment, attributable to both cost 
contributions (ongoing share of intangible development costs) and external contributions (the 
preexisting advantages which the parties bring into the arrangement)…In this regard, valuations 
                                                                
136 Preamble to Proposed Regulations, 70 Fed. Reg. 51115, Section A.  Published in Federal Register August 29, 
2005.  
137 Preamble to Proposed Regulations, 70 Fed. Reg. 51115, Section E-3. Published in Federal Register August 29, 
2005 
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are not appropriate if an investor would not undertake to invest in the arrangement because its 
total anticipated return is less than the total anticipated return that could have been achieved 
through an alternative investment that is realistically available to it.” 138  Further, the preamble 
states:  “The proposed regulations recognize that there may be different risks, and hence, 
different discount rates associated with different activities undertaken by a taxpayer.  Consistent 
with the investor model, for items relating to a CSA, the discount rate employed should be that 
which most appropriately reflects…the risks of development and exploitation of the intangibles 
anticipated to result from the CSA” 139 
The Investor Model 
The Investor Model’s key objective is valuing intangible assets accurately.  Introducing the 
Investor Model, the IRS stated in the 2005 Preamble to its Proposed Regulations:   
“Under the (investor) model, each controlled participant may be viewed as making an 
aggregate investment, attributable to both cost contributions (ongoing share of intangible 
development costs) and external contributions (the preexisting advantages which the 
parties bring to the arrangement), for purposes of achieving an anticipated return 
appropriate to the risks of the cost sharing arrangement over the term of the development 
and exploitation of the intangibles resulting from the arrangement.  In particular, the 
investor model frames the guidance in the proposed regulations for valuing the external 
contributions that parties at arm’s length would not invest, along with their ongoing cost 
contributions, in the absence of an appropriate reward.  In this regard, valuations are not 
appropriate if an investor would not undertake to invest in the arrangement because its 
total anticipated rate of return is less than the total anticipated return that could have been 
achieved through an alternative investment that is realistically available to it.” 140 
 
The IRS proposes six methods to value intellectual property contributions, all supporting its 
Investor Model.  Three of the methods are new:  the Income Method, the Acquisition Price 
Method, and the Market Capitalization Method.  The Residual Profit Split Method is retained; 
however changes are proposed to make it consistent with the Investor Model.  The regulations 
                                                                
138 Preamble to Proposed Regulations, 70 Fed. Reg. 51115, Section A.  Published in Federal Register on August 29, 
2005. 
139 Preamble to Proposed Regulations, 70 Fed. Reg. 5116, Section C(2)(f).  Published in Federal Register on August 
29, 2005. 
140 Preamble to Proposed Regulations, 70 Fed. Reg. 51115, page 7, August 29, 2005. 
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preserve the Comparable Uncontrolled Transaction (CUT) method, although the IRS does not 
believe it should be used frequently.  Finally, a sixth unspecified method is permitted by the IRS, 
but it must be consistent with Investor Model principles.  This allows taxpayers to create their 
own methodology, if they believe it is the best method to value intangible assets.  Note that all 
six methods were defined in both the 2005 Proposed and 2009 Temporary Regulations, and are 
very similar in both sets of regulations.  In some cases, modifications were made to the 2009 
Temporary Regulations, based on feedback from tax professionals. 
 
The “best method rule” states taxpayers should select a method that best reflects the arm’s-length 
standard, based on facts and circumstances.  The 2005 Proposed Regulations identified a number 
of ways in which intangible asset transfers could be valued, and the number of examples 
generated confusion concerning which method should be used in certain circumstances.  The 
2009 Temporary Regulations attempt to clarify this by stating the new rules: “clarify that these 
principles were intended to provide supplementary guidance on the application of the best 
method rule to determine which method, or application of a method, provides the most reliable 
measure of an arm’s length result in the CSA context.  In other words, the principles provide best 
method considerations to aid the competitive evaluation of methods or applications, and are not 
themselves methods or trumping rules.”141 
   
There is an overriding valuation investor model principle, applicable to all methods.  The 
Proposed Regulations state:  “The valuation of the amount charged in a PCT (buy-in) must be 
consistent with the assumption that, as of the date of the PCT, each controlled participant’s 
aggregate net investment in developing cost shared intangibles pursuant to the CSA, attributable 
to both external contributions and cost contributions, is reasonably anticipated to earn a rate of 
return equal to the appropriate discount rate…over the entire period of developing and exploiting 
the cost shared intangibles.” 142   In other words, taxpayers should plan to earn a risk adjusted 
rate of return.  The 2009 Temporary Regulations support this approach, and state in that 
                                                                
141 Preamble to Temporary Regulations, 74 Fed. Reg.,, No. 2, p. 343, January 5, 2009. 
142 Prop. Regs. §1.482-7(g)(2)(viii) 
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preamble:  “The investor model is a core principle of the 2005 proposed regulations…(a CSA 
participant) is investing for the term of the CSA Activity and expects returns over time consistent 
with the riskiness of that investment.”143 
 
The Treasury Department has also indicated it may be open to taxing cash flow, rather than 
income.  On the one hand, Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) analysis has generally proposed that 
investors should focus on cash flow, not income, when making investment decisions.  But U.S. 
tax laws have not generally taxed cash flow, so making this change would be a significant 
departure from existing rules and years of legal precedents.  In addition, the IRS seems to doubt 
whether it can make this change and comply with the “commensurate with income” standard 
stated in IRC 482.  The preamble to the Temporary Regulations states: “The Treasury 
Department and the IRS continue to consider, and solicit comments, on whether and how the 
cost sharing rules could reliably be administered on the basis of cash flows instead of operating 
income, and whether such a basis is consistent with the second section of 482 and its CWI 
(commensurate with income) standard.”144 Beyond stating it is willing to consider taxing cash 
flow, the regulations show no indication the IRS has given much thought to making this change, 
which may suggest it considers this issue to be a low priority, at least for now. 
 
Taxpayers must also comply with IRS documentation regulations to qualify for a safe harbor.  
During the life of the CSA, the taxpayer is responsible for updating and monitoring results, 
calculating returns earned by CSA participants, and providing that information to the IRS when 
it is requested.   
Key Regulatory Changes in the Investor Model 
One of the IRS’s responsibilities is to collect taxes due to U.S. government, consistent with U.S. 
tax law.  As mentioned, the IRS believes taxpayers have structured CSAs that do not properly 
value the intellectual property contributed to CSAs.  Thus, the Treasury Department has 
developed a model which, in its view, will value those assets more accurately.  As a result, the 
                                                                
143 Preamble to Temporary Regulations, 74 Fed. Reg., No. 2, p. 343, January 5, 2009. 
144 Ibid, p. 344. 
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IRS has implemented a number of important changes to CSAs, which it believes will support 
arm’s length valuation. 
 
In the Investor Model, CSA participants must obtain permanent rights to use the intellectual 
property rights contributed in a CSA.  In contrast, the 1995 CSA regulations did not require 
permanent IP transfers.  Using the 1995 rules, CSA participants imposed time limitations on 
intellectual property transfers, and argued this reduced their value.  As the preamble to the 2005 
Proposed Regulations stated the IRS needed to make this change: 
“in response to arguments that have been encountered in the examination experience of 
the IRS under existing regulations.  In numerous situations taxpayers have purported to 
confer only limited availability of resources or capabilities for purposes of the intangible 
development activity (IDA) under a CSA.  An example is a short-term license of an 
existing technology.  Under the existing regulations, such cases may, of course, be 
examined to assess whether the purported limitations conform to economic substance and 
the parties’ conduct…In addition, even if short-term licenses were respected, the 
continued availability of the contribution past the initial license term would require new 
license terms to be negotiated taking into account relevant factors, such as whether the 
likelihood of success of the IDA had materially changed in the interim.  The proposed 
regulations address the problems administering such approaches more directly by 
requiring an upfront valuation of all external contributions which would be more difficult 
to calculate if it involved the valuation of a series of short-term licenses with terms 
contingent on such interim changes.  Accordingly, the proposed regulations assume a 
reference transaction that does not allow for contingencies based on the expiration of 
short-term licenses that might require further renegotiation of the compensation for the 
external contribution.” 145 
 
In other words, the intellectual property transfers must be permanent.  Taxpayers cannot reduce 
the buy-ins by limiting license duration.   The 2009 Temporary Regulations continued to require 
permanent intangible asset contributions to a CSA.146  However the Temporary Regulations have 
adopted new terminology.  The Temporary Regulations use the term “platform contribution” to 
describe a contribution of intangible property to CSAs, replacing the “reference transaction” 
                                                                
145 Preamble to Proposed Regulations, 70 Fed. Reg. 51115, pages 18-19 August 29, 2005. 
146 Regulation 1.482-7T(b)(4)(i-iii) 
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term used previously.147  When intangible property is contributed to a CSA, it is now called a 
Platform Contribution Transaction (PCT) which requires compensation. 
 
The 2009 Temporary Regulations require CSA participants divide their markets into permanent, 
exclusive, and non-overlapping markets.  The 1995 Regulations did not impose such a 
requirement.  Kochman (2005) wrote, “The IRS apparently believes that separate exploitation is 
not possible without exclusive rights, and without separate exploitation reasonably anticipated 
benefits cannot be estimated” (p. 3).  In other words, dividing markets enables the IRS to 
evaluate buy-in valuations, since it makes it possible to determine the market size each CSA 
participant serves.  This enables calculation of the buy-in.  However in response to taxpayer 
feedback, the 2009 Temporary Regulations permit CSA participants more flexibility when 
dividing markets than did the 2005 Proposed Regulations.  The Proposed Regulations would 
have required CSA participants to divide their markets into non-overlapping geographic 
territories.  The Temporary Regulations still require CSA participants divide their markets into 
permanent and exclusive markets, but they no longer require firms to divide markets 
geographically.  The 2009 Temporary Regulations state: “To provide taxpayers with more 
flexibility in designing qualifying divisional interests, the temporary regulations permit use of a 
new basis—the field of use division of interests—in addition to the territorial basis.”148   For 
example, this would allow CSA participants to allocate markets based on distribution channel.  
One CSA participant might sell its products to distributors, while another might sell products 
online through a website.  In this respect, the 2009 Temporary Regulations are more flexible than 
the 2005 Proposed Regulations. 
  
The Investor Model grants the IRS the sole right to make adjustments to the CSA, to align costs 
with benefits.   When a controlled participant’s profits fall outside an acceptable range 
determined by IRS, it is empowered to change the agreements, but taxpayers cannot do the same.  
In the preamble to the 2005 Proposed Regulations the IRS writes: “Because the guidance on 
periodic adjustments is intended to address the problem of information asymmetry, and because 
                                                                
147 Preamble to Temporary Regulations, Vol. 74, No. 2, p. 342, January 5, 2009. 
148 Preamble to Temporary Regulations, Vol. 74, No. 2, p. 341, January 5, 2009. 
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it is exceeding unlikely that a taxpayer would use information asymmetry for anything other than 
a tax-advantaged result, periodic adjustments of this type can only be exercised by the 
Commissioner.”149   These adjustments can include adding to or removing costs from the CSAs’ 
Intangible Development Costs, changing shares for the CSA participants, or assigning 
unallocated territorial interests to participants.  In the preamble to the 2009 Temporary 
Regulations, the IRS acknowledged that a number of taxpayers believed this was inherently 
unfair, and they argued taxpayers should also have the right to make adjustments based on actual 
history.150  However the IRS has maintained its position in the Temporary Regulations, and the 
regulations give the IRS the sole authority to make changes to CSAs based on actual 
performance.  It argues this was Congress’s intent when the commensurate with income standard 
was developed.  However, others disagree with the IRS position.  Bhasin (2009) writes: “The 
regulations reaffirm the use of asymmetric periodic adjustment.  That is, when a U.S. parent 
company sells the rights to certain intangibles to its foreign subsidiary, the IRS will make an 
adjustment only if the buy-in payment from the foreign subsidiary is low.  No adjustment would 
be made if the foreign subsidiary overpays for the rights to the rights to these intangibles” (pp. 1-
2).  Further, Kirschenbaum and Rahim (2005) believe the IRS’s position may not be sustained in 
court.  They write that an existing regulation “clearly grants taxpayers the discretion to adjust 
their financial statement results in a timely filed return if necessary to achieve an arm’s length 
outcome.”   They add: “The proposed regulations’ ill-conceived attempt to tip the 
commensurate-with-income scales should be reversed, and if it is not removed from the final 
regulations, the authors fully expect it to be unceremoniously rejected by a reviewing court.” (p. 
436).  It is possible this disagreement will be litigated in the future.   
 
The 2009 Temporary Regulations make several important changes and improvements to the 
2005 Proposed Regulations.  The 2005 Proposed Regulations essentially assumed that 
contributions of intellectual property to a CSA had an unlimited life, and could contribute to 
profits indefinitely into the future.  For example, the 2005 Proposed Regulations stated investor 
model valuation extends “over the entire period of developing and exploiting the cost shared 
                                                                
149 Preamble to Proposed Regulations, 70 Fed. Reg. 51115, page 58, August 29, 2005.  
150 Preamble to Temporary Regulations, Vol. 74, No. 2,. p. 347, January 5, 2009. 
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intangibles.”151  Technologically advanced products often lead to enhanced and improved 
versions.  When the intangible assets lead to development of further intangibles “then the period 
in the preceding sentence includes the period of developing and exploiting such indirectly 
benefited intangibles.”152  Given that one product frequently leads to further versions, under the 
Proposed Regulations it is possible the benefits would have extended indefinitely into the future, 
conceivably in perpetuity.   
 
In the 2009 Temporary Regulations the IRS modified its position, and acknowledged that at least 
in some circumstances, intangible assets have a finite useful life.  The Preamble to the 2009 
Temporary Regulations states: “It may be, depending upon facts and circumstances, that the 
technology is reasonably expected to achieve an incremental improvement in results for only a 
finite period (after which period results are reasonably anticipated to return to the levels that 
would otherwise have been expected absent the investment).  The period of enhanced results that 
justifies the platform investment in such circumstances effectively would correspond to a finite, 
not a perpetual life.”153  Similarly, in one example in the Temporary Regulations, the IRS gives 
an example of an intangible asset that has a useful life of three years.  When describing the 
contribution of a certain software product, ABC, the Temporary Regulation states: “The current 
version of ABC has an expected product life of three years,”154 and the compensation for the 
contribution of that asset terminates after three years.  But note, the IRS has not agreed intangible 
assets have finite lives in all circumstances.  It has only agreed that in certain cases certain 
intangible assets have limited lives.  So in some ways the 2009 Proposed Treasury Regulations 
are a step forward, but much depends upon how the IRS enforces its rules, and there is no 
assurance it will generally concede that intangible assets have limited lives.  In fact, the IRS 
argued for perpetual life of intangibles in the Veritas case, which was decided after the release of 
the Treasury Regulations cited above.  That case will be discussed in more detail later in this 
paper.  
 
                                                                
151 Prop. Regs. §1.482-7(g)(8)(viii)(A) 
152 Ibid 
153 Preamble to Temporary Regulations, 74 Fed. Reg., Section C-3. 
154 Treas. Reg §1.482-7T(c)(4)(ii) 
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Similarly, the 2009 Temporary Regulations improve the 2005 Proposed Regulations by allowing 
firms to employ declining royalty rates to compensate an intangible property contributor.  The 
2005 Proposed Regulations specifically stated declining royalty rates could not be used.  In those 
regulations it was assumed that since once product version led to further versions, the original 
intellectual property contribution had permanent value.  At the time these Proposed Regulations 
were released, I argued this placed excessive value on the original intellectual property, and too 
little on subsequent improvements.  The 2009 Temporary Regulations replace these unrealistic 
assumptions with more balanced ones, and thus are an improvement.  For example, in one 
example the Temporary Regulations provide an example that says: “The current version of ABC 
has an expected product life of three years.  P and S enter into a contingent payment agreement 
to cover both the PCT Payments due from S for P’s platform contribution and payments due 
from S for the make or sell license.  Based on the uncontrolled make or sell licenses, P and S 
agree on a sales-based royalty rate of 20% in Year 1 that declines on straight line basis to 0% 
over the 3 year product life of ABC.”155  This assumption is more reasonable, and was also 
supported by the Tax Court in the Veritas case.  
 
In addition, the 2009 Temporary Cost Sharing Regulations make it clear that intangible assets are 
created during the period of the CSA.  The 2005 Proposed Regulations essentially assumed that 
valuable intangible assets were created only before the CSA formation, and they limited the 
reward to organizations that did not contribute pre-existing intangible assets to the CSA.  When I 
first reviewed the 2005 Proposed Cost Sharing Regulations, I thought they assigned too much 
value to intangible assets created before a CSA was formed.  I believed they did not recognize 
the purpose of a CSA was to fund the development of new intellectual property.  The 2009 
Temporary Regulations correct this, stating: “A platform contribution is any resource, capability, 
or right that a controlled participant has developed, maintained, or acquired externally to the 
intangible development activity (whether prior to or during the course of the CSA) that is 
reasonably anticipated to contribute to developing cost shared intangibles.”156  Thus the new 
                                                                
155 Reg. §1.482-7T(c)(4)(ii)  
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regulations specifically state intangible assets contributed to a CSA during the agreement is a 
platform contribution, which is an improvement. 
Reactions to Investor Model 
When the 2005 Proposed Regulations were released, many tax practitioners and analysts were 
very critical of them.  They were criticized as unclear, overly complex, and they placed a large 
administrative burden on firms.  At that time Tobin (2006) said “For the most part, these changes 
are not for the better” (p. 31).  Kochman (2005) said: “in trying to guard against bargain transfers 
of existing intangibles, the proposal would put huge upfront burdens on participants” (p. 11).  
Others argued that they were in conflict with the arm’s length standard.  For example, 
Kirschenbaum and Rahim (2005) wrote of the Investor Model:  “But it is a substantial departure 
from well-entrenched global transfer pricing principles set forth the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and 
also in other provisions of the Section 482 regulations embodying the arm’s length standard.  By 
relegating cost sharing participants to a fixed and determinable (albeit risk-adjusted) financing 
return, the proposed regulations deny taxpayers the right to structure their transactions as they 
see fit (provided that the allocation of risk was made at a time when the results of the 
undertaking are not known or knowable).  This violates a fundamental tenet of tax law first 
articulated by Judge Learned Hand in Helvering v. Gregory: ‘Anyone may so arrange his affairs 
that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best 
pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes’” (p. 2).    Similarly, 
Naegele (2010) wrote:  “The 2005 Proposed Regulations, which are the foundation for the 2009 
Temporary Regulations, significantly changed all prior sets of cost sharing Regulations, were 
extremely restrictive, and received substantial criticism when originally issued.  The main reason 
was they actually diverged from the arms-length standard” (p. 33).  In short, the 2005 Proposed 
Regulations were severely criticized. 
 
The reaction to the 2009 Temporary Regulations has been more muted.  This does not mean that 
analysts now support the Investor Model.  But in general analysts appear to believe Temporary 
Regulations are a step in the right direction.  Wood (2010) said “the IRS made some welcome 
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revisions to the more arbitrary limitations initially proposed” (p. 81).  Kochman (2009) writes:  
“The Temporary Regulations retain key concepts and methods of the Proposed Regulations but 
incorporate a number of taxpayer-friendly technical changes in response to the many comments 
received by the IRS.  The taxpayer/practitioner response has been relatively benign as compared 
to that to the Proposed Regulations, with only a handful of comments submitted to the IRS and 
three parties testifying at the April 21, 2009, hearings on the regulations.  Unlike the response to 
the Proposed Regulations, no one has challenged the general approach of the regulations.  
Instead, commentators have proposed additional technical changes to the rules” (p.556).  
Shapiro, Chung and Klitgaard (2009) wrote: “The mostly technical changes in the temporary 
regulations are generally favorable to taxpayers, with the exception of the commensurate with 
income trigger” (p. 1).  And Keates, Muyelle and Wright (2009) said:  “The 2008 Regulations 
modify the 2005 Regulations only slightly, but these regulations have significant implication for 
other long-term intangibles and services transactions between US and non-US related entities” 
(p. 166).  While these changes are considered improvements, many still have fundamental 
disagreements with the Investor Model.  For example, the director of transfer pricing at Ernst and 
Young, David Canale, said that while the changes were positive, the Temporary Regulations are 
still very restrictive, and will make it much less likely firms will want to engage in CSAs (Nadal, 
2009, p. 111).  
Income Method 
As mentioned, the IRS identifies six acceptable Investor Model methods, one of which is 
unspecified.  One is the Income Method, which should be used when only one CSA participant 
contributes pre-existing intellectual property to the CSA.  To determine the value of a CSA buy-
in, the participants need to evaluate the value of realistic alternatives to the CSA.  The preamble 
to the 2009 Temporary Regulations states: “Under the general rule, the arm’s length charge was 
an amount that equated a controlled participant’s present value of entering into a CSA with the 
present value of the controlled participant’s best realistic alternative.”157  
 
 
                                                                
157 Preamble to Temporary Regulations, 74 Fed. Reg., No.2, p. 345, January 5, 2009. 
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The regulations propose two ways the Income Method can be applied.  One focuses upon the 
realistic alternatives available to the organization not transferring intellectual property to the 
CSA, known as the PCT Payor.  The second focuses upon options available to the organization 
transferring intellectual property to the CSA, called the PCT Payee.  The preamble to the 2009 
Temporary Regulations states: “In general, they provide that the best realistic alternative of the 
PCT Payor to entering into a CSA would be to license intangibles to be developed by an 
uncontrolled licensor that undertakes the commitment to bear the entire risk of intangible 
development that would otherwise have been shared under the CSA.  Similarly, the best realistic 
alternative of the PCT Payee to entering into the CSA would be to undertake the commitment to 
bear the entire risk of intangible development that would otherwise have been shared under the 
CSA and license the resulting intangibles to an uncontrolled licensee.”158  In short, the Payor 
should value the option of licensing another organization’s products.  The Payee should value the 
option of exploiting the intangible itself, without licensing it to another organization. 
 
For example, suppose a MNE invests in a new technology.  In one scenario the U.S. parent funds 
the investment itself and is the sole intellectual property owner.  It could exploit the technology 
abroad by licensing the technology to overseas subsidiaries.  The present value of this investment 
is $100M.  As an alternative, it could form a CSA with an overseas subsidiary.  In this option, 
the domestic parent owns the U.S. market, the subsidiary owns all other markets, and the 
intellectual property is owned jointly.  If the present value of income in the US market is $60M, 
then it should receive $40M from the overseas subsidiary.  In the IRS’s view, a rational investor 
would demand the same profit, discounted to present value, with or without the CSA.  In the 
following example the Payor funds the licensing activity through a royalty levied on sales, 
though it could be funded in other ways, such as an upfront payment. 
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Table III:  Income 
Method PCT Payee 
Option 1:  Exploit 
WW through 
licensing (no CSA) 
Option 2:  CSA—
value of US market 
Option 2:  CSA—value 
of international markets 
(excludes US) 
Present Value of 
Total Profits 
$100M $60M  
Sales   $100M 
Royalty Rate   40% 
(Payment) Receipt  $40M ($40M) 
Present Value of Total 
Profits (PVTP) 
$100M $100M  
 
The U.S. parent effectively earns the same profit despite under either scenario.  But note these 
are discounted profits.  The PCT Payor earns the discount rate, so its PVTP is zero. 
 
As mentioned, under the Income Method firms can also evaluate realistic alternatives available 
to the organization not contributing pre-existing intellectual property to the CSA.  This is the 
PCT Payor.  In the following example, a pharmaceutical company is developing a new vaccine.  
In Year 1, the US parent (USP) and a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary, FS, structure a CSA to 
complete development of the vaccine.  USP contributes a partially-developed vaccine and an 
experienced R&D team to the CSA, which are external contributions to the CSA.  FS makes no 
such contributions to the CSA.  FS invests in the CSA, but contributes no intangible assets to the 
CSA.  The total cost of completing the vaccine is estimated to be $100 million, in year one 
dollars.   USP and FS each have total projected sales of $100 million, in year one dollars.  
Accordingly, the two organizations share development costs equally. 
 
FS profits from sales made in territories allocated to it.  Its territorial operating profits are 
projected to be $80 million, generated by $100 million in sales minus $20 million in expenses.  
Its share of development costs ($50M) reduces total profits to $30 million.  To compensate USP, 
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FS needs to pay $30 million to USP.  This could be a lump sum payment, or a royalty based on 
sales or profits.   
 
Table IV: Income Method, 
PCT Payor 
US Parent (USP) Foreign Subsidiary 
Estimated Territorial 
Operating Profits  
Unlimited $80M 
Development Costs $50M $50M 
Profit Net of Development 
Costs 
-- $30M 
Payment Received (Paid) $30M ($30M) 
Present Value of Total Profits Territorial Profits plus $30M -0- 
 
In the above scenario, the Present Value of Total Profits for FS equal zero.  But note, from a 
financial accounting perspective, it is allowed to earn the discount rate on its investment. This 
makes determination of the discount rate extremely important.  However if there are any 
extraordinary profits earned on this investment, they belong to USP, since it was the organization 
that contributed intangible assets to the CSA. 
 
Thus the Temporary Regulations identify two ways in which the Income Method can be applied, 
and the “best method rule” determines which approach should be employed.159  The Temporary 
Regulations state:  “Thus, comparability and the quality of data, the reliability of the 
assumptions, and the sensitivity of the results to possible deficiencies in the data and 
assumptions, must be considered in determining whether this method provides the most reliable 
measure of an arm’s length result.”160 
                                                                
159 Treas. Reg. §1.482-1(c) 
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The 2005 Proposed Regulations were criticized by some tax professionals, since they seemed to 
suggest the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) was the preferred discount rate to 
employ.  Kochman (2009) writes: “The discount rate guidance in the Proposed Regulations was 
interpreted as implying a strong preference for a company’s WACC.  The Temporary 
Regulations clarify that discount rates should be determined based on market conditions and may 
differ among a company’s various activities and transactions.  Different risk profiles for various 
realistic alternatives may lead to different discount rates, as might the form of payment in a 
PCT” (p. 560).   
 
Critics argued that the risk of a particular project could be very different from the firm’s WACC, 
which is undoubtedly true.  The 2009 Temporary Regulations provide more flexibility 
concerning how firms should determine an appropriate discount rate.  The 2009 Preamble 
explains investors ultimately look for the highest after-tax rate of return, but payments are 
generally made in pre-tax dollars.161  The Temporary Regulations do not emphasize using the 
WACC.  The 2009 Temporary Regulations also state:  “a discount rate or rates should be used 
that most reliably reflect the market correlated risks of activities or transactions and should be 
applied to the best estimate of the relevant projected results…”162 In short, firms should use a 
discount rate that reflects that that particular investment’s risk, not the firm’s WACC.  The 
discount rate should reflect the level of risk each CSA participant assumes.  The Temporary 
Regulations state: “In some circumstances, a party may have less risk as a licensee of intangibles 
needed in its operations, and so require a lower discount rate, than it would have by entering into 
a CSA to develop such intangibles, which may involve the party’s assumption of addition risk in 
funding its cost contributions”163 to the development of intangibles.  The discount rate should 
also be adjusted for differences in the risk of how payments are made.  For example, the 
Temporary Regulations state that a royalty based on profit is riskier than a royalty based on 
revenue, so the discount rate should reflect this risk.164 
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The additional guidance on discount rates is in some ways an improvement over the 2005 
Proposed Regulations.  All of the above suggestions are reasonable and consistent with the 
general principle that risk and reward must be correlated.  Nonetheless, they don’t provide much 
specific guidance concerning how a discount rate should be determined.  They also add 
complexity to the process of determining an appropriate discount rate, and are likely to increase 
IRS/taxpayer disputes over the discount rate.     In the Veritas case that firm and the IRS reached 
widely different conclusions concerning the correct discount rate, and these disputes are likely to 
continue given the lack of specific direction in the 2009 Temporary Regulations. 
 
Acquisition Price Method 
A merger triggers the Acquisition Price method.  After the acquisition the assets of the acquired 
firm need to be revalued.  The difference between the acquisition price and the value of the 
firm’s individual assets is unassigned, and according to the proposed regulations, this is the 
intellectual property value, unless the firm can demonstrate otherwise.  If the acquired firm joins 
the CSA, this unassigned value is that firm’s external contribution to the CSA.  The firm must 
contribute substantially all of the acquired company’s intellectual property to use this method. 
 
To determine the intellectual property value, the firm must first calculate an “adjusted acquisition 
price.”  The regulations state this is “the acquisition price of the target increased by the value of 
the target’s liabilities on the date of the acquisition, other than liabilities not assumed in the case 
of an asset purchase, and decreased by the value of the target’s tangible property on that date and 
by the value on that date of any other resources and capabilities not covered by a PCT or group 
of PCTs.”165  Once the adjusted acquisition price is determined, the buy-in can be calculated.  
 
For example, suppose a U.S. parent corporation, known as USP, organizes a CSA with an 
overseas subsidiary, FS, to produce Product Y.  Based upon Reasonably Anticipated Benefits, 
the two organizations share costs 50/50.  In the year following the CSA’s inception, USP buys 
                                                                
165 Treas. Reg.. §1.482-7T(g)(5)(iii) 
232 
 
another U.S.-based firm, Company X for $100 million.  Company X’s resources consist of its 
workforce, patents and technology intangibles, and tangible property.  USP and Company X file 
a consolidated tax return, so they are treated as one taxpayer.  The resources of Company X are 
contributed to the CSA.  It has $20M in land and $10M in liabilities not contributed to the CSA.  
Under the Acquisition Price method the intellectual property value is $90 million (the $100 
million purchase price, plus the $10M in liabilities, and less $20 million in net assets not 
contributed to the CSA).  As FS expects to realize 50% of RABs, it bears 50% of CSA costs, and 
it should make a $45M payment to USP to compensate it for Company X’s external 
contributions. 
 
Table V: Acquisition 
Price Method 
US Parent (USP) Company X Foreign Subsidiary 
(FS) 
Cost Sharing % 50%  50% 
X’s Acquisition Price $100M   
Net Value of Property 
not contributed to the 
CSA 
 $10M ($20M in assets 
less $10M in 
liabilities not 
contributed to CSA) 
 
Value of Intangible 
Property contributed 
to CSA 
 $90M  
Buy-in Received 
(Paid) 
$45M  ($45M) 
50% of $90M 
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Market Capitalization Method 
The Market Capitalization Method is very similar to the Acquisition Price Method.  However the 
firm’s intellectual property value is determined by the market value of the business, as 
determined by securities markets.  As a result, this method can only be used when one of the 
participants is publicly traded.  Taxpayers use this method when they contribute substantially all 
the firm’s IP to the CSA, as in the Acquisition Price Method.  There is nothing in the regulations 
that states the Market Capitalization Method must be used if a firm is public, but it would be 
relatively easy to defend this as the best method available.  The acquisition of a privately held 
firm would not trigger the Market Capitalization method; it would have to use the Acquisition 
Price Method.  
 
The regulations propose taxpayers use an average market capitalization, rather than the market 
value on the date of the PCT.  “The average market capitalization is the average of the daily 
market capitalizations of the PCT Payee over a period of time beginning 60 days before the date 
of the PCT and ending on the date of the PCT,” according to the regulations.166   The apparent 
purpose is to create a more stable buy-in value.  This would make it less likely a firm would 
contend that unusual stock market activity on the day of an acquisition created an anomalous 
firm value. 
Taxpayers must adjust this figure by the value of assets and liabilities not contributed to the 
CSA.  According to the proposed regulations, “The average market capitalization is the average 
market capitalization of the PCT Payee increased by the value of the PCT Payee’s liabilities on 
the date of the PCT and decreased by the value on such date of the PCT Payee’s tangible 
property and any other resources, capabilities or right of the PCT Payee not covered by a PCT or 
group of PCTs.”167  
 
The arm’s length charge for the external contributions is apportioned with Reasonably 
Anticipated Benefits.  The proposed regulations state:  “Under the market capitalization method, 
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the arm’s length charge for a PCT or group of PCTs covering resources, and rights of the PCT 
Payee is equal to the adjusted average market capitalization, as divided among the controlled 
participants according to their respective RAB shares.”168 
 
As an example, suppose USP is a publicly traded US firm, with no overseas subsidiaries.  It later 
creates a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary, FS.  USP and FS will create a new generation of 
software products, based on intellectual property owned and developed by USP.  USP 
contributes the intellectual property to the CSA.  FS contributes no intellectual property to the 
CSA.  Based on Reasonably Anticipated Benefits, USP will fund 80% of the CSA, and FS will 
fund 20%.   
 
The average market capitalization for USP is $205 million, prior to the CSA’s formation.  USP 
will not contribute $10 million in liabilities and $15 million in land to the CSA.  Using the 
Market Capitalization Method, the intellectual property contribution is $200 million ($205 
million market capitalization, plus $10 million liabilities not contributed, less $15 million in land 
not contributed to the CSA).  Therefore, FS owes a $40 million to USP.  
Table VI: Market 
Capitalization Method 
US Parent (USP) Foreign Subsidiary 
(FS) 
Cost Sharing % 80% 20% 
Market Capitalization $205M  
Net Value of Tangible 
Property not part of CSA 
$5M ($15M land less 
$10M liabilities) 
 
Value contributed to CSA $200M  
Buy-in Received 
(Payment) 
$40M ($40M) 
Net CSA cost $160M $40M 
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The Market Capitalization method could be used when a publicly held firm headquartered in the 
United States formed a CSA with a foreign subsidiary.  In addition, according to Femia and 
Kirmil (2005), “The use of the market capitalization method ordinarily is limited to cases where 
substantially all of a PCT Payee’s nonroutine contributions are covered by a PCT” (p. 460).     
Residual Profit Split Method 
As mentioned, the 2009 Temporary Regulations include a Residual Profit Split Method (RPSM) 
that is substantially different from one outlined in the 1995 Regulations.  It is limited to 
situations in which more than one CSA participant makes significant, non-routine contributions 
to intellectual property development.169  Its central concept is that the superior profits from the 
development and exploitation of intangible assets should be allocated to CSA participants 
according to each member’s relative contribution.  If one participant contributes 60% of the non-
routine value, it should receive 60% of present value of non-routine profits. 
  
The 2009 Temporary Regulations provide an example in which two CSA participants each make 
non-routine contributions to a CSA.  The two firms are the US Parent (USP) and its Foreign 
Subsidiary (FS).  USP develops the firm’s technology and markets its products in the United 
States, while FS markets products internationally. In this example, USP has partially completed 
development of extremely compact storage discs, called nanodisks.  FS “has developed 
significant marketing intangibles outside the United States in the form of customer lists, ongoing 
relations with various OEMs, and trademarks that are well recognized by customers due to a long 
history of market successful data storage devices and other hardware used in various types of 
consumer electronics”170  FS’s intangible assets contribute to the non-routine profits earned only 
in its territory; they do not contribute to non-routine profits earned in the United States. 
 
Kochman (2009) says applying the RPSM method involves three steps (p. 562).  First, the 
present value of non-routine profits for each participant is calculated.  Second, this figure needs 
to be divided among participants based on the proportion of non-routine contributions.  Third, 
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the participants make and receive payments to allocate non-routine profits according to the 
nonroutine contributions each has made.    
 
Thus to use this method the firm must distinguish between profits attributable to routine 
contributions and non-routine contributions.  An example in the regulations provides an example 
in which routine costs include the costs of distributing products to customers.  Each of the 
participants in entitled to earn an amount equal to 6% of costs incurred performing these routine 
activities, based on an analysis of what firms performing similar functions earn for such work.171    
The Temporary Regulations state:  “The present value of nonoutine divisional profit or loss 
equals the present value of the stream of the reasonably anticipated residuals over the duration of 
CSA Activity of divisional profit or loss, minus market returns for routine contributions, minus 
operating cost contributions, minus cost contributions, using a discount rate appropriate to such 
residuals…”172   
 
Kochman (2009) says: “The present value of the nonroutine residual profit or loss in each 
participant’s division is allocated among the participants in relation to their nonroutine 
contributions to the division” (p. 562).  The Temporary Regulations discount future profits at a 
rate of 17.5% rate per annum, and the present value of nonroutine profits earned in FS’s 
territories is calculated to be $1.319 billion.173 
 
Next, the firms need to allocate these profits based on the nonroutine contributions each has 
made.  The example states, “After analysis, USP and FS determine the relative value of the 
nanodisk technologies contributed by USP to CSA (giving effect only to its value in FS’s 
territory) is roughly 150% of the value of FS’s marketing intangibles (which only have value in 
FS’s territory).  Consequently, 60% of the nonroutine residual divisional profit is attributable to 
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USP’s platform contribution…”174   Thus 60% of the $1.319 billion needs to be paid to USP, and 
FS retains 40%.  This example is summarized below: 
 
Table VII: RPSM method USP FS 
Nonroutine Contribution Technology development Marketing intangibles in 
FS territories 
Return due on routine cost 
contributions 
6% of routine costs 
Return due on nonroutine 
contributions 
Profits discounted at 17.5% per annum 
Present value of nonroutine 
Profits 
US earnings are calculated 
separately 
$1.319 billion 
Value of nonroutine 
contributions in FS 
territories 
60% 40% 
Payment received (due) $791 million ($791 million) 
Profits retained US earnings plus $791 
million 
$528 million 
 
To summarize this approach, taxpayers should use the Residual Profit Split Method when two or 
more organizations make nonroutine external contribution to a CSA.  A market rate of return 
should be earned on routine contributions to the CSA.  The CSA participants allocate the 
remaining profit based on the value of intellectual property contributed.  In many cases the costs 
the costs incurred to develop those external contributions could be used to value those assets, as 
it can be difficult to determine a reliable method to value the contribution each CSA participant 
has made. 
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Comparable Uncontrolled Transaction Method 
The Comparable Uncontrolled Transaction method is retained in the Temporary Regulations.  
Taxpayers should evaluate a PCT (buy-in) “by reference to the amount charged in a comparable 
uncontrolled transaction.”175   Once that figure is determined it “must then be multiplied by each 
PCT Payor’s respective RAB share in order to determine the arm’s length PCT Payment due 
from each PCT Payor.”176  However, once again it is not expected this approach will be used 
frequently, as the IRS believes there are few, if any, business relationships comparable to a CSA.   
Therefore the IRS seems to believe it is very difficult, and perhaps impossible, to find a CUT 
that is close enough in substance to a CSA to make comparisons valid.  Thus, as we will see in 
the Veritas case, the IRS ignored CUTs identified by the taxpayer, and advocated the Income 
Method to value a PCT.   
 
While the IRS may not support CUTs, others still believe they provide valuable information.  
Keates, Muyelle and Wright (2009) write:  “The authors believe that the CUT method remains 
the best method of evaluating contributions to a cost sharing arrangement, but there is concern 
that the IRS will be aggressive in determining that CUTs do not meet the comparability standard 
and cannot be applied.  In fact, the preamble to the …Regulations states plainly that the IRS does 
not believe that unrelated third parties enter into cost sharing arrangements that are comparable 
to related party cost sharing arrangements.  The authors’ guess that companies that use the CUT 
method will likely find themselves explaining their method to a Tax Court judge” (p. 171).  The 
IRS may vigorously challenge firms that rely upon CUTs to value intangible assets. 
Unspecified Methods 
Consistent with current law, the IRS regulations permit taxpayers to adopt unspecified methods.  
However any unspecified method must be consistent with the Investor Model, and derive values 
based upon realistic alternatives available to the taxpayer. 
 
                                                                
175 Treas. Reg. §1.482-7T(g)(3) 
176 Ibid 
239 
 
The proposed regulations state:  “Consistent with the specified methods, an unspecified method 
should take into account the general principle that uncontrolled taxpayers evaluate the terms of a 
transaction by considering the realistic alternatives to that transaction, and only enter into a 
particular transaction if none of the alternatives is preferable to it.  Therefore, in establishing 
whether a PCT achieved an arm’s length result, an unspecified method should provide 
information on the prices or profits that the controlled participant could have realized by 
choosing a realistic alternative to the CSA.” 177  
CSA Adjustments based on Actual Returns 
As mentioned, the 2009 Temporary Regulations authorize the IRS to make financial adjustments 
to CSAs when the returns fall outside parameters it has established. Taxpayers are not permitted 
to make adjustments to CSAs after the fact.  The 2009 Temporary Regulations have narrowed 
the “safe harbor” proposed in the 2005 Regulations.  This is one area in which Temporary 
Regulations are more restrictive than the 2005 proposal.   
 
The regulations governing these adjustments are quite intricate, and most analysts have 
concentrated on their key concepts, rather than the precise process by which adjustments are 
made.  I believe this makes sense.  The Investor Model gives the IRS considerable power to 
make adjustments, and latitude to determine when they should be made.  Ultimately an 
organization considering a CSA must ask itself whether the IRS will use its powers judiciously.  
The process by which an adjustment is made is less important, as the IRS’s powers are broad.  
For example, one of the most important figures in the Investor Model is the discount rate, and 
judging an investment’s riskiness requires considerable judgment.  The IRS has the benefit of 
hindsight to determine an investment’s riskiness.  If a firm lacks confidence the IRS will use its 
increased powers prudently, the exact process by which adjustments are made is less important.       
 
In general, the Investor Model evaluates the profits earned by the PCT Payors, or the 
organizations that make payments for use of intangible assets.  The Temporary Regulations 
                                                                
177 Treas. Reg. §1.482-7T(g)(8) 
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compare the profits earned by the PCT Payor with its investment to determine whether results 
should be adjusted.  They do not test the profits earned by the PCT Payee, which is the 
organization contributing intangible assets to the CSA.  Thus if a U.S. MNE forms a CSA and 
transfer intangible assets abroad, the IRS will test the profits earned by the overseas firms to 
determine if they are excessive.  In that situation, the domestic organization’s profit will not be 
evaluated. 
 
Several figures need to be calculated to determine whether the returns are within the safe harbor 
range.  The first is the PCT Payor’s Present Value of Total Profits (PVTP).  The Temporary 
Regulations state this figure “is the present value, as of the CSA Start Date…of the PCT Payor’s 
actually experienced divisional profits or losses from the CSA Start Date through the end of the 
Adjustment Year.”178  Thus this figure is highly dependent upon the discount rate. 
 
The PVTP is divided by the PCT Payor’s Present Value of Investment (PVI).  The Temporary 
Regulations state: “the PVI is the present value, as of the CSA Start Date, of the PCT Payor’s 
investment associated with CSA Activity, defined as the sum of its cost contributions and its 
PCT Payments, from the CSA Start Date through the end of the Adjustment Year.”179  These two 
figures are used to calculate the Actually Experienced Return Ration (AERR).  The AERR is 
calculated by dividing the Present Value of Total Profits (PVTP) by the Present Value of 
Investment (PVI).180   
 
The Periodic Return Ratio Range (PRRR) is the safe harbor in the 2009 Temporary Regulations.     
Assuming documentation requirements are met, “the PRRR will consist of return ratios that are 
not less than .667 nor more than 1.5.”181  Thus a firm can earn 50% more than it invested in the 
                                                                
178Treas. Reg. §1.482-7T(i)(6)(iii)(B)  
179 Treas. Reg. §1.482-7T(i)(6)(iii)(C) 
180 Treas. Reg. §1.482-7T(i)(6)(iii)(A) 
181 Treas. Reg. §1.482-7T(i)(6)(ii) 
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CSA and fall within the IRS safe harbor.  The safe harbor range in the 2005 Regulations was .5 
to 2.0.   
 
Birnkrant (2009) writes: “the Temporary Regulations introduce the calculation of a ‘Periodic 
Trigger’ to identify circumstances in which the IRS can exercise its authority under the 
‘commensurate with income’ standard of Section 482” (p. 363).  During the first five years of a 
CSA, it is very likely that the AERR will fall below the lower range of the PRRR, so the Periodic 
trigger will not be activated.182  Birnkrant (2009) writes: “In addition, if a Periodic Trigger does 
not occur within each of the first ten years starting with the first tax year in which substantial 
exploitation of the cost shared intangibles occurs, a Periodic Trigger cannot occur thereafter”183 
(p. 304).  Thus the IRS has at least ten years in which it can make financial adjustments to the 
CSA. 
 
If the firm has not substantially required with documentation requirements for CSAs, “the PRRR 
will consist of return ratios that are not less than .8 nor more than 1.25.”184  The PRRR in the 
2005 Proposed Regulations was .67 to 1.5 in this situation.  The regulations are designed to 
encourage taxpayers to comply with documentation requirements, which are considerable.  
Birnkrant (2009) says: “The breadth and detail of the documents that must be created and 
maintained are a significant change from prior Regulations” (p. 305).  Firms need to document 
the assumptions used when the CSA is formed, they need to be updated at least annually, and 
they must be produced within 30 days of an IRS request.  
 
As discussed, the Temporary Regulations give the IRS the sole power to adjust financial results, 
when the PCT Payor’s AERR falls outside the PRRR.  Bhasin (2009) writes: “The regulations 
reaffirm the use of asymmetric periodic adjustment.  That is, when a U.S. parent company sells 
the rights to certain intangibles to its foreign subsidiary, the IRS will make an adjustment only if 
                                                                
182 Treas. Reg. §1.482-7T(i)(6)(vi)(B)(2) 
183 Ibid 
184 Treas. Reg. §1.482-7T(i)(6)(ii) 
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the buy-in payment from the foreign subsidiary is low.  No adjustment would be made if the 
foreign subsidiary overpays for the rights to the rights to these intangibles” (pp. 1-2).  The IRS 
can adjust results in a variety of ways, including re-determining the intangible development 
costs, recalculating the allocation of costs between the intangible development activity and other 
activities, improving the reliability of the method used to calculate the RAB, improving the 
financial projections used, and allocating any unallocated interest in the cost shared intangible.185  
The 2009 Proposed Regulations state “the Commissioner may make periodic adjustments with 
an open taxable year (the Adjustment Year) and for all subsequent taxable years for the duration 
of the CSA Activity with respect to all PCT Payments, if the Commissioner determines that, for 
a particular PCT (the Trigger PCT), a particular controlled participant …has realized an Actual 
Experienced Return Ratio (AERR) that is outside the Periodic Return Ratio Range (PERR).”186  
  
The process to evaluate returns and make financial adjustments to PCTs is very intricate and 
detailed.  Further, the precise method to determine arm’s length ranges of PCTs can vary 
between methods, and may involve a number of inputs (discount rate, revenue projections, cost 
projections, etc.).  But when a range of arm’s length transfer prices is calculated, the general rule 
is that the IRS will adjust the PCT to the median figure calculated.  In the preamble to the 2009 
Temporary Regulations, the Treasury Department states: “Generally Treas. Reg. §1.482-1(e)(3) 
governs the Commissioner’s ability to make an adjustment to a PCT Payment due to the 
taxpayer’s results being outside the arm’s length range.  Consistent with the principles expressed 
there, adjustment under the temporary regulations will normally be to the median.”187  The 
precise process by which these calculations are made has not attracted much attention, primarily 
because most analysts dislike other features in the Investor Model, and doubt whether firms will 
want to structure new CSAs.   
 
Keates, Muyelle and Wright (2009) summarize the issue well when they write: “Given this 
uncertainty, and subsequent room for abuse, the periodic re-evaluation that allows the IRS to 
look back at the outcome of a cost sharing arrangement and reassign shares is especially 
                                                                
185 Treas, Reg. §1.482-7T(i)(2) 
186 Treas, Reg. §1.482-7T(i)(6) 
187 Preamble to Temporary Regulations, 74 Fed. Reg.,, No. 2, p. 344, January 5, 2009. 
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troubling.  This violates one of the basic tenets of the arm’s length standard, i.e. that transfer 
prices are set at the outset of a transaction by the taxpayer and should not be based on outcomes.  
The IRS includes a safe harbour that provides protection against periodic adjustments as longer 
as the present value of discounted returns earned by participants is within a ratio of 0.67 to 1.25 
of the discounted value of their contributions.  This is not really a safe harbour, however, 
because the calculation is highly dependent on the discount rates that are used to provide those 
values, and the discount rates are subject to substantial differences of opinion” (p. 173).  A firm 
may believe its actual results fall with the IRS safe harbor, but if it determines a firm is using a 
discount rate that is too high, it may still adjust results. 
 
Further, the Investor Model seems might encourage taxpayers to calculate low values for assets 
contributed to a CSA.  If the taxpayer’s estimates of intangible assets too high, they cannot revise 
them down.  The IRS is empowered to do so, but it may have little or no incentive to do this.  
Therefore a taxpayer may be motivated to calculate a low value.  As Bhasin (2009) writes: “the 
asymmetric nature of the adjustment will motivate taxpayers to set the buy-in at the lowest 
possible price within the arm’s-length range and prepare to deal with the dispute because they 
have nothing to lose” (p. 929).   
 
However the IRS has said it will use its powers fairly, and it will not automatically reduce CSA 
buy-ins when a PCT Payor’s profit levels are above the PRRR.  Nadal (2009) writes that IRS 
international economist Michael McDonald said: “nothing about the application of a periodic 
adjustment should be mechanical and that it should instead be an exercise in asking what really 
happened.  For example, ‘where above-market returns were just due to the cost-sharing risks 
panning out, there should not be an adjustment,’ McDonald said” (p. 681).  Since the Investor 
Model gives the IRS considerable powers, a firm must ask itself whether it believes the IRS will 
enforce the rules as McDonald states.  Birnkrant (2009) says: “As a practical matter, the future 
use of CSAs will depend upon the Service’s approach to enforcement of these Temporary 
Regulations” (p. 306).   
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International Perspective on CSAs 
While this paper’s focus is upon the IRS Investor Model, it should be noted the United States is 
not the only country in the world to sanction CSAs.  A detailed examination of the rules in 
various countries is outside this paper’s scope, but it may be useful to provide international 
context by reviewing the OECD’s guidance on CSAs, due to that organization’s international 
influence. 
 
The OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations 
(2010) dedicates one chapter, or approximately fifteen pages, to similar structures.  That chapter 
outlines how related parties should organize cost sharing agreements.  They are much less 
detailed than the IRS regulations, but the general principles are very similar.  The guide 
describes these agreements as ways for related organizations within the same MNE to share the 
costs and risks of developing intangible property.  Those organizations share the costs of creating 
intangible assets, but they exploit the benefits separately.  They should also share costs based on 
the benefits each organization expects to receive under the agreement.  Firms need to make buy-
in payments to compensate related parties for intangible assets contributed to these joint working 
agreements.  However the OECD sometimes uses different terms to describe the same idea.  The 
OECD calls these agreements Cost Contribution Arrangements (CCAs) rather than Cost Sharing 
Agreements.  When one firm makes payments to another, these are called “balancing payments” 
rather than cost contributions.   
 
In addition, the OECD’s guidelines lack the details found in the 2009 Temporary Regulations.  
While the IRS identifies six different methods to value intangible assets, OECD simply says 
firms should use the arm’s length principle to value buy-ins.  It provides little guidance beyond 
that.  The OECD also says firms might form CCAs for reasons other than intangible property 
development, including purchasing property, sharing advertising costs, or creating shared service 
organizations.  Furthermore, the OECD also discusses the idea of a ‘buy-out” payment, in which 
one organization leaves the CCA and receives compensation for its contributions.  Unlike the 
IRS Regulations, the OECD guidelines also acknowledge that valuing intangible assets is 
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inherently challenging.  For example, the guidelines state: “It is unlikely to be a straightforward 
matter to determine the relative value of each participant’s contribution…” (p. 224).  
 
In January, 2011 OECD approved a new project to provide further guidance concerning 
intangible asset valuation in such agreements, indicating it also considers this to be an important 
topic.  The project is entitled “Transfer Pricing and Intangibles,” and the OECD has formed a 
working group to analyze this issue and make additional recommendations.  It is planning to 
release a discussion draft by the end of 2013.  The OECD’s announcement said this project was 
needed because: “transfer pricing issues pertaining to intangibles were identified as a key area of 
concern to governments and taxpayers, due to insufficient international guidance in particular on 
the definition, identification and valuation of intangibles for transfer pricing purposes” (p. 2).  
The OECD’s announcement indicates it will address many of the issues covered by the IRS 
Investor Model. 
Veritas 
As mentioned, U.S. taxpayers can challenge IRS positions in court.  Taxpayers sometimes argue 
that Treasury Regulations are inconsistent with the IRC, which is the most authoritative source 
of tax law.  Taxpayers may also argue the IRS is not interpreting its Treasury Regulations 
properly, or that they are inconsistent and/or ambiguous.  Thus businesses and individuals also 
evaluate court rulings to determine a tax strategy.  Since its Temporary Cost Sharing Regulations 
were released the IRS lost two important cost sharing cases, and these rulings may weaken the 
IRS’s position when it enforces these rules.    
 
In December, 2009 a Tax Court ruled in favor of Vetitas in its dispute with the IRS, in a ruling 
that was quite critical of the IRS.188  Legal experts have different opinions concerning how the 
Veritas decision will impact the 2009 Temporary Regulations, but this decision will not bolster 
                                                                
188 Veritas Software Corporation versus Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service, 133 T.C. 297 (December 10, 
2009).  
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the IRS position; it can only weaken it.  The Tax Court favored the Veritas on almost all issues it 
litigated with the IRS.   
 
Veritas was a Silicon Valley headquartered firm that developed and marketed storage 
management software.  It was acquired by Symantec in 2005.  In 1999 Veritas’s U.S.-based 
parent formed a CSA with its Irish subsidiary.  In that year the subsidiary paid the U.S. parent 
$6.3 million for preexisting intangibles contributed to the CSA.  Veritas adjusted its buy-in 
valuation several times after that date, ultimately settling in 2002 upon a $118 million buy-in.  
 
The IRS challenged that figure, supported by an outside economist who calculated Veritas-U.S. 
should have received between $1.9 and $4 billion for the intangible assets it contributed to the 
CSA.  The IRS settled on a $2.5 billion figure, and assessed Veritas-U.S. with $1.1 billion in 
back taxes and penalties for failing to value the buy-in properly.  Veritas challenged the IRS’s 
position, and the firm had to face a high standard to win its case.  Chung, Hustad, and Shapiro 
(2010) wrote: “The Tax Court, based on well-settled law, held that the IRS position is 
presumptively correct unless it is arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable” (p. 12).  But the Tax 
Court ultimately concluded that Veritas proved its case, and determined the IRS was arbitrary, 
capricious and unreasonable in enforcing its cost sharing regulations. 
 
 The IRS’s problems began before the trial began, as it could not explain what method it used to 
determine the $2.5 billion valuation.  It also replaced its first economist with a second, Dr. John 
Hatch.  Chung, Hustad and Shapiro (2010) write: “During pretrial proceedings, the IRS 
abandoned the original analysis and submitted a new analysis that reduced the amount of the 
buy-in to $1.675 billion.  The new analysis valued in the aggregate all the alleged intangibles and 
other property transferred to Veritas-Ireland and was based on a discounted cash flow or ‘income 
method’ using perpetual life” (p. 12).   
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In a strongly worded opinion, the Tax Court determined the best method to value the pre-existing 
intangibles was not the Income Method,189 but the CUT approach.  Criticizing Hatch’s analysis, 
the Tax Court said the economist:  “inflated the determination by valuing short-lived intangibles 
as if they have a perpetual useful life and taking into account income relating to future products 
created pursuant to the (cost sharing agreement). After an extensive stipulation process, a lengthy 
trial, the receipt of 1,400 exhibits, and the testimony of a myriad of witnesses, our analysis of 
whether respondent’s $1.675 billion allocation is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable hinges 
primarily on the testimony of Hatch.  Put bluntly, his testimony was unsupported, unreliable, and 
thoroughly unconvincing.  Indeed, the credible elements of his testimony were the numerous 
concessions and capitulations.”190  The court suggested minor modifications to Veritas’s 
approach to determine a final buy-in figure. 
 
The IRS argued the Veritas-U.S. parent essentially sold its intangible assets to the CSA, and this 
sale created synergistic asset values with perpetual lives.  Greenwald (2010) writes:  “the IRS 
contended that Veritas’s transfer of pre-existing intangibles was ‘akin at a sale’ and should be 
evaluated as such.  The IRS further contended that because ‘the assets collectively possess 
synergies that imbue the whole with greater value than each asset standing alone,’ it was 
appropriate to aggregate the controlled actions, rather than value each asset” (p. 259).   
 
The Tax Court concluded this was not the best method to value the intangible asset contribution.  
Chung, Hustad and Shapiro (2010) wrote: “In disagreeing with the IRS’s theory that valuing the 
transferred intangibles and other property in the aggregate was more reliable, the Tax Court 
concluded the opposite, because the IRS’s approach valued short-term intangibles as though they 
had perpetual life” (p. 2).   
 
                                                                
189 The IRS used the Income Method to value the Veritas CSA, which was formed in 1999.  However the Income 
Method was first articulated by the IRS in 2005, so the firm would have had no way to use that approach.  However 
the IRS argued this was still the best method to value that transaction.  
190 Veritas Software Corporation versus Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service, 133 T.C. 297 (December 10, 
2009). 
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Several of the court’s criticisms of the IRS have a direct bearing on the 2009 Temporary 
Regulations.  As mentioned, the Tax Court concluded the intangible assets in this case do not 
have a perpetual life.  Oates and O’Brien (2011) write: “The participants do have to pay for the 
use of the pre-existing intangible property to the extent that the intangible property continues to 
be used in later generations of new products.  At some point, however, new products no longer 
have anything to do with pre-existing intangible property.  And, at some point prior to the pre-
existing intangible property no longer being used, the pre-existing intangible property may have 
lost all value at arm’s length” (p. 14).  The Tax Court noted that Veritas provided support for its 
position that the intangibles had a useful life of four years, and that without substantial, ongoing 
research and development the products would soon be obsolete.  In his opinion, Judge Foley 
noted that even the IRS’s economist conceded the firm’s products would eventually become 
obsolete without updates, and that preexisting intangible assets would not provide value 
indefinitely. 
 
The conclusion that intangible assets have a limited life undercut the remainder of the IRS’s 
position.  The IRS used its Income Method to argue that all profits earned above the discount rate 
should be allocated from Veritas-Ireland to Veritas-US.  But if the contributed intangible assets 
have a limited life, the court determined allocating all residual profits to the U.S. parent is not 
reasonable. 
 
The Tax Court also ruled that declining royalty rates were appropriate in this case.  Chung, 
Hustad and Shapiro (2010) write: “Based on the evidence, the court noted that unrelated parties 
that license static technology that is neither subject to updates nor rights to new versions agree to 
a ramp-down of the royalty over the life of the agreements.  Based on comparable agreements, 
the court then reduced the royalty rates starting in year 2 at a rate of 33% per year” (p. 14).  This 
ruling seems to undermine the IRS position that looking to Comparable Uncontrolled 
Transactions for guidance is not a valid approach to determine a buy-in. 
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The IRS and Veritas also disagreed over what figure should be used to discount future profits.  
The IRS used a 13.7% figure in its calculations, while Veritas used a 20.47% rate.  Both used the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to calculate the figure, and the IRS and Veritas disagreed 
on how the risk-free rate, the equity risk premium, and the beta should be calculated.  Not 
surprisingly, in each case the IRS calculated a lower figure than did Veritas.  For example, the 
IRS used the yield on a 20-year U.S. Treasury bond as the risk free rate, while Veritas used the 
30-day U.S. Treasury bill rate as the risk-free rate of return.  The IRS used an equity risk 
premium of 5%.  Veritas used an 8.1% figure calculated by Ibbotson Associates for the years 
1926-1999.  The IRS employed an industry beta, while Veritas used a firm-specific beta.   The 
Tax Court supported Veritas on each figure.  Greenwald (2010) wrote: “The court therefore 
found that Dr. Hatch had used the wrong beta, the wrong equity risk premium, and thus the 
wrong discount rate with which to calculate Veritas-Ireland’s requisite buy-in payment to 
Veritas” (p. 261).   
 
The IRS ultimately decided not to appeal the Veritas decision.  But it also said it disagreed with 
the court’s decision and said the ruling would not change the way it enforces cost sharing 
regulations (Hustad and Shapiro, 2011, p. 293).  This strategy is sometimes used by the IRS 
when it believes it has a weak case to appeal, based on its specific facts and circumstances.  So it 
may wait for a case in which it believes a better chance for success. 
 
However the key question for this paper is how this ruling impacts enforcement of the 
Temporary Regulations.  Chung, Hustad and Shapiro (2010) write:  “The Tax Court’s decision 
has no direct bearing on those regulations.  However, some of the court’s determinations could 
have an impact upon the interpretation of those regulations.  For example, the court’s 
determination that a valuation using the income method based on a perpetual life that took into 
account items of income other than preexisting intangibles may be equally applicable in 
determining the life of transferred prior and contemporaneous transactions under the temporary 
regulations” (p. 15).  As mentioned, while the Temporary Regulations identify certain examples 
in which intangible assets have limited useful lives, this does not mean the IRS necessarily 
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believes this is always correct.  Thus the Tax Court’s decision in this case may bolster a 
taxpayer’s argument their intangible assets have finite lives.  Hustad and Shapiro (2011) write: 
“The additional guidance in the action on decision on intangible property useful life, however, 
may reduce or eliminate the IRS’s assertions of a perpetual life and open the door to meaningful 
discussions of useful life of preexisting intangibles” (p. 296). 
 
Greenwald (2010) thought this IRS’s position was so weak it would have lost it even if it had the 
support of the Temporary Regulations.  He wrote: “Would Veritas v, Comr. Have been decided 
different if the requisite buy-in payment had been controlled by the 2009 Temporary 
Regulations?  Probably not” (p. 263).  On the other hand, Hustad and Shapiro (2011) say: “As a 
practical matter, the IRS’s position in Veritas is likely to be much stronger when litigated under 
the temporary regulations” (p. 296).  But in either case, the Veritas case does not inspire 
confidence in the IRS, and may make taxpayers reluctant to believe that the IRS safe harbor 
offers much protection. 
Xilinx 
Shortly after losing in Veritas, in March, 2010 the IRS lost another important case in Xilinx v. 
Commissioner.191  Xilinx focused on whether CSAs should include stock-based compensation, 
such as the cost of employee stock options, in those agreements.  After years of litigation, the 9th 
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled they did not need to be included in CSAs during the years 1997-
1999.  The case is significant as Court of Appeals’ decisions are considered to be quite 
authoritative, and can only be overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court, which rarely rules on tax 
cases.  However during the years in question cost sharing regulations did not specifically state 
employee stock costs must be included in CSAs.  In 2003 the IRS modified its regulations to 
state these costs had to be included in CSAs, and this action should bolster the IRS’s case, should 
it be litigated again. 
 
                                                                
191 Xilinx Inc. v. Commissioner, 598 F. 3d 1191, 9th Cir. (March 22, 2010). 
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Xilinx is a Silicon Valley firm that designs and manufactures integrated circuits and related 
software products.  In 1995 the firm’s U.S. parent entered into a CSA with Irish subsidiaries.  
The participants did not include stock-based compensation costs in the agreement.  The IRS 
argued this compensation should have been valued and shared in the CSA, which would have 
transferred a portion of those costs to the Irish subsidiaries.  In its argument the IRS cited a 
Treasury Regulation that said “all costs” should be included between CSA participants.192  Xilinx 
provided evidence that unrelated parties that form joint venture agreements similar to CSAs do 
not share these costs.  Xilinx said their case “presents an exceptionally important question: 
Whether this Court may apply a U.S. transfer-pricing regulation in a way that is ’irreconcilable’ 
with the ‘arm’s-length standard, when that standard has always been the statutory standard for 
such transactions under U.S. law” (Greenwald, 2010, p. 116).  Beyond this, the arm’s length 
standard is supported countries throughout the world.  
 
The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals first sided with the IRS, and shortly thereafter reversed its 
position in favor of Xilinx. In its final decision it said the court was confronted with two rules 
that directly conflicted.  On the one hand, cost sharing regulations clearly stated that “all costs” 
should be included in a CSA, and the cost of stock-based compensation is a research and 
development cost.  But Xilinx also presented evidence that unrelated parties structuring similar 
joint development agreements do not share those costs.  Third parties considered stock option 
costs to be too unpredictable to include in an agreement, and determined that sharing those costs 
would not build constructive working relationships between those firms. 
 
The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals said it could resolve this difference in one of two ways.  Judge 
Noonan said one approach would be to conclude that a specific regulation should control a more 
general rule.  This approach would favor the IRS, since its regulations say all costs need to be 
shared.  But in this case Noonan felt the dominant purpose of the regulations should determine 
the outcome.  He wrote: “Purpose is paramount.  The purpose of the regulations is parity 
between taxpayers in uncontrolled transactions and taxpayers in controlled transactions.  The 
                                                                
192 Reg. §1.482-7(A)(d)(1) 
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regulations are not to be construed to stultify that purpose…” (p. 1197).  Thus he concluded the 
more general arm’s length standard had more importance than the more specific “all costs” 
regulation, and ruled in favor of Xilinx.  This is significant, in that once again courts have looked 
to the arm’s length standard, rather than cost sharing regulations, to settle a cost sharing dispute.  
And once again the courts have backed the taxpayer, rather than the IRS. 
 
While the 9th Circuit settled this particular issue, I believe one important issue is frequently 
overlooked when courts interpret the arm’s length standard.  One of the reasons unrelated firms 
do not share stock option costs is their interests are not aligned.  For example, one firm’s share 
price might increase dramatically, while another firm’s share price might remain stagnant or 
decline in value.  If this happened when two firms formed a joint venture, that organization 
would absorb stock option costs contributed by only one of the two firms.  This would appear to 
be unjust.   
 
In contrast, the interests of Xilinx and its Irish subsidiary are aligned, and they have a common 
interest is seeing the firm’s shares appreciate.  In this case, sharing the costs appears to be 
appropriate.  Horst (2009) writes: “By contrast, while Xilinx Inc. and Xilinx Ireland may be 
separate legal entities, Xilinx Inc.’s publicly traded stock reflected the consolidated results of 
both companies, not the separate results of just the U.S. parent company” (p. 860).   Further, 
Horst says: “If the R&D employees of both cost sharing participants qualify for options of the 
stock of what is in effect a join venture company, R&D related ESO costs should be shared in 
the same way” (p. 861).   
 
Horst’s reasoning is, in my opinion, correct.  When courts apply the arm’s length standard, I 
believe they should do more than simply determine what unrelated taxpayers do; they should 
also ask why they take those actions.  Unrelated firms may not want to share stock option costs, 
as they might be allocated unevenly.  Their interests diverge.  In contrast, related taxpayers have 
a common interest in higher share prices, so their goals are consistent.  Thus it makes sense for 
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them to share such costs.  The arm’s length standard should not be interpreted mechanically.  
Courts should not only evaluate what unrelated taxpayers do, they should consider why, and 
make reasonable distinctions when interpreting the actions of related and unrelated 
organizations. 
 
While the IRS lost the Xilinx case, in 2003 it redrafted its Current Regulations to state 
specifically that the cost of employee stock options must be included in CSAs.  Modifying the 
regulations significantly strengthens the IRS’s case should it be litigated again, particularly if a 
firm is seeking safe harbor in the cost sharing regulations.  Keates, Muyelle and Wright (2009) 
write: “As is often the case, when the IRS loses in Tax Court, it amends the laws and/or the 
regulations to obtain results consistent with its litigating position” (p. 167).  But if a firm does 
not seek safe harbor in the Cost Sharing Regulations, the stock option regulation has less 
authority.  A firm could form a CSA but not seek to qualify it under the IRS safe harbor rules.  If 
the IRS challenged its position, it could cite the Xilinx decision to support its position, and argue 
the stock options regulation should not apply.  It could argue its approach is consistent with the 
arm’s length standard.  In short, a taxpayer might have a much stronger position if it does not 
seek the IRS safe harbor. 
Critique of the Investor Model 
 
The 2009 Temporary Regulations have improved the Investor Model in a number of significant 
ways.  Several of these modifications made it more consistent with ways in which unrelated 
parties invest assets.  Improvements include: 
 
 Recognizing intangible assets may have temporary lives, not permanent value.  The 2009 
Temporary Regulations acknowledge that in some circumstances intangible asset values 
expire. 
 Permitting declining royalty rates as compensation for intangible assets, at least in some 
situations.  As the IRS accepted that intangible assets may have limited lives, it also 
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accepts they can decline in value.  The Tax Court subsequently supported declining 
royalty rates in its Veritas decision. 
 The 2009 Regulations provide better guidance on discount rates, at least in concept.  The 
2005 Proposed Regulations emphasized use of the Weighted Average Cost of Capital, 
which suggested that all investments a firm makes are equally risky.  The 2009 
Temporary Regulations state more clearly a discount rate should be determined by a 
specific investment’s risk.  However these conceptual improvements do not mean the 
Treasury Regulations provide sufficient practical guidance concerning how firms should 
calculate this figure.  
 The 2005 Proposed Regulations placed too much emphasis upon contributions of 
intangible assets completed prior to formation of the CSA, and too little on the intangible 
assets created during the course of the CSA.  The 2009 Temporary Regulations correct 
this, and state that platform contributions also include intangible assets created during the 
CSA’s duration. 
 Permitting MNEs additional flexibility in the way they apportion markets.  As mentioned, 
the 2005 Proposed Regulations mandated that CSA participants divide their markets into 
non-overlapping geographic territories.  The Temporary Regulations permit CSA 
participants to divide markets in other ways, such as distribution channels.  This 
additional flexibility is merited, as unrelated businesses sometimes allocate markets in 
this way. 
 
But in spite of these improvements, there are serious problems with the 2009 Temporary 
Regulations, and the way the IRS has enforced cost sharing regulations.  I would not advise firms 
to seek safe harbor there.  A safe harbor should offer advantages for both the taxpayer and the 
IRS.  In return for complying with IRS rules, the taxpayer should reduce its audit risk and the 
probability of tax adjustments and penalties.  However the 2009 Temporary Regulations do not 
appear to reduce a firm’s risk; in some ways they appear to increase it.  Beyond this, since the 
Temporary Regulations were released the IRS lost the Xilinx and Veritas cases, and both have 
established precedents that make the IRS safe harbor less attractive.  These decisions indicate 
courts are more receptive to taxpayer arguments than is the IRS.  I would advise firms to avoid 
IRS qualified CSAs for the following reasons:  
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1) The IRS argues its Investor Model is needed because CSAs are unique business 
arrangements, and this makes it difficult or impossible to find Comparable Uncontrolled 
Transactions (CUTs).  However recent decisions demonstrate courts still consider CUTs to 
be valid, and CUTs sometimes support the taxpayer’s position. 
 
When the IRS first announced its Investor Model, one of its key arguments was that IRS 
qualified CSAs were unique business arrangements, and there were no comparable business 
structures between unrelated parties.  In its preamble to the 2005 Proposed Regulations the 
Treasury Department wrote the Investor Model was needed: “because of the fundamental 
differences in cost sharing arrangements between related parties as compared to any superficially 
similar arrangements that are entered into between unrelated parties.  Such other arrangements 
typically involve a materially different division of costs, risks, and benefits than in cost sharing 
arrangements under the regulations.”193  The Treasury Department has said CSAs are unique as 
firms share costs but exploit benefits separately.  Because CSAs are unique, in the IRS’s view, 
the search for CUTs is fruitless, and the Investor Model is necessary.  Keates, Muyelle and 
Wright (2009) said they believe taxpayers that use CUTs to support buy-in valuations are likely 
to face court challenges from the IRS (p. 171). 
 
However there are several problems with the IRS’s position.  One is that it appears there are 
business arrangements very similar to CSAs.  For example, Dau (2006) noted that GM, 
DaimlerChrysler, and BMW partnered to develop a hybrid engine, which each company plans to 
use in its own autos.  He wrote “In short, under this arrangement, the participants will have 
worldwide, nonexclusive rights to the separate exploitation of the co-developed technology, a 
type of arrangement consistent with the current cost sharing regulations but not permitted under 
the Proposed Regulations” (p. 69).    
 
                                                                
193 Preamble to Proposed Regulations, 70 Fed. Reg. 51115, Section A.  Published in Federal Register August 29, 
2005.  
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Similarly, I have seen several agreements very similar to the ones Dau describes.  Hewlett-
Packard (HP) and Intel each invested hundreds of millions to develop an integrated circuit, 
Itanium, which each corporation exploited separately.  HP incorporated the integrated circuit in 
computer servers, while Intel sold the circuit to HP competitors.  The firms developed the 
integrated circuit together, but profited from the product separately.  On another occasion, HP 
and Oki Semiconductor built a printed circuit board factory in Puerto Rico.  The two companies 
shared the construction costs equally.  HP’s intended to use the facility to supply its internal 
needs for printed circuit boards in Puerto Rico, while Oki’s goal was to sell its share to external 
customers.  HP planned to sell the products internally at cost, while Oki planned to sell the 
products to trade customers at market prices.  They shared costs equally, and planned to exploit 
the benefits separately.   
 
Beyond this, in both the Xilinx and Veritas decisions, courts have resolved tax disputes by 
looking to the arm’s length standard, rather than the IRS’s cost sharing regulations.  U.S. courts 
still appear to view the arm’s length standard as the most authoritative transfer pricing principle, 
and use CUTs to resolve transfer pricing disputes.  Courts do not appear as willing to disregard 
what unrelated parties do, simply because the IRS argues that such transactions are only 
“superficially similar.”  As mentioned, in Xilinx the IRS argued its regulations stated “all costs” 
must be included in a CSA, and this must include stock option expenses.  Xilinx provided 
evidence that in similar situations unrelated taxpayers did not share stock option expenses.  The 
9th Circuit Court of Appeals sided with Xilinx, ruling that the dominant purpose of IRC 482 was 
to treat related and unrelated taxpayers equally.  This principle was considered more important 
than the “all costs” Treasury Regulation.  In the Veritas case the Tax Court had to determine the 
best method to value a CSA buy-in.  The IRS advocated its Income Method, and Veritas favored 
CUTs.  The Tax Court agreed with Veritas.  Reviewing this decision Poniachek (2010) said: 
“The Tax Court’s decision that inexact CUTs could be adjusted to yield the best method could 
have broad ramifications for transfer pricing applications” (p. 897).  Thus businesses may be in a 
good position to litigate valuation disputes with the IRS, particularly if the firms find reasonable 
CUTs and value their assets fairly. 
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2) The Investor Model assumes it is possible to value intangible assets accurately when they 
are created, or even before they are completed. This is an unrealistic assumption. 
 
The Investor Model assumes it is possible to value intangible assets accurately when they are 
created, or even before products are viable.  For example, the IRS regulations provide examples 
in which firms must estimate the cost of completing an investment, as well as revenue, product 
costs, and operating expenses decades into the future.  Firms may need to determine the project’s 
risk and its discount rate.  They need to do this before they have completed the product, know 
whether it is viable, sold one unit, determined who their competition is, and whether they are 
early or late to market.  It is not reasonable to expect a firm to do this accurately.  The Tax 
Executives Institute (TEI) described this problem well when it wrote: “It is difficult to identify in 
advance those technologies that may turn out to be critical or the platform for future 
development.  Uncertainty is inherent in the nature of R&D, and crucial developments can 
sometimes only be identified with the benefit of hindsight.  Many extremely valuable products 
(such as penicillin) were the result of serendipity, having been discovered by scientists driving 
toward different objectives” (2005, p. 635).   
 
There are many similar examples.  Years ago 3M developed an adhesives technology that later 
developed into its popular “Post-It” notes.  When the adhesive was developed the inventors did 
not contemplate it would be used to create that product.  Even if the inventors thought it could be 
used to create Post-It notes, no one could have predicted how popular they would become.  They 
were new product category and it is hard to comprehend how future revenue and profit margins 
could have been estimated reasonably.  At the same time, companies often have high 
expectations for new products that fail.  For example, earlier this year HP released tablet 
computers to compete with Apple’s popular iPads.  The firm decided to abandon that market and 
obsolete those products only seven weeks after they were introduced.  In short, it is very difficult 
to determine the commercial potential of new products before they are released.  As the court 
noted in Xilinx, taxpayers “are merely required to be compliant, not prescient.”194  The Investor 
                                                                
194 Xilinx Inc. v. Commissioner, 598 F. 3d 1191 9th Cir. (March 22, 2010). 
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Model is predicated on the false assumption a firm can accurately calculate the future revenue 
and costs of unproven technologies and products decades into the future. 
 
3) Taxpayers that seek safe harbor in the Treasury Regulations may be giving up their ability to 
revalue CSA buy-ins based on new information.  
 
The 1995 Regulations allowed taxpayers to adjust CSA buy-ins when new information became 
available.  As mentioned, Veritas originally valued its CSA buy-in at $6.3 million, and 
subsequently increased it to $118 million.  These changes made the buy-in more reasonable and 
also increased U.S. tax revenue. 
 
The 2009 Temporary Regulations changed this rule.  The Investor Model gives the IRS the sole 
right to adjust CSA buy-ins after the fact.  If a firm underestimates the value of a new 
technology, the IRS is empowered to increase the buy-in.  If the firm overestimates the value of a 
new technology, it does not have the authority to revise that figure.  Taxpayers face a real 
disadvantage.  They must value a CSA buy-in accurately long before they have sufficient 
information to do this.  In addition, this may incentivize some to undervalue the buy-in. 
 
The 2009 Temporary Regulations put the IRS in a stronger position if disputes are litigated.  The 
taxpayer has only one chance to value the CSA buy-in accurately, at its inception.  The IRS has 
several chances to get it right, and it has the benefit of hindsight.  This puts the IRS in a very 
advantageous position vis-à-vis the taxpayer, and I believe it increases the taxpayer’s risk.  As 
Birnkrant (2009) says: “the playing field is uneven to the extent that the IRS can use perfect 
hindsight and periodic adjustments to revisit the pricing of platform contributions that produce 
successful cost shared intangibles” (p. 306). 
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If a firm does not seek the safe harbor in the 2009 Temporary Regulations, it has a stronger 
position that it has the authority to make such changes.  Firms can rely upon the “commensurate 
with income” standard in IRC 482, and argue they have the right to make such adjustments, 
which they have had in the past.  The ability to adjust CSA buy-ins when additional information 
is available is an important tool, one that firms may be giving away if they agree to form an IRS 
qualified CSA.  In the Veritas case, the courts determined its $118M buy-in was more reasonable 
than the IRS’s $1.675 billion figure.  But if Veritas had been bound by its original $6.3 million 
figure, perhaps courts would have ruled against that firm.   
 
4) The IRS gives far too little guidance concerning how discount rates should be determined, 
which diminishes the value of the safe harbor. 
 
As mentioned, in several ways the 2009 Temporary Regulations give taxpayers better conceptual 
guidance concerning how discount rates should be determined.  They place less emphasis on the 
WACC, allow firms to determine project specific discount rates, and identify other ways in 
which discount rates should reflect risk.  But the Veritas case demonstrates the practical 
difficulties firms and the IRS may have agreeing upon discount rates.   The IRS said 13.7% was 
the appropriate discount rate, and Veritas calculated 20.47%.  A seven point difference can 
create large differences in present value calculations.  The IRS and Veritas could not even agree 
on how any of the three components of CAPM (the risk-free rate, the equity risk premium, or the 
appropriate beta) should be determined.     
 
The Temporary Regulations provide very little practical guidance concerning how discount rates 
should be determined.  IRS economist Michael McDonald acknowledges the IRS’s Temporary 
Regulations are quite general, saying:  “But the guidance beyond that is the old, ‘choose the 
appropriate rate,’ he said” (Stewart, 2011, p. 337).  The discount rate is one of the most 
important factors in the Investor Model, and the IRS could provide better guidance than this.  
When the Investor Model was first announced the Tax Executives Institute thought this would be 
a significant problem.  It wrote: “Instead, a discount rate that takes into account the unique risks 
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and rewards of a CSA must be developed – a highly subjective exercise likely to increase 
controversy between the taxpayer and the IRS” (2005, p. 631).  The 2009 Regulations do not 
address this issue. 
 
The regulations could specifically state that discount rates should be determined by using 
CAPM, which was used by both the IRS and Veritas in that case.  I recognize that CAPM is not 
universally accepted, but it is the best model available and it provides structure and guidance, 
which both taxpayers and the IRS need.  The regulations could specifically state how firms 
should calculate the risk-free rate of return, which might be the 30-day Treasury bill rate, the 
figure used by Veritas.  Perhaps the studies by Ibbotson Associates, which the Tax Court 
referenced in its Veritas decision, could be used to determine the equity risk premium.  The 
Treasury Regulations could also propose a process to determine a CSA’s beta.  In Veritas, the 
IRS used an industry beta, and the court agreed with Veritas that a firm-specific beta was a better 
approach.  The IRS could suggest a process to determine a firm-specific beta.  The regulations 
might also state that if a firm is investing its assets to enter a different industry, it could use the 
beta from that industry to determine the appropriate beta.  My purpose here is not to state exactly 
how those regulations should read, but to suggest there are ways the IRS could provide better 
guidance on this important topic.  Without improved direction on discount rates, I am not sure 
why a firm would want to structure an IRS qualified CSA.  
 
5) The Investor Model is very sensitive to minor changes in financial assumptions, and small 
changes in assumptions can have large financial consequences. 
 
Discounted cash flow/profit analysis is very sensitive to the financial assumptions used.  This 
can be demonstrated by using one of the IRS’s own examples included in its Temporary 
Regulations.  I will use the same example that was used to explain the Residual Profit Split 
Method.195   
                                                                
195 Treas. Reg. §1.482-7T(g)(7)(v)Example 1 
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In that example, a US Parent (USP) and its Foreign Subsidiary (FS) collaborated to create and 
market a new, highly portable storage device.  USP owned all the rights to the U.S. market, and 
it formed a CSA to market the product internationally.  The U.S. Parent developed the product 
and contributed the technology.  FS contributed marketing intangibles.  The firm determined that 
60% of the overseas value was contributed by the technology and 40% by the marketing 
intangibles.  The Temporary Regulations provided estimates of the cost to complete the project, 
revenue and growth rate estimates, and a variety of cost estimates.  Future profits were 
discounted by 17.50%.  Present Value of Total Profits in overseas markets was estimated to be 
$1.319 billion.  Since USP contributed 60% of the value, FS owed it $791 million for those 
contributions.  
 
To determine how sensitive the Investor Model is to minor changes in assumptions, I used the 
IRS revenue, cost and discount rate assumptions to recreate the IRS’s results.  Using its figures, I 
calculated the PVTP to be $1.27 billion, which is within 4% of the IRS’s calculations.  I did not 
have access to the IRS model, and had to make several assumptions in my calculations, which 
may account for the difference.  In any case, my objective was to determine how sensitive the 
Investor Model is to minor changes in assumptions, and this difference does not affect that 
objective.  The comparisons that follow are based on my calculation that the PVTP was $1.27 
billion. 
 
Three assumptions were changed.  First, the IRS assumed a discount rate of 17.50% in their 
analysis.  I increased the discount rate to 20.47%.  This was the discount rate Veritas used and 
the Tax Court supported.  In that case the IRS and the taxpayer used discount rates that differed 
by approximately seven percentage points, so this change was significantly less than the 
difference in that case.  And the 20.47% rate may not be unreasonable, as both Veritas and the 
hypothetical firm in the IRS example both produced high capacity, storage management 
products.  
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Second, I assumed the firm fell 10% short of the IRS revenue estimates each year.  For example, 
the IRS calculations assumed product revenue would peak at $1.806 billion by year ten, and I 
reduced this figure to $1.626 billion in that year.  I believe any organization capable of projecting 
revenue ten years in the future that accurately would be doing this extraordinarily well. 
And third, the IRS assumed that routine costs, which would include the cost of the product, plus 
distribution and selling expenses, would be 45% of revenue.  I increased this figure to 50% of 
revenue.  Again, this seems to be within the margin for error, and forecasting results that 
accurately would be a remarkable achievement. 
 
Using these assumptions, the Present Value of Total Profits decreased from $1.27 billion to $491 
million, a 61% decline.  This would reduce the payment for intangibles by $466 million, to $295 
million.  Thus relatively minor changes in assumptions can have a large impact upon PVTP, and 
thus the CSA buy-in figure.  The IRS and taxpayer might also reach different conclusions 
concerning how much value each CSA participant contributed.  If we assumed the USP 
contributed only 55% of the value, rather than 60%, the PCT payment would drop to 
approximately $270 million, a decrease of 65% from the original figure.  In short, relatively 
minor changes in assumptions about revenues, costs and discount rates, along with the value 
contributed by each CSA participant, can cause substantial changes to the buy-in.  This may 
make firms reluctant to form an IRS qualified CSA, particularly since the IRS insists it is the 
only organization empowered to change CSA buy-ins, and it provides little practical guidance on 
discount rates. 
Conclusion 
 
The 2009 Temporary Regulations have improved the Investor Model in a number of respects.  
They recognize that valuable intangible assets are created during the course of a CSA.  They also 
back away from unreasonable positions that intangible assets always have infinite lives, prohibit 
declining royalty rates, and require firms to divide markets into non-overlapping geographic 
territories.  And in some ways they improve guidance on discount rates, though further 
improvements are needed. 
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Despite these improvements, I believe there are two important ways in which the Investor Model 
should be improved.  First, the IRS should allow taxpayers to adjust CSA buy-ins when new 
information becomes available.  If the IRS insists it has the sole right to change CSA buy-ins 
after the fact, it gives that organization too much power, and thus makes CSAs much less 
attractive to taxpayers.  Valuing intellectual property at the time it is created is inherently very 
difficult to do, and requiring taxpayers to determine this figure accurately at inception is 
unreasonable.  It also may encourage some taxpayers to undervalue buy-ins, since they have no 
opportunity to revise this figure down.  In other situations it can also reduce U.S. tax revenue.  
As mentioned, Veritas increased its buy-in from $6.3 million to $118 million when more 
information became available. 
 
Second, the IRS needs to improve discount rate guidance.  Its “choose the appropriate discount 
rate” approach provides too little taxpayer direction.  The IRS might suggest that taxpayers use 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model, which both Veritas and the IRS used in that case.  It can outline 
a process by which firms can calculate the risk-free rate of return, the equity risk premium, and a 
beta to use.  Again, without such guidance, I am not sure why taxpayers would want to structure 
new, IRS qualified CSAs.  Further, asking a Tax Court to rule on the appropriate discount rate, 
which it did in the Veritas case, does not seem to be the best process to resolve such issues. 
 
As the regulations are currently drafted, I would not recommend that firms structure new, IRS 
qualified CSAs.  Because the regulations give the IRS additional powers, and its guidance on 
discount rates is so general, a taxpayer needs to believe the IRS will enforce its powers fairly if 
they seek the IRS safe harbor.  Unfortunately, the IRS’s track record does not inspire confidence, 
particularly in the Veritas case.  The IRS argued for a $2.5 billion CSA buy-in, and reduced that 
figure when it could not state what method it used to calculate that figure.  Nearly one year after 
the 2009 Treasury Regulations were released the IRS argued intangible assets have unlimited 
lives, against declining royalty rates, and used questionable methods to determine discount rates.  
Veritas persuaded a Tax Court the IRS’s position was arbitrary, capricious and unfair.  If a firm 
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seeks safe harbor in the 2009 Temporary Regulations, it may be giving important rights to the 
IRS, and it has no assurance the IRS will use its powers in a fair and even-handed manner.   
 
Birnkrant (2009) made an excellent point when he said:  “As a practical matter, the future use of 
CSAs will depend on the Service’s approach to enforcement of these Temporary Regulations.  
Implementing a CSA will impose unacceptable risks, unless IRS teams acknowledge the 
intended flexibility and give appropriate credit for contributions of non-U.S. participants.  In this 
regard, the Service’s current approach of demonizing CSAs, such that field economists and 
international examiners treat a CSA as a ruse to avoid proper U.S. taxation of valuable U.S. 
platform contributions and treat platform contributions of non-U.S. participants as completely 
lacking in value, is not encouraging” (p. 306). 
 
Naegele (2010) also believes firms will not want to form CSAs, given the new rules.  He writes:  
“The primary problem with the new Regulations is that while Treasury’s intention was to close 
the loophole in the old Regulations, the New Regulations are so restrictive and overzealous in 
their attempt to fix the problem that many companies will not enter into cost sharing agreements 
in the first instance.  As a result, U.S. multinationals are at a competitive disadvantage compared 
with other countries, which will result in less overall U.S. revenue and subsequently less capital 
to tax.  These Regulations, therefore, fail to achieve their purpose of generating more revenue for 
the U.S. Treasury” (p.59). 
 
 Kochman (2009) agrees, writing: “New CSAs will, however, have to jump through a number of 
hoops and will be subject to potentially onerous periodic adjustment rules for at least 10 years” 
(p.555).  He also says “Although the Temporary Regulations include a number of taxpayer-
friendly modifications to the Proposed Regulations, they retain the periodic adjustment rules that 
many taxpayers and practitioners have argued effectively eliminate any substantial upside a non-
US participant might gain from participating in a CSA.  That being the case, the new rules are 
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likely to discourage many taxpayers from incurring the substantial upfront costs necessary to 
enter into a CSA” (p. 563). 
 
Based on the above, I would not advise firms to seek safe harbor in the 2009 Temporary 
Regulations.  I acknowledge that this approach may increase certain taxpayer risks.  The IRS 
may be more likely to challenge a firm’s position, as it is not protected by the safe harbor.  But at 
the same time, the safe harbor does not appear to provide much protection.  The Investor Model 
requires tremendous foresight to project financial results accurately, and this is difficult to do.  
And even if a firm believes it has done everything to operate within the safe harbor, the IRS may 
still determine a firm used the wrong discount rate, and adjust the CSA buy-in. 
 
The IRS appears to have a much stronger position when supported by the Temporary 
Regulations, which may discourage taxpayers from seeking safe harbor there.  The IRS can 
adjust CSA buy-ins after the fact, while the taxpayer is bound by its first estimate.  If litigated, 
the IRS’s valuation may appear to be much more reasonable to a court.  The regulations also 
discourage the use of CUTs.  They specifically state stock option costs must be included in 
CSAs.  The taxpayer seems to have a better case when it does not seek safe harbor, and turns to 
the courts and the arm’s length standard.  It has important legal precedents to support its position, 
in the Xilinx and Veritas decisions. 
 
While courts appear more taxpayer-friendly than the IRS, to win in court firms must demonstrate 
the IRS is arbitrary, capricious and unfair when it enforces it rules.  This is a high legal standard, 
so it involves risk.  If disputes are taken to court, a firm also faces large legal expenses.  But on 
balance, it seems to me that the U.S. legal system is more receptive to taxpayer arguments than is 
the IRS, and I would prefer to rely upon the arm’s length standard than the 2009 Treasury 
Regulations.   Further, a firm can reduce its risk by not taking overly aggressive positions in a 
CSA.  It can use its powers to adjust CSA buy-ins if its investments are very successful, and 
create reasonable values the IRS will be less likely to challenge, and can sustain legal challenge. 
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So firms do have ways to manage and reduce their audit risk without seeking the IRS safe 
harbor. 
 
Negotiating an Advanced Pricing Agreement (APA) with the IRS is another way a firm could 
reduce its risk.  In an APA, a taxpayer and the IRS agree upon a firm’s transfer pricing policies, 
and the IRS monitors compliance with the APA.  Birnkrant (2009) says: “An alternative is to 
protect against a challenge to the valuation and periodic adjustments through an APA.  
Taxpayers will need to decide whether the cost of an APA and the time required to secure the 
APA are worth the benefit of eliminating the ongoing risk and uncertainty” (p. 306).  Since the 
Xilinx and Veritas decisions were reached, it appears to me taxpayers are in a stronger position to 
negotiate a reasonable APA, and the IRS should recognize this.   
 
To summarize, I believe the IRS’s Investor Model does not offer an attractive safe harbor for 
taxpayers.  It shifts important powers towards the IRS, and it provides too little guidance on 
discount rates.  Further, the IRS has taken unreasonable positions since the Temporary 
Regulations were released, which undermines its credibility and assurances it will use its powers 
judiciously.  Given the Veritas and Xilinx decisions, a taxpayer might find other ways to reduce 
its audit risk.  One approach would be to negotiate an APA with the IRS, and use the recent court 
decisions to support its negotiating position. If this approach is not successful, a firm can still 
structure a CSA, but it will need to be prepared to demonstrate that its provisions are consistent 
with the arm’s length standard.  A firm using this approach could reduce its audit risk by valuing 
its assets in a conservative, fair, reasonable, and defensible manner. 
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